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PREFACE
Between 1970 and 1972 I was employed as a government research 
librarian with the Montana State Library. During that period my 
major responsibility entailed assisting as a librarian those who en­
gaged in research, planning, policy formulation, and legal drafting. 
The major problem before these ad hoo planning groups was to guide 
Montana in attempting to guard a nearly pristine landscape from rape 
by impending and long overdue modernization. The task immersed me in 
a body of literature which pivoted around geography, law, history, 
and conservation, and the disorder of this literature incited me to 
further study.
I sought that study in the formalized atmosphere of the 
Department of Geography at the University of Oklahoma. There, Dr. 
James Bohland directed my study of rural settlement geography and 
strongly encouraged me to include in my program the formal study of 
law. Professor Harold Young of the School of Law at the University 
of Oklahoma directed this inquiry. In his lectures on the law of 
real property. Professor Young made it abundantly clear that common 
law was essentially synonymous with land law and that common law tied 
land to history. The authority to use and convey land rests in the 
land's history or "chain of title," and when the chain lacks perfec­
tion dilemmas result which are resolved through reference to the re­
solution of similar historical crises. Even where the burden of 
history on land is overruled by newly evolved pressures, any
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revolutionary act is undertaken only with serous consideration.
Professor Young's emphasis upon the relationship of land to 
history led me to inquire more deeply into the history of the American 
institutions of property. Dr. Norman Crockett of the Department of 
History, the University of Oklahoma, guided my efforts on this 
portion of my graduate education.
By this point my studies focused on the point at which tradi­
tional geographic inquiry merges with law and history. Only an in­
triguing research problem was lacking, and even this began to emerge. 
U. S. Bureau of Land Management maps of western American states reveal 
a peculiar landlord controlling up to millions of acres of land in 
each state. This landlord is the state itself. Why do the states own 
this land? How do they use and manage it? What effect has it had 
upon land use and the land tenure of others? What effect might it 
have upon land use and land tenure?
Fundamental to these questions, however, was a salient problem 
which first had to be addressed. What could conceivably explain the 
distribution, generally regular as a checkerboard, of the state lands? 
A survey of state enabling acts answered both the question of why 
these lands are owned by the states and why the expected ownership 
pattern is regular. The lands were given to new states by the federal 
government to subsidize the cost of public institution development 
during the turbulent frontier period. The lands are regularly dis­
tributed because, with a few exceptions, the lands were given according 
to such, a pattern.
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The explanation to the distributional question presented the 
fundamental research problem before this study. The exceptions to 
the regular distribution are great enough to suggest that the state 
enabling acts did not operate in fact as their language suggests.
The research question then became, "If the state enabling legislation 
did not provide explanation for the modern distribution of state 
lands, what factors did?"
Indeed, multitudinous, rather than singular, forms of the law 
acted as variables in determining the modern distribution of state 
lands. There was the law and policy dictated by Congress to the 
states; the law and policy which the states evolved; the law and 
policy which the states delegated to politicians; and the law and 
policy which politicians delegated to bureaucrats. Indeed, in this 
study this hierarchical legal structure is assumed as a conceptual 
model from the outset so that the major research task is one of ex­
plaining its operation rather than empirically deriving or testing 
its existence.
In the state under study, Montana, the pivotal source of
power in shaping the modern distribution of the estate was the
political decision-maker. The politician, in implementing the laws 
and policies of others, possessed delegated authority in his own 
right, could interpret laws when necessary irrespective of their con­
text or intent; and so long as he could avert public wrath and
judicial review, act as if he were above law. With such power, the
politician could make either a glorious success or shambles of an 
important portion of national land policy, the state land grants.
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Again in the case of Montana, politicians appear to have used their 
power in the best interests of the state as those interests were 
understood at the time of decision-making. Still, possessing almost 
limitless power, Montana's politicians could have made relative suc­
cess into absolute failure by substituting only a little selfishness 
for selflessness.
If the politician's power was frightening, the chaotic socio­
economic landscape upon which he deployed this power was terrifying.
In the chaos of the hour, the decision-maker had little alternative 
but "to do something, even something wrong." With uncertain laws,
little data, and abundant advice, it is a wonder indeed that Montana's
politicians sought at all the public good.
The temptation in Montana is to laud the politicians but cri­
ticize the system in which they made their decisions. Specifically, 
the system is criticized on two grounds. First, those who wrote the 
laws did so with more respect for tradition than for the socio-econo­
mic environment in which administrators actually operated. Law, a 
form of theory, was segregated from reality and the result was to sow 
the seeds of potential disaster. Second, the decision-maker was 
delegated power but made accountable only through the most absurdly 
difficult processes. Lack of accountability handed the decision­
maker the instrument needed to convert potential disaster into history. 
That Montana's politicians chose not to reap the crop is laudable but 
not comforting.
The conclusion for the modern administration of politico- 
legal systems is that such innovations as "administrative account­
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ability" and "legislative research" are utterly necessary to sound 
legal constructions and as instruments which protect the decision­
maker from weakness both in his own character and in society's.
This study has been accomplished only through the encour­
agement of my graduate committee: Drs. James Bohland, Richard
Nostrand, Norman Crockett, Christopher Smith, and Thomas Wilbanks. 
Additionally, Professor Harold Young has encouraged my pursuit of 
the subject.
The selection of Montana as a study area was based in part 
upon the excellent state land records in Montana and for this minor 
administrative miracle unknown former state land administrators are 
thanked. The records would be little, however, without the support 
of the Montana Department of State Land and Investments. For their 
assistance, patience, and guidance, I thank the former Commissioner, 
Mr. Ted Schwinden, and the present Acting Commissioner, Mr. Leo Berry. 
Further, the state land department of several western states, parti­
cularly New Mexico and Oklahoma, are thanked for assisting me in final 
selection of the study state, Montana.
The contribution of Mr. Dick Lewis in construction of the 
cartographic presentations in this study are acknowledged. My wife, 
Karen, and children, Karl Oskar and Molly Kathleen, have been toler­
ant to an excess. To these and many others not mentioned I offer my 
grateful thanks.
THE BIBLIOGRAPHY--TECHNICAL NOTES
The central research question has required the considera­
tion of a wide variety of literature generally foreign to scholarly 
geographic consideration. For brevity, the nature and citation of 
this literature are discussed here rather than in the text of the 
study per se. Of greatest concern is the primary archival and 
formal legal literature.
Throughout the text an internal scientific citation system 
is employed. Only secondary sources are included in the "Biblio­
graphy." Standard legal sources are treated as primary sources, 
cited according to acceptable methods in the legal profession, and 
not included in the bibliography. Annual reports of Montana's 
state officials and agencies are, as a matter of convenience, treated 
as secondary sources and listed under "Montana" in the text and 
bibliography. No complete collection of official and agency reports 
is known to exist. The combined collections of the Library and 
Archives of the Montana Historical Society and the Montana State 
Library make the most complete collection available.
In addition to standard legal sources, the data for this 
study came from three primary sources. The first is the Minutes 
of the Montana Board of State Land Commissioners maintained by the 
Montana Department of State Lands and Investments in Helena. The 
Minutes contain a brief record of each official meeting of the 
Montana Board of State Land Commissioners. In the text of this
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study, reference is made to the Minutes with the date of the parti­
cular meeting noted.
The second primary source is the records of correspondence 
and agreements in the files of the Montana Department of State 
Lands. Citation of this source describes the document as completely 
as possible and notes the file where it is maintained. No descrip­
tive information is given in the citation if the descriptive infor­
mation necessary to identify the document is obvious from the text.
The third source of primary data is the collected papers of 
the Governors of Montana maintained by the Library and Archives of 
the Montana Historical Society. A cited document is described as 
far as possible, and the collection, box, and folder where the docu­
ment is maintained is given. The designation is followed by "MHS"
(i.e., 35a-136-27 MHS). Again no information is given if the cita­
tion is obvious from the immediately proceeding text.
Dates of land selection and acquisition were obtained from 
the records used to document the chain of title to Montana grant
lands. These technical records are maintained by the Montana De­
partment of State Lands and Investments. No reference to these
technical legal records are given in this study.
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MONTANA BECOMES A LANDLORD 
A STUDY OF STATE LAND SELECTION
CHAPTER I
STATE LAND ESTATES: A PROBLEMATIC DISTRIBUTION
Congress requires that each state formally acknowledge 
federal sovereignty over unsettled land prior to admission to the 
Union. In exchange. Congress traditionally gives land to the new 
states for the support of public institutions and vital improve­
ments. Known as grant lands, these land gifts must be managed as 
a sacred trust to produce revenue for the support of beneficiaries, 
the land-grant institutions.
The spatial distribution of the land-grant estates in seven­
teen western states is a variable contributing to revenue producing 
capacity. Today, the estates' spatial distributions are nearly im­
mutable. This has not always been the case. Under the general land 
disposal laws of the United States, state officials possessed sub­
stantial latitude in the selection and acquisition of estate lands 
so that the policies and laws affecting land selection and acquisi­
tion amounted to management of the distribution of the state lands.
The objective of this study is to analyze the body of policy 
and law which affected the spatial pattern of state-land estates. 
Specifically, policies and laws are analyzed through study of the 
geographic patterns of state grant lands and through the decision­
making institutions and processes that contributed to the evolution
1
2of state-land ownership patterns. I have attempted to meet these 
objectives by seeking answers to the following questions:
1. What has been the general nature of the administrative 
structure in which land selection and acquisition decisions were 
made?
2. What locational decisions were permitted to be made by 
state administrators, and what locational decisions were dictated 
through the federal land grants?
3. What were the policies and objectives subscribed to by 
state administrators as they made the locational decisions implicit 
in land selection?
4. What were the conflicts which the state administrators 
encountered in making state land selections under various policies, 
and how did these conflicts influence either policy or state land- 
selection decisions?
This chapter examines the rationale of the research objec­
tive. Chapter II conceptually examines the question of the admin­
istrative structure in which land selections were made. Identifi­
cation of important locational decisions made by state officials 
necessitates, in Chapter III, identification of state lands which 
have been subject to important decisions, and in Chapter IV, the 
dating of those decisions. Through the primary sources. Chapter V 
examines the federal-state land conflicts which have enhanced the 
state's freedom to select land. Chapter VI examines the objectives 
to which state officials subscribed in making land selections and 
the local conflicts encountered in meeting those objectives.
3Chapter VII summarizes the findings of this study.
The Rationale for the Research Objective 
State lands have hardly been noticed, much less studied in 
any depth. Durrenberger (1972), encountering the problematic state 
lands in a study of the Colorado Plateau, has probably made the 
most extensive geographical observation of state lands. To Durren­
berger, land tenure and fragmentation on the Colorado Plateau is 
hopelessly complex, and he attributes much of the condition to con­
flicting, inconsistent, and ül-conceived federal land policies.
The state land grants were simply the last straw in this chain of 
events. Durrenberger (1972, p. 232) states:
The difficulties created by these [federal land disposal 
and reservation] policies might have been solved had it 
not been for yet another set of policies adopted by the 
federal government. The states had been given sections 
1, 16, 32, and 36 of every township for school purposes, 
and were given authority to select several million more 
acres for other purposes. Because of the late date at 
which they achieved statehood, Arizona and New Mexico 
have had a difficult time finding enough land from which 
to make their selections, and in 1971 they had not com­
pleted their task. Both states adopted policies which 
have tended to keep these lands in state ownership, 
leasing rather than selling the land. Conflicts were 
inevitable when individuals, corporations, government 
agencies, and Indian tribes were all acquiring land at 
virtually the same time, and some still have not been 
settled.
Indeed, state land tenure conflicts have not been resolved 
in many western states, and there is evidence that the conflicts 
are worsening. For example, much of the American West is becoming 
the energy storehouse for the nation. Yet energy development, with 
all that attends it, cannot be viewed without reservation. The 
advance of rural subdivision, tourism, recreation, and closure of
4private lands to the public are contributing to a mounting land 
crisis in the American West, The land crisis has inspired poli­
tical criticism of land institutions as well as experimentation 
with new politico-legal formulations which may be, at best, viewed 
as innovative, and, at worst, as radical aberrations of Anglo- 
American real property traditions. That the state lands contri­
bute to land tenure complexity in the West cannot be doubted, but 
the lands also present an opportunity for the states to formulate 
a new land ethic. Yet before it is assumed that state lands are a 
cure-all for land problems, we must realize that scholars have de­
voted much attention to state lands, and the results reveal a dis­
mal history of state land management.
The major literature on state lands has been reviewed and 
synthesized by Gates (1968, pp. 285-340). It is necessary to re­
evaluate a portion of this literature in the context of this study. 
The first scholar to study state lands, Knight (1885), exposed the 
tragic abuse of grant lands in the Old Northwest. In 1902,
Schafer ably traced land grant concepts into colonial history. 
Orfield's (1915) classic study traced land grant concepts into the 
obscurity of the middle ages and simultaneously revealed abuse upon 
abuse of Minnesota's state lands. Typically, for example, lumber 
companies would buy northern Minnesota timber lands "on time," 
make a single payment, strip the timber, and default on further 
payments. One jurisdiction learned little from another--Anderson 
(1940, p. 98) found similar practices in Montana as late as 1909.
The Depression, which was accompanied by substantial
5interest in land, generated a plethora of state land studies.
Most, searching for theft and crime, concerned aspects of finan­
cial management. Two studies conducted in Montana are worth 
further notice, however. Anderson (1940) rendered a valuable ser­
vice by simply summarizing the state land administrative practices 
in Montana. Murray (1942) examined the similarity of Montana 
state land rental rates to rental rates on private land. Cole 
(1968, 1966) asked the same question of Colorado's state lands.
Both concluded that state lands have been rented for less than 
similar private lands and pointed to this as an example of poor 
management and abuse of state lands.
Lokken (1942) and Sheldon (1936) studied land administra­
tion in Iowa and Nebraska, respectively. Both studies reinforce 
the annals of state land abuse. Typically, Iowa and Nebraska sold 
their lands to settlers at the same price as federal homesteads 
except that, unlike federal homesteads, the states offered credit. 
The low sale price, and the fact that lands tended to be sold at 
the same price through time, has been concluded to be an abuse of 
state lands. Congress, aware of this, placed minimum sale prices 
on lands granted to subsequent states. The unreasonably high 
minimum sales price kept land in state administration until manage­
ment experience was attained and officials became seasoned land­
lords. Durrenberger's (1972, p. 232) observation that the states 
have adopted policies " . . .  which have tended to keep these lands 
in state ownership . . . "  must be contested--the policies were 
forced on, rather than adopted by, the states.
6Even with this measure of protection, the lands could be 
selected to gain control of vital topographic features to the ad­
vantage of specialized leasees. Mosk (1943), for example, found 
that New Mexico state land selections gave large ranchers de facto 
control of substantial tracts of the public domain. The practice 
is similar to the private selection of forest lieu lands in the 
Sand Hills of Nebraska which McIntosh (1974) described. The 
critical difference is that private land selection in the Sand 
Hills of Nebraska involved only the private abuse of a poorly 
written law, while the conditions described by Mosk in New Mexico 
required state assistance in land selections which, if not crim­
inal in the letter of the law, were at least ill-advised.
Gladen's (1970) study of Arizona state lands completes the 
list of relevant studies. Gladen summarizes a century and a half 
of criminal and near-criminal abuse of state lands. The abuses 
vary from vanishing accounting ledgers to state exploitation of 
its own estate culminating in a monumental U. S. Supreme Court 
case, (Lassers v. Arizona Highway Department, 385 U.S. 458, 460;
17 L.Ed.2d 515 [1967]).
The academic literature indicates that the states have 
been incapable of managing land. But is this a fair conclusion?
With the exception of Anderson's (1940) study, all of the scholars 
described poor management and selection. None studied in depth 
the system which produced the poor management, and none realized 
that previous land administrators lacked complete knowledge of 
future events. I think a sounder approach is to assume the position
7of previous decision-makers and to seek to understand the process 
which led to seemingly unfortunate decisions. This approach per­
mits a glimpse of the decision-making process itself without re­
quiring any a priori evaluation of the decisions which that pro­
cess generated.
Such a view of decision-making is needed if the institu­
tional organization which engenders errors is to be altered. The 
need for greater understanding of the decision-making processes, 
rather than evaluation of the decisions per se, should be obvious 
to anyone who has attempted to enter the literature of decision­
making at the state level.
Beyond the problem of decision-making at the state level 
is the more general question of public decision-making. The appli­
cation of systems modeling to decision-making has been notably un­
successful, while game theory has produced slightly better results 
since it recognizes the crisis nature of each decision. It is 
precisely the crisis oriented decision-making process described by 
game theory that the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 (83 
Stat. 852) and various similar state laws seek to thwart. Yet 
these laws, which require decision-makers to search broadly into 
the future to evaluate the potential consequences of their deeds, 
do not substantially alter the decision-making process. The suc­
cess of any law which seeks to alter decision-making without altering 
the decision-making system is doubtful. This research permits a long 
range empirically based review of the public decision-making process 
and the tools necessary to sustain it. Such empirical research is 
necessary if we are to alter the decision-making processes.
8The Geographic Study of Law and Public Policy 
The major issue in this research is to analyze the policy 
and decision-making process which affected the spatial distribu­
tion of state estates. The data necessary to adequately conduct 
the research include technical legal doctrines and principles. It 
is fair to ask if analysis of such material is not more properly 
conducted by legal scholars and political scientists rather than 
geographers. It is my conviction that geographers have effectively 
inquired into the spatial efficacy of law and public policy, a sub­
field which I am calling geographical jurisprudence. Further, geo­
graphical jurisprudence is logical and necessary to the development 
of at least one of the widely accepted and well established themes 
of geographical research and inquiry--namely, the "man-land" or 
"ecological" theme.
In order to understand the contribution of geographers to 
jurisprudence, it is necessary to understand the nature of juris­
prudence. Jurisprudence is the science of law. Traditionally, it 
is formal, abstract, and without concern for "questions of moral 
or political policy" (Black, 1968, p. 992). In practice, however, 
legal systems, often seeking to implement political, religious and 
moral philosophies, are concerned with questions of moral and poli­
tical policy. The dilemma for American law is that the underlying 
political philosophy is amoral so that the legal system must be 
amoral. Without a predetermined moral order to enforce, the objec­
tive of the legal system is uncertain.
The easiest substitute for moral order is social order. By
9this approach the legal system seeks to implement social objectives. 
Those who subscribe to this line of thought are known as legal posi­
tivists (Davitt, 1959), and to them there is an obvious need for a 
system of jurisprudence which measures the efficacy of the legal 
order's social impact. The resultant field of inquiry is sociolo­
gical jurisprudence. Legal positivism is beset with logical dilem­
mas and is not easily applied without producing questionable results; 
but to social scientists sociological jurisprudence is imperative, 
and may be pursued without concern for the philosophical and logical 
quandaries which generated it.
While legal positivism was emerging, geographers were de­
fining the domain and research goals of their own discipline. Among 
the lines of inquiry which emerged was the "man-land" (Pattison,
1964) or "ecological" (Taaffe, 1974) theme. The goal of this ap­
proach is understanding the functional relationships between man 
and his landscape. This tradition is not the only acceptable ap­
proach to geography, but it is intellectually productive and ' mse- 
quently well-established. Employment of the ecological theme creates 
recognition of the importance of law in explaining the functional 
relationship between man and the land.
The early geographer to give best expression to the link of
geography to law was Whittlesey who wrote (1939, p. 588):
The legal forms which guide most human activities may 
vary considerably without doing violence to human 
living. At the same time they may produce contrasts 
on man's use of identical environments. Variations in 
culture patterns in uniform environments on opposite 
sides of a political boundary are common, and prove 
the possibility of modifying the landscape by politi­
cal means. The operation of law can be traced only
10
through patient study of the incidence of individual
laws. Few such studies have been made.
The methodology suggested by Whittlesey is beset with difficulties. 
Law is part of culture so that similar cultures are likely to have 
similar laws while different cultures have different laws. But, 
can differential use of "uniform environments" be attributed either 
to laws specifically or political processes generally in isolation 
from the rest of the contrasting or similar culture? Even if the 
problem of isolating law from culture could be solved, most 
modern cultures possess voluminous legal structures, so that it is 
difficult to isolate a single law as producing a landscape character­
istic. Nonetheless, Whittlesey clearly understood the need to ana­
lyze law as a cultural and social variable shaping and reflecting 
man's relationship to the land.
Since 1939, several powerful and persuasive contributions 
to geographical jurisprudence have emerged. American land law, be­
cause it so clearly influences the relationship of man to his land, 
provided a fruitful area of inquiry. Pattison (1957) conducted re­
search into the origin and evolution of the grid survey system, 
while Thrower (1966) compared landscape development under the grid 
and meets-and-bounds survey system. Johnson (1957) has attempted 
to measure directly certain implications of the grid survey system. 
She found that the quarter section, the usual basic unit of settle­
ment, could be geometrically adapted to various environmental cir­
cumstances. Despite this flexibility, the quarter section restricted 
the degree to which environmentally sound decisions could be made. 
McIntosh (1974; 1975) directed his inquiry at the impact of various
11
land disposal laws rather than the impact of the survey per se.
The Pattison, Thrower, Johnson and McIntosh studies represent a 
valuable contribution to understanding the relationship between 
American land law and the evolution of settlement patterns.
Patterns other than land distribution also became sub­
ject to the inquiry of geographical jurisprudence, McManis (1965), 
for example, studied the regional economic impacts of the U, S, 
embargoes associated with the Napoleonic Wars and found valid 
reasons for regional disobediance to the embargoes, Steiner (1966) 
reviewed the impact of federal land ownership on the shape of the 
southern California metropolitan area. Brown (1972) asked why re­
versal of judicial opinion on segregated housing had no impact.
He found that the procedures of the real estate industry consti­
tuted an effective barrier to the implementation of judicial in­
tent, O'Riordan (1969) asked why implementation of a British water 
resource management law was not as intended. He found that the 
bureaucrats responsible for the administration of the law rede­
fined the law in terms that suited local needs. Agriculture, a 
highly regulated industry, likewise has come under consideration.
An example is Raitz’s (1971) study of the protected Wisconsin tobacco 
farmers. Other obvious studies in geographical jurisprudence are 
Sommers and Gade, 1971; Boal, 1970; Alexander, 1968; Large, 1957; 
and Hamming, 1958.
Empirically based studies such as these, attributable as 
much to a real concern for public issues as the philosophical dic­
tates of the discipline, are now common in geography, and becoming
12
more so. The literature indicates that geographers have long felt 
the need to address questions of morality and political policy; 
however, the paucity of those in the profession, and uncertain 
methodological procedures and fundamental concepts have kept geo­
graphical jurisprudence restricted to small projects on the peri­
phery of major social concerns. However, methodological innova­
tions combined with new concepts have placed geographers with juris­
prudential concerns on more certain intellectual ground. Possibly 
the most important conceptual innovations have been offered by Cox 
(1972). Cox envisions that effects emanate from bounded space, 
and that these effects may either be beneficial or detrimental to 
surrounding bounded space. Law and policy may be employed to direct 
the flow of these emanations to other bounded space and, conse­
quently, to other segments of society occupying that space.
Using variations on these conceptual themes, Cox (1973) 
and Harvey (1972) studied the relationship of policy and law to a 
broad range of urban problems. Both found that the current system 
of bounding space combines with urban policies and laws to concen­
trate the negative effects of land use in discrete geographical 
areas. The result is that the system of urban policy and law re­
inforces segregation, poverty and ignorance in subtle though effec­
tive ways. With this knowledge, Cox (1973) was able to recommend 
specific and realistic policy and law alternatives which would re­
duce spatially distributed injustices without doing excessive vio­
lence to established legal and political systems. The studies by 
Cox (1973) and Harvey (1972) are quite unlike considerations of
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the "individual laws" recommended by Whittelsey (1939, p. 588). 
Geographical jurisprudence has progressed a long way methodologic­
ally since 1939, and has proven what Whittlesey realized--the 
study of law and policy is necessary to a proper understanding of 
man's relationship to his total environment.
Conclusions
The research objective is to attain an understanding of the 
contribution of policy and law to the evolution of the distribution 
of state land estates. Pursuit of the research problem will con­
tribute to an understanding of the complex land tenure and frag­
mentation in the American West at a time when that tenure and frag­
mentation appears to provide both frustrations and opportunities in 
solving major land use questions.
Review of the geographical literature reveals that geo­
graphers have contributed to understanding of politico-legal insti­
tutions. The need for an analysis of law's affect on land and space 
is implicit in one of the major research themes in geography.
CHAPTER II
THE NATIONAL LAND ALLOCATION STRUCTURE:
A CONCEPTUALIZATION
My first research problem was to describe the administra­
tive structure within which state land selection and acquisition 
decisions were made. One possible approach to this problem was to 
describe in detail the administrative structure of each state's 
bureaucracy. This approach was rejected, for it would reveal little 
about the decision-making process itself, and would engulf the study 
in details not pertinent to other research objectives. Instead, a 
general conceptual model of the administrative structure was the 
approach chosen. The purpose of this chapter is to develop such a 
conceptual understanding of state-land administrative structures.
The National Decision-Making Hierarchy 
The American Revolution resulted in the creation of a sover­
eign who proceeded to establish policies through the exercise of so­
vereign authority. The sovereign arbitrarily willed perfect union, 
justice, domestic tranquility, common defense, general welfare and 
liberty (U. S. Const., Preamble). These policies are vague so to 
give them substance the sovereign delegated authority to three 
branches of government, the states, and the people. Delegation of 
authority necessary to expedite decision-making also decentralized
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decision-making power and authority (Froman, 1967). Those institu­
tions receiving sovereign-like authority through delegation and de­
centralization are termed sub-sovereigns. Many of the functions 
of the sub-sovereigns were, in turn, delegated to other sub-sover­
eigns, and in turn delegated to still other sub-sovereigns.
Such a hierarchy of authority is complex. No matter how 
complex, the first tier of the hierarchy dictates policy and law 
in the sense that other levels of the hierarchy must abide. The 
second tier of the hierarchy of delegated authority creates evolved 
policy and law, the policy and law which that level may alter or 
change at its will. A third tier is created through delegation by 
sub-sovereigns to lower sub-sovereigns, or "politicians” who create 
"political" policy, or that which is subject to some extent to re­
view by higher sub-sovereigns. The three levels of authority are 
relative to the position of the institution in the hierarchy of de­
cision-making. For example, to "We, the people," Congress is poli­
tical and its policies and laws are political, but to those operating 
under Congressional mandate. Congressional law and policy is ulti­
mate and absolute--it is dictated.
At any point in the hierarchy is the functionary, the 
bureaucrat, without authority to create policy or law, but responsi­
ble for its implementation. Though lacking authority, the bureau­
crat has considerable power to influence the implementation of laws 
and policies through his professional paradigms, prejudices, and at­
titudes (O'Riordan, 1969). This informal and often unintended 
source of policy and law is referred to as bureaucratic policy and 
law.
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The hierarchy of policy- and law-creating systems is graph­
ically summarized in Figure 2.1. To any sub-sovereign, X, there 
exists a greater sub-sovereign, W. W grants to X authority and 
with it a certain body of dictated policy and law to which X must 
subscribe. Within his domain X may create an experimental body of 
policy and law which he may alter at his will. His policies evolve. 
Part of the evolved policy of X may be delegated to another sub-so­
vereign, Y. Since X need not recognize the sovereignty of Y, X 
views the policies and laws of Y as political rather than sovereign 
in nature. At any point in the hierarchy there are bureaucrats who 
implement policy and law without having direct authority to create 
it. However, the subtle influences of the bureaucracy on policy 
lead to the realization that bureaucratic policy exists.
Each level of authority is not responsible for issuing 
policy and law on all subjects. As the authority to create policy 
and law descends the hierarcy of sub-sovereigns, the population 
over which the sub-sovereign has authority becomes increasingly 
smaller and specialized. The boundaries of policy authority of a 
particular sub-sovereign are referred to as the scope of his policy. 
To the degree that the scope of policy coincides among sub-sover­
eigns, it is improperly partitioned, and intra-governmental con­
flicts arise. Protectionism by, and negotiation among, sub-sover­
eigns tends to reduce conflict to tolerable levels and, this failing, 
appeal is made to higher sub-sovereigns or the external judicial 
analysis.
To summarize, policy is the normative, arbitrary objectives
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of the sovereign, while law is a tool effecting policy. Within 
American society the sovereign has delegated much of his authority 
to create policy and law to a hierarchy of sub-sovereigns each of 
whom has responsibility for policy and law making authority of 
limited scope. Ultimately, bureaucrats implement policies and 
laws. Decisions affecting the allocation of public land resources 
--the harvesting of national timber, the mining of national minerals, 
the allocation of water rights, and the disposal of the public do- 
main--are made within this structure of decentralized and delegated 
authority.
Congressional Policy of Land Allocation
The United States came to possess a tremendous amount of 
land. Though the sovereign's authority over this land was acknow­
ledged by the term "public domain," the particular sub-sovereign 
having management authority over the public domain was initially 
subject to debate. The responsibility, with a few important ex­
ceptions, was seized by Congress.
Congressional policy for the public lands dictated their 
orderly disposal. Part of that order required a rigid and systema­
tic survey (Ordinance of May 20, 1785 in Commager, 1973, pp. 123-124} 
Once the land was surveyed Congress confronted two divergent pos­
sibilities. Land could be disposed of as a capital asset strength­
ening central government or land could be treated as a capital as­
set whose disposal stimulated social developments desired by Con­
gress. In fact, Congress has never made a final choice between 
these two courses, but well into the 20th Century, Congress opted
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generally for the latter policy (Salisbury, 1967). Friedman (1973,
p. 203) summarizes:
The government did not choose to manage its land as a 
capital asset but to get rid of it in an orderly, 
fruitful way. A whole continent was sold or given 
away— to veterans, settlers, squatters, railroads, 
states, colleges, speculators, and land companies. On 
the surface, one sees in this policy the powerful in­
fluence of free enterprise and laissez-faire. The 
government possessed a resource of incalculable value; 
but it was determined to denationalize it as soon as 
possible. True, the land was sold for cash, but money 
was not to be used to aggrandize the government. Yet 
divestment was never the whole policy, nor ever the 
sole reason for policy. The professed social reason 
was not to make government weaker or smaller; but to 
create a country of free citizens, living independ­
ently on their land. Where strict market principles 
seemed to clash with this goal, these principles had 
to yield. Government was never merely a passive um­
pire of the market; it did more than chip the land 
into units and market it. It used land as a lever of 
policy.
Friedman sees the disposal of the public lands as a "lever 
of policy," and although he acknowledges that this necessitated 
the giving of land to a wide variety of those seeking lands, the 
central policy was to create "a country of free citizens, living 
independently on their land." Why then did Congress give land to 
institutions or persons other than actual settlers? The argument 
that the land donations ultimately served the yeoman's best in­
terests is appealing when recipients were states, colleges, and 
railroads, but not when speculators and land companies were re­
cipients. Bogue (1963) has argued that this inconsistency was 
based upon the fact that speculators and corporations could better 
serve the settlers than could the federal government, although 
Socolofsky (1968) found little grounds favoring this hypothesis in 
Nebraska.
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Another point of view is to accept Friedman's argument 
that land disposal was designed as a "lever of policy," but to 
contest the idea that Congress subscribed to a singluar policy of 
creating "a country of free citizens, living independently on 
their land." Certainly, Congress used land to better the lot of 
the yeoman. But it also used land to create colleges. The crea­
tion of farms and colleges may consequently be viewed as distinct 
rather than components of a single policy. If the policies and 
laws which led to land disposal served each other so much the 
better. If they did not then the advocates of the individual 
policies could be viewed as competitors whose task it was to con­
vince a skeptical Congress of the importance of their program for 
public land disposal.
Partitioning of policy should have involved different pro­
cesses depending upon whether Congress subscribed to a singular or 
multiple set of objectives in land disposal. If a singular policy 
existed, then Congress had to identify those land disposal methods 
which would most clearly benefit the yeoman. If several policies 
existed, then Congress had to identify those potential users it 
wished to assist and find a land disposal formula which would pro­
vide an optimum compromise between competing demands. The two pro­
blems suggest differing solutions, but since Congress lacked the 
methodology to solve optimization problems of any type, the only 
solution open to Congress, regardless of its philosophy of land dis­
posal, was experimentation.
Experimental solutions to land allocation problems could
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take two forms. One was fixed location formulation while the other 
was administrative competition. Fixed location formulation necessi­
tated giving certain pre-identified lands to certain users. Rail­
roads, states, Indians, and the military generally received large 
amounts of land through fixed locational formulation. The amount 
of land given through fixed location formulation was seldom based 
upon reason. Rather, it was simply the amount thought necessary to 
satisfy those demanding access to land through fixed locational for­
mulation. Administrative competition necessitated identifying those 
parties to obtain land through administrative procedures and creating 
land disposal procedures by which they could obtain land. The 
parties would compete for the acquisition of land under the adminis­
trative procedures. Settlers, miners, and states received land 
through administrative competition. Competition was, consequently, 
limited to the private sector, except for the state.
In allocation of land resources through fixed locational 
formulation. Congress made a definitive and arbitrary allocation 
of land resources to a certain party. Although it may not have been 
the best solution, it was supposedly a definitive solution, thus im­
plying the termination of competition for land in Congress. An 
error in the fixed locational grant, however, could lead to serious 
conflicts. In the administrative solution to land allocation. Con­
gress did not attempt to terminate competition; it only sought, in 
passing on competition for land, to make the competition somewhat 
orderly.
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State Grants in the Land Allocation System
Congress donated land to most states for the betterment of 
vital social institutions on the grounds of the "general welfare" 
clause of the Preamble to the U, S. Constitution. Whether Congress 
thought those social institutions were necessary for the betterment 
of the yeoman or for independent social causes has yet to be re­
solved. For example, the first state to actually receive lands 
for the development of common schools which had been reserved under 
the Ordinanoe of May 20  ^ 1785 (Commager, 1973, pp. 123-124) was 
Ohio. However, the reasons for the allocation do not appear to be 
directly related to the welfare of either the school children or 
the yeoman. Hoping to use western lands to extinguish debts. Con­
gress demanded that Ohio not only recognize Congressional authority 
over unsettled Ohio lands, but agree that land disposed of by Con­
gress in Ohio be exempt from taxes for five years. The result was 
that the cost of development of social institutions in Ohio fell 
on the earliest residents of the state. Statehood was consequently 
not palatable to Ohio. The land grant was therefore, in part, de­
signed to encourage Ohio's entry into the Union with the exorbitant 
demands imposed by Congress.
Congress continued to use the land grants as a tool for 
achieving "manifest destiny" by encouraging a desire for statehood 
and the land that came with statehood among the territories. Con­
sequently, the grants tended to become larger through time, parti­
cularly when the majority party in Congress needed new states ad­
mitted to the Union. As the dismal management record of the grant
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lands became obvious, however. Congress imposed harsher management 
rules even as they granted larger estates. In this sense. Con­
gress adhered to the intent of the grants irrespective of other 
policies effected through the grants.
Hence, an historical view of state land grants suggests 
that grants were indeed being used as a "lever of policy," but that 
the policy was complex rather than singular. Congress at once pro­
bably saw the grants as assisting the yeoman, as benefiting the in­
stitutions to which they were dedicated, and as a tool in achieving 
manifest destiny and building partisan political power (see Gates, 
1968, pp. 285-340, for an excellent historical review of state 
land grants).
State land grants were given in two ways. The fixed loca­
tional formulation, so many sections per township, was designed to 
reduce conflicts and competition. These lands are termed place 
grant lands or, since such lands were exclusively dedicated to the 
support of common schools, school lands. The second was by admin­
istrative competition and involved acreage which was selected and 
acquired as best the state could. These lands are termed quan­
tity grant lands. Because of various factors some in place grant 
lands were acquired as if they were in quantity lands, that is, 
subject to competition. These lands are known as lieu or lieu 
grant lands and are dedicated, like the i^ place lands, to public 
school support. The in quantity grant lands, in contrast, are en­
trusted to the support of a variety of public institutions.1
^The terms ijn place, in quantity, and lieu or lieu are used 
throughout this study. The term "school land" refers to the combined 
in place and lieu grants. The terms are derived directly from the 
language of the land grant instruments which are discussed in more 
detail in Chapter III.
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A number of important questions can be asked about each of 
these types of lands. How much of the in place grant was actually 
subject to competitive acquisition factors? Once the amount of 
land actually selected in competitive markets is know, interest 
turns to the techniques by which this land was selected and acquired. 
Where were the lands acquired and how were they acquired?
Fundamentally, the state political hierarchy had two pro­
blems in acquiring land. First, lands which would show a profit for 
the beneficiaries was a major goal. Second, since lands which would 
satisfy the first criterion would also be attractive to other poten­
tial users, the political hierarchy had to face the possibility that 
competition would break into actual conflict. In short, the politi­
cal decision-making system faced a "mini-max” problem: minimize po­
tential conflict and maximize potential economic return.
The expected solution to that problem was a compromise which 
may have appeared unsatisfactory to any number of observers. How 
was it solved? What lands were acquired? What compromises did the 
state make? What decisions were too sacred to permit compromise?
How were conflicts, once unavoidable, resolved? IVhat could be nego­
tiated and what was too important for negotiation?
The upper tier of the policy hierarchy which initially had 
to address these questions was Congress which dictated certain pro­
cedures and rules to the states. Given the dictated policy, the 
states (sub-sovereign) could experiment with the administration of 
their lands. The evolved policies of the states included the dele­
gation of power to a politically based board. Beneath the board 
was the bureaucracy which executed the policies. It is certain that
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the intermix of the four bodies of policy (dictated, evolved, 
political and bureaucratic) found a solution to the "mini-max" 
problem, or the lands would never have been acquired; however, 
the manner in which the solution was derived, and its influence 
on the geographic distribution of state lands, is the focus of 
this investigation.
A Conceptualization of State Land Selection Processes
In attempting to find the characteristics of the "mini-max" 
solution to state land selection and acquisition problems, rele­
vant policy and legal statements could be reviewed. This method 
would be somewhat inadequate, however. It assumes that all policy 
and law-like statements are a matter of record and clearly under­
standable. This is unacceptable, since policy is seldom a matter 
of record and the impact of recorded law is difficult to interpret. 
It is naive to assume that the meaning of a legal statement is simi­
lar to those who merely read it and those who must execute it. Any 
sound inquiry into the impact of policy must accept these two limi­
tations: the absence of complete information about policy, and the
inability to determine a priori the practical meaning of seemingly 
clear legal statements. One technique would be to limit consider­
ation to the efficacy of very small portions of the legal-political 
literature. This, however, would mitigate the difficulties only to 
a limited degree. It might be easier to construct studies by this 
method,but their contribution to the understanding of legal systems 
would be minimal.
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Most geographical studies which have contributed to sound 
understanding of political-legal systems have looked first at the 
distribution of a phenomenon and then to the laws and other socio­
economic factors which brought about that distribution. Fortunately, 
the organization of the current state land estates permits, with a
few difficulties, such an approach. If it is possT5Te^tb~Tàïow^what 
lands were acquired at any given time, then it is possible to associ­
ate their acquisition with the policies and laws which existed at the 
time of selection, and where important policies are not a matter of 
record, to infer their existence from the behavior of decision makers.
The current absolute distribution of state lands is known in 
great detail. The dates of acquisition of these state lands, be­
cause of the burden of history or the chain of title (Cribbet, Fritz 
and Johnson, 1972, pp. 724-746), are also known. Conceptually, 
therefore, it may be stated that;
n
Current Estate = ^ L (2.1)
1=1
Where :
L = state land acquisition at time n,
n = the length of time over which lands have been ac­
cumulated, expressed in descrete time units ordered 
chronologically.
Selection at any one time period, n, can be expressed as:
Ln = fCwjDPn + WgEP^ + WgPPn + w^BP^) (2.2)
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Where:
n = a given time period,
DP = the content of dictated policy,
EP = the content of evolved policy,
PP = the content of political policy,
BP = the content of bureaucratic policy,
w = the relative weights defining the potency of the 
content of each category of policy.
Though stated in mathematical terms, a mathematical solu­
tion to Equations 2.1 and 2.2 is impractical at present because 
most of the independent variables are not quantifiable. The formu­
las, however, reflect the conceptual organization of policy admin­
istration described in Figure 2.1 and can be used to organize a dis­
cussion of the processes which led to state land selection and ac­
quisition (Figure 2.2).
To elaborate on Figure 2.2, at a time n^ four bodies of 
policy combined to dictate the decisions made in an administrative 
process called "selection and acquisition of state land." At the 
conclusion of this process land was brought into the state's estate. 
At time ii2 slightly different policies were called upon again 
leading to selection and acquisition of state land, but this time 
the lands acquired in time n2 must be added to the estate already 
acquired in time nj. When this process has been repeated through 
all possible time periods there emerges a modern state land estate 
representing the sum of acquisitions through time. If the modern 
estate can be broken into regional components determined by the
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date of selection and acquisition, considerable information about 
the operation of known policies which determine selection and ac­
quisition can be retrieved. Further, if clear policy statements 
are wanting, motivations can at least be inferred from the social- 
economic-political conditions which existed at the time of selec­
tion. The actual method by which this conceptual model can be 
operationalized is discussed in detail in Chapters III and IV.
Politico-economic Factors in the State Estate's 
Spatial Distribution
The estate which emerged as a result of the land selection 
decision-making process (Figure 2.2) was quantitative and qualita­
tive. Quantitatively, the estate was limited by the acreage which 
Congress willed to grant to the state. The spatial distribution of 
the estate is a portion of its quality. Insomuch as Congress 
granted lands by fixed location formulation to the state, the "de­
cision to and act of selection" (Figure 2.2) was a >'ollow bureau­
cratic exercise. A considerable portion of the fixed location or 
in place land was, however, selected as ^  lieu land free from the 
fixed location formula. This land, combined with the ^  quantity 
land grant, was selected irrespective of locational dictates to 
give spatial form and substance to the modern state land estate.
The purpose of this section is to develop the major policy themes 
which helped to shape and will assist in interpreting the spatial 
development of modern state land estates.
Land selection could not have been conducted in other than
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an atmosphere of spatial competition and possibly conflict for land 
while the state objective in selecting was logically to acquire 
quality land while avoiding open conflict with the citizen. This 
has been identified as the "mini-max" problem. Another source of 
conflict and competition existed, however, and this with the grantor. 
Congress. First, it must be assumed that when Congress granted land 
to the state by fixed location formulation Congress expected the 
land grant to be implemented by fixed location formulation. State 
administrators, however, if they were seeking quality lands would 
have desired to make land selections freely. This implies that Con­
gress's goal was to assure that in place land grants remain in place 
while the goal of the state was to move as much land as possible 
from the iji place to the lieu land grants. The state's goal 
could only be achieved if Congress gave lands place to the state, 
and before the state's title to that land was perfected, dedicated 
the same land to other uses. There was opportunity for such multi­
ple land grants. While Congress was granting land to new states it 
was also giving land to settlers, railroads, and mineral prospectors 
as well as reserving land for national forests, national parks, the 
military, and Indians. With so much activity it would be surprising 
if multiple donations of the same land did not occur. A major ob­
jective then in understanding the modern distribution of state lands 
is to understand how these multiple land donations arose and how the 
state manipulated them to gain the freedom to select land free from 
spatial restraints.
Freedom to select land irrespective of spatial dictates was
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never more than relative, however. The state could never select 
land until the federal cadastral survey had been completed. After 
Congress legitimized many forms of "squatting" on public land in 
the Preemption Aot of 1849 and the Homestead Act of 1862^ the federal 
surveyors became followers rather than leaders of the frontier. 
Surveyors could only hope to conduct their surveys after the course 
of settlement was somewhat advanced but before excess damage was 
done to the integrity of the grid survey. This situation implies 
that state land selectors had to work in immediate proximity to 
federal land surveyors. They could not select land in advance of 
the surveys for this was forbidden by law. Selection of land far 
behind the surveyors would have been unadvisable for by definition 
this land would have been the "dregs" passed over by settlers.
It follows that in nearly every state land selectors should 
have been continually critical of the progress of land surveys. The 
faster surveys were conducted the more land was available to select 
from. Indeed administrators were critical of the survey and sought 
to gain control of it or, this failing, to direct its progress. 
Further, insomuch as the surveys could not be rapid enough to sat­
isfy state land selectors, they would be expected to develop a fear 
that there was insufficient land to satisfy the land grants.
Logically, a theme of insufficient land to fill the land 
grant would develop independent of the progress of the survey, how­
ever. Assume a category of land. A, which is more valuable than B 
category land. A wise administrator would select A quality land. 
Desperate feelings would arise when it was realized that there was
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more land to be selected than A quality land available. Land 
selectors had to recognize that at some future time they would be 
forced to select B quality land, a decision which they regarded as
poor. Additionally, since everyone was competing for category A
land, the longer land selection was delayed, as through the slow 
surveys, the sooner the day would come when only category B land 
would be available. The prospects could not but produce anxiety 
among state land administrators.
These competitive processes resemble the classical inter­
pretation of economic rent offered by Ricardo (1911). The implica­
tions of Ricardo's concepts for estate land selection are best ex­
plained through an example. If it is assumed that:
(1) There is a plain being settled.
(2) Settlers produce only one product and the product price
is constant.
(3) The minimum supply price of a unit of land is zero.
(4) The settlement plan consists of four grades of land, A 
through D.
(5) The cost of bringing a unit of A type land into produc­
tion is zero, and each succeeding grade of land costs $5.00 per 
unit more than the last grade of land to bring into production.
Then:
(1) Settlers will seek all of A type land before B type 
land is brought into production.
(2) Until all A type land is settled, it is a free commodity, 
commanding no rent, and valued only for the market value of its product.
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(3) When all type A land is settled, the next settler has 
a choice of paying $5.00 to bring B type land into production or 
paying $5.00 to gain access to A type land. Hence, the cost of
bringing B type land into production accrues as rent to type A land.
If it is assumed that the entire plain is settled, the rent
which accrues to A type land is:
Cost to bring B land into production = $5.00
Cost to bring C land into production = 5.00
Cost to bring D land into production = 5.00
Rent accruing to A land $15.00
The $15.00 rent which accrues to A type land through bringing
lesser grades of land into production is neither land rent nor econ­
omic rent as economists currently use these terms (Barlowe, 1972, pp. 
157-158). Instead the rent is what Renne (1947, p. 212) has called 
"rent as an unearned increment," the form of rent which explains why, 
as John Stuart Mill stated (1965, p. 18), the landlord "grows rich, 
as it were, in his sleep without working, risking, or economizing." 
Generally, however, it is precisely rent as an unearned increment 
which produces revenues from state lands. With few exceptions, 
states acquired lands which they did not work, on which they avoided 
risk as a matter of law, and upon which they did little economizing. 
Consequently, if revenue was to be derived from the trust grants, 
and there was no other purpose for which they were given, most had 
to accrue as unearned rent.
Ricardian economics suggest that acquiring land was specu­
lative and economically dangerous. To use the example above, type 
A land is at the intensive margin since it accrues the most unearned
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rent. The unearned rent of type B land is then $10.00; C, $5.00; 
and D, none. Type D land, at the extensive margin, is occupied, 
though it accrues no unearned rent. If there were another type of 
land, E, beyond the extensive margin, it would neither produce un­
earned rent nor be occupied. Land types A, B, and C would attract 
both vendees and lessees. Land type D would attract neither ven­
dees nor lessees but since society needs the products of D type 
land, it would attract squatters. Society, however, does not need 
the produce of E land so it will not attract even squatters, much 
less vendees or lessees.
It would follow that land administrators should have been 
seeking A type land which commanded the most unearned rent. If 
they failed, however, the implications were desconsolate. Lesser 
land would command little rent and, in areas where settlement was 
in progress, no rent until all better land was fully occupied.
The administrator faced the prospect that his land selections might 
produce no revenue for years, and if he selected land beyond the 
extensive margin, it might never produce revenue. Yet revenue pro­
duction was the salient objective of land selection. The short-range 
revenue production capacity of selected land would be even more dis­
mal if Congress dictated to the states a minimum acceptable rent, 
which it normally did not do, or a minimum acceptable sale price, 
which it normally did do.
Ricardo's perception of land economics suggests that state 
land could produce revenues, by and large, only through unearned 
rent increments, and that the potential unearned rent varied with
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the quality of the land. Wise state land selectors would have re­
cognized the variable quality of land, though probably as a grad­
ient rather than discrete categories, and should have sought lands 
as close as possible along this gradient to the intensive margin.
In subsequent analysis in this study, the search for land close to 
the intensive margin is referred to as the "environmental objectives 
of state land selection."
In meeting environmental objectives of state land selection 
the imperative restraints of Ricardian theory could be overcome if 
the land administrator could cater selection to a sub-population 
which required greater access to cheap unoccupied land than the 
homestead laws provided. To this class leasing, if not purchase, 
of state land would be attractive. The rancher population in states 
where they existed should have filled this niche. The ranchers' de­
mand for land in most states was fantastic. The homestead laws even 
when taken advantage of rarely met this demand. Further, while the 
rancher demanded a secure relationship to the land he operated 
there was little reason to establish a fee interest in the land. In 
the formulation of the spatial distribution of state lands, a close 
relationship between state land administrators and ranchers, where 
such entrepreneurs existed, may be anticipated.
Ricardo's concepts are essentially aspatial, using only 
land quality to define economic rent. Von Thunen has presented a 
model (1966) parallel to Ricardo's except that distance from a mar­
ket is used to determine rent producing capacity, for Von Thunen 
sought to explain the land use patterns surrounding a central place
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or market. However, Von Thunen's model may be adapted to explain 
the distribution of settlement expanding into a wilderness (Figure 
2.3). By this variation, the market or central place becomes a 
core area of settlement. Three zones of land use surround the core 
of settlement: intense settlement (line A-B, Figure 2.3), de­
veloping settlement (line C-D) and the wilderness (line E-F). The 
objective of settlement is to extend the zone of intense settlement 
to the limits of the land. Hence on a dynamic frontier lines A-B 
and C-D are constantly moving toward point F.
Accordingly there is a core of settlement which attracted 
new settlers from afar. New settlers arrived to find the zone 
around the core area intensely settled. Lands were surveyed, par­
celed among well-established settlers and nothing was left of the 
wilderness but the least valuable wastelands. Beyond was a zone 
of developing settlement. An important "margin of transference" 
can be recognized (line x-y. Figure 2.3). Inside point y, the best 
lands were already taken, the survey completed, and the settlers 
well on their way to establishing a mature rural society. Beyond 
the margin, in the "zone of transference" (line y-z) conditions were 
far different. Much fine land was still available, social condi­
tions were primitive, and the survey would be incomplete though in 
progress. The zone of transference would merge, at the frontier, 
into the wilderness. Qualities of the wilderness varied, of course, 
but the zone was marked by the crudest of social organization if 
there was a society at all. Additionally, the nature of the wilder­
ness resources were poorly understood so that the area was left to
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trappers, traders, prospectors, and the most extensive livestock 
operators. These "vanguards of the frontier" explored the wilder­
ness while searching for its valuable extractable resources.
To many settlers, the zone of transference between developing 
settlement and the wilderness was the only place where high-quality 
low-cost land was available. To the state officials, likewise, 
this zone was the logical area in which to select land. Of course, 
state officials preferred land in the zone of intense settlement, 
but unless it was obtained before intense settlement, land in this 
area was unavailable to the state.
Beyond the frontier, in the wilderness, state officials 
could be certain neither about the quality of the land they 
selected nor that the selected land ever would be anything but 
wilderness. Further, with surveys being hard to obtain and settlers 
receiving priority for surveys, it was futile to ask for surveys 
beyond the frontier. Hence it was within the margin of transfer­
ence between the area of developing settlement and the wilderness 
that the state land officials could most wisely and reasonably re­
quest surveys and make land selections. Many settlers were com­
peting for land in this same zone; consequently, state officials 
faced intense competition with settlers.
Facing competition for land was a common experience for 
potential landlords. The state, however, was a rather peculiar 
potential landlord. The state, the Board, and their policies ex­
isted only at the will of the people to serve the needs of the 
people. Yet the state, an artifically created corporate being.
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in subscribing to deterministic theories of economics, placed a 
demand on itself to compete for the same land that the citizen was 
seeking. If the citizens found competition for land with the state 
excessively obvoxious, they held devastating powers to determine 
political power and to reorganize policy, law and objectives. 
Consequently, state officials faced the responsibility, regardless 
of their economic and environmental appreciation of land value, of 
maintaining citizen acquiescence to state land selection. The main­
tenance of public approval, or at least tolerance, of state land 
selection is referred to in subsequent analysis as the "political 
objectives of state land selection."
Conclusions
Policy and law in the United States are created by dele­
gation of sovereign power through a decentralized hierarchy. Within 
this hierarchy, responsibility for allocation of the public domain 
fell to Congress. Congress used land as a lever for implementation 
of policy, but whether that policy was singular or multiple is a 
matter of viewpoint rather than fact.
Implementation of Congressional policy, in any case, neces­
sitated the donation of land to various individuals and groups in­
cluding the states. Donation was through a fixed locational formu­
lation designed to terminate further competition for land, and 
through administrative procedures designed to organize competition 
rather than eliminate it. To the degree to which state administra­
tors faced competition for land, they faced a "mini-max" problem-- 
that is minimize conflict while maximizing potential estate value.
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Given this information a conceptual model of state-land 
selection processes has been developed (Figure 2.2). It suggests 
that administrators made decisions through time to create the 
modern distribution of state lands. The modern distribution con­
sequently reflects a continual process of decision-making so that 
distribution is the key to understanding state-land selection 
policies.
Theory permits anticipation of the general topics of state- 
land selection policy which were important in the formulation of 
the estate's spatial distribution. No decisions had to be made, 
and hence no policy had to be generated, if Congressional fixed 
locational grants had been efficacious. Since they were not, states 
sought to increase their freedom to select land by removing grant 
land from the fixed locational formulation. Federal-state goals 
consequently conflicted and, at least desirably, federal and state 
policies managing this conflict should have evolved.
To the extent that state administrators possessed the free­
dom to select land they had to formulate policies and decision­
making processes which resolved the "mini-max" problem. The maxi­
mization portion of the problem was resolved through the "environ­
mental objectives of state land selection," a recognization of 
variable land quality in a fashion approaching Ricardian land rent 
theory. In searching for limited land as close as possible to the 
intensive margin it would occur to administrators that there was 
not sufficient land to fill the grants. This fear of insufficient 
land would be heightened by the torpid progress of the national
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cadastral surveys. Federal-state conflicts over surveys would 
inevitably result.
The progress of settlement in a new state compounded by 
the relationship of land selection to the progress of the cadastral 
survey would inevitably force state land selectors into the zone of 
greatest competition. While other potential landlords could dis­
miss the competition as economic reality, the state, as an artifi­
cial corporate being existing only at the will of its competitors, 
could take no such liberty. Selection policies had to be adapted 
to the limits which competitors would accept. Where conflicts be­
tween the state and its competitors could not be avoided, policies 
to fairly and reasonably resolve these conflicts were desirable.
The resultant policies would meet the potential objectives of state 
land selection.
No matter whether stated in the precise terras of law or in 
loosely organized administrative intuition, three bodies of policy 
had to be formulated if the state lands were to be selected. These 
policies were those which resolved federal-state conflict and set 
the direction for meeting the environmental and political objectives 
of state land selection. The interrelationship of these three bodies 
of policy, undoubtedly changing through both time and space, guided 
the administrator whose decisions built the spatial distribution of 
the modern state land estate. How they interacted is the question 
which remains to be answered. If the modern distribution of state 
land can be decomposed into areal classes using discrete dates of 
selection as the basis of classification, association of the locational
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characteristics of land selection with the policy at the time of 
selection may be accomplished.
CHAPTER III
REGIONALLY SIGNIFICANT STATE LAND CONCENTRATIONS
IN MONTANA
As suggested in Chapter II, a technique for associating 
the policy and law with state land selection is to disaggregate 
the current estate into areas derived according to the dates of 
land selection. The procedure requires two stages. First, lands 
that have been the object of important state land decision-making 
processes must be identified and mapped. Second, a temporal frame­
work for categorizing these land must be developed. This chapter 
concerns the first of three objectives.
The Study Area
The type of detailed temporal-spatial analysis required 
for a study of state land decision-making prohibits a large sample 
of states. The data collection requirements and lack of compara­
bility between state administrative structures make interstate com­
parison a goal for future studies. In this study only Montana was 
selected as a case study.
There are eighteen state land offices in the United States. 
Texas, once an independent nation, is too unique to be of utility. 
Alaska's land selection has scarcely begun. Hawaii combines fea­
tures of both Texas and Alaska. These states were consequently
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eliminated as potential study areas. For the remaining fifteen 
States, three constraints were set for selecting the sample state.
The state had to have:
(1) A relatively complete legal record of state land 
selections and acquisitions,
(2) A current state land administration amenable to cooper­
ation with the study objectives,
(3) A minimum percentage of lands sold, since sales would 
unduly influence the modern distribution of state lands.
The state best meeting all criteria was Montana (Figure 3.1). 
Its land records are not free from flaws, but they are remarkably 
complete. The Montana Department of State Lands and Investments and 
the Montana State Forester were willing to cooperate in the study. 
Slightly more than 10 per cent of the grant lands in Montana have 
been sold. This was not felt to unduly influence the modem dis­
tribution of Montana state lands.
Other reasons existed for selecting Montana. Studies by 
Anderson (1940), Murray (1942) and State of Montana investigators 
reveal the usual catalog of poor management, but a remarkable ab­
sence of serious criminal abuse of the state land. Since overt 
criminality in the management of state lands could not be confused 
with official policy, definitional problems are eliminated.
Montana was admitted to the Union under the Omnibus State­
hood Act of February 27  ^ 1889 (25 Stat. 676), the same act under 
which Washington and the Dakotas were admitted. Hence, even if 
generalizations from a detailed study of Montana state land selection
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are not appropriate to all of the remaining states, the study of 
Montana's state land should at least provide a basis for compari­
son with the Dakotas and Washington where socio-economic conditions 
differ from those in Montana.
Finally, Montana is currently reconsidering fundamental 
land policies. Possessed with a love of their land and an environ­
mental radicalism stimulated by this love, Montanans face serious 
threats from coal development, urbanization, tourism, recreation, 
private land closure, and subdivision. These threats to Montana's 
landscape have stimulated reconsideration of, and radical experi­
mentation with, Anglo-American land institutions (see for example, 
H. B. 85, 98, and 672, 44th Mt. Legislature). Where such radical 
experimentation is taking place, it is desirable to possess a 
thorough understanding of the processes involved in the antecedent 
land use system. It was felt that selection of Montana as a case 
study area would assist Montanans in their quest for a new land 
ethic.
Dictated Policies of Montana Land Grants
How the state land administrative structure of Montana was 
established is important to understanding how lands were distributed. 
Montana was organized as a territory on May 26, 1864, by the Organia 
Act of the Territory of Montana (12 Stat. 85). Section 14 of that 
act reserved for school purposes sections 16 and 36 in each town­
ship. Following tradition, the act reserved from federal land dis­
posal only surveyed lands. No provisions were made to permit the 
territory to administer the lands or derive funds from them. The
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act did not mention the grants quantity, or lieu land selec­
tions for place school lands lost to the territory through pre­
emption or mineral claim.
Montana statehood followed in 1889. Sections 10 through 
19 of the Statehood Act conveyed the grants to the new state, and 
delt with the basic administrative procedures that Congress wished 
to dictate to the new states. The amounts granted in the State­
hood Act and the amounts of land in each of these grants still re­
tained by Montana in 1970 are shown in Table 3.1.
In principle, Montana obtained Sections 16 and 36 in each 
township for the support of common schools. The grant was to be 
effective at the amount of statehood or upon approval of the sur­
vey, whichever was later, so long as the sections had not been legi­
timately occupied by preemptors, were not mineral in character, and 
were not subject to federal reservation for other purposes. In the 
event of preemption, claim to Sections 16 and 36 could be relin­
quished, and lieu lands were to be chosen as near as possible to 
the lands relinquished. In the case of place lands denied the 
state by virtue of federal reservation, no lieu lands could be 
selected. The state could only await the extinguishment of the 
federal reservations to obtain the iri place lands. The in quantity 
lands were to be selected from the surveyed, unoccupied, non-mineral, 
and unreserved portions of the public domain.
The Montana citizen accepted the land grants in the Montana 
Constitution of 1889 (Article XVII, Secs. 1-3; Article XIX, Secs.
3 and 7; Article XI, and Constitutional Ordinance No. 1, Sec. 7).
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Table 3.1. Montana Land Grants.
Grant
Original
Acreage
Retained
Acreage
In Place and In Lieu 
Common School
5,188,000.00 4,595,406.96
In Quantity
University of Montana 46 ,7 20 .0 0 18,160.87
Mt. State University 90,000.00 60,977.31
MSU (2nd Morrill) 50,000.00 32,632.13
School of Mines 100,000.00 59,606.22
Normal School 100,000.00 62,890.00
Deaf and Blind Asylum 50,000.00 36,235.86
State Reform School 50,000.00 68,744.01
Public Buildings 182,000.00 186,249.56
Veterans' Home 1,275.61 1,275.61
Militia Camp 640.00 640.00
Agricultural School 5,000.00 2,000.00
Penitentiary 9.75 9.75
TOTAL 5,863,645.36 5,108,686.50
Source: Montana Commissioner of Lands and Investments, 1971, p. 1.
The Montana Constitution and the Statehood Act together established 
a sacred trust which could not he altered without the concurrence 
of Montana citizens and Congress. However, Congress could provide 
permissive alteration of the trust by legislation. Montana could 
not be compelled to abide by legislation passed after the Statehood 
Act became law, but Montana could, if it willed, take advantage of 
such legislation so long as the legislation was consistent with
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state constitutional and statutory law.
Congressional legislation passed subsequent to the State­
hood Act is considered in this study as need arises. However, one 
act, the Lieu Selection Act of 1891 (Sec. 24, 26 Stat. 1095), is 
so important to Montana land selection that it is best considered 
with the dictated policy. The Lieu Selection Act empowered Montana 
administrators to relinquish claim to Sections 16 and 36, whether 
surveyed or not, within federal reservations prior to extinguishment 
of those reservations, and to select eligible lands anywhere in 
Montana to replace the relinquishments. Thus, a significant con­
straint on locating state land was removed by this act, and its im­
pact on the distribution of land was extremely important.
In addition to accepting the land grants, the Montana Con­
stitution of 1889 created sub-sovereigns to manage the state estate 
and dictated to them certain administrative procedures. Land ad­
ministration authority was delegated to a political board, though 
the state legislature was to make the laws necessary for the board 
to effectively manage the lands. Known as the Board of State Land 
Commissioners, the Board was to consist of the Governor, Secretary 
of State, Attorney General, and Superintendent of Public Instruc­
tion. The four individuals were to be members of the Board by 
virtue of, but separate from, their elected offices.
The Act to Provide for the Selection, Location, Appraisal, 
Sale and Leasing of State Lands of March 6, 1891 (1947 RCM 81-101, 
108) empowered the Board to proceed with the selection and manage­
ment of the state lands. On March 14, 1981, the Governor announced
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his choice for the chief bureaucrat, the State Land Agent. His 
selection of Granville Stuart (Anderson, 1940, p. 26) was approved 
by the Board, and Stuart was instructed to proceed in cooperation 
with the Surveyor General of the United States to identify lands 
suitable for selection, or areas where the Governor could wisely 
request survey with the intent of making selections, and to report 
this information to the Board (Minutes, April 1, 1891). Montana 
was now in the land-grab business.
Regions of Significant Concentrations 
of Montana State Land
The objective of this chapter is to identify areas of im­
portant concentration of Montana state lands. From the dictated 
policy, it can be determined that school land should be located in 
a regular pattern (Sections 16 and 36), so that any divergence from 
this pattern is, in a sense, a deviation from policy dictates. 
Location of i^ quantity lands was not decreed in the dictated policy 
so, in a sense, all in quantity lands symbolize significant acts of 
administrative decision making. As a practical matter, however, 
minor concentrations of either kind of land are not pertinent. To 
avoid pursuit of trivial land administration decisions only areas of 
major land concentration were identified. The methodology for their 
identification is much different for school land than for in^  quantity 
lands. Consequently, the regional patterns of school land concentra­
tion is investigated apart from the concentration of quantity 
lands.
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School Land Concentration
Each township in Montana should contain Sections 16 and 
36 as school land, or about S.56 per cent of the land in each town­
ship. Consequently, about 5.56 per cent of the land in each county 
should be school land. School land in excess of 5.56 per cent of 
each county is by definition lieu land which was selected through 
the decisions made by bureaucrats and politicians. Conversely, 
counties with significantly less than 5.56 per cent of their land 
area owned by the state provided major areas of base land offering 
which permitted the lieu land selections in other areas. Since the 
amount of state school land owned in each Montana county is known 
in detail (Montana Department of State Lands, 1970, pp. 1 and 12), 
calculating divergence from the expected ownership of 5,56 per cent 
is easily accomplished.
A serious problem is encountered, however. About 11.42 per 
cent of the common school grant was sold or otherwise alienated 
between 1891 and 1970 (author's calculation based upon data in 
Montana Department of State Lands, 1970, pp. 1 and 12). Concentra­
tions of land sales would alter the observed amount of school land 
in each county without implying a land selection decision. Disinter­
ring information about land sales is difficult and would necessitate 
impractically protracted and expensive searches of patents and 
titles. The only satisfactory method of anticipating land sales is 
to assume that the state rate of alienation has been applicable uni­
formly among the counties so that 11.42 per cent of the expected 
land ownership should be discounted. The technique is, of course.
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not entirely satisfying, but where the 11.42 per cent approxima­
tion to land sales inaccurately estimates the rate of alienation, 
the areas become obvious in subsequent analysis.
The number of sections of school land that the state might 
be expected to own^, the amount it owns, and the difference between 
expected and observed for each county are shown in Columns B, C, 
and D of Table 3.2. The trend has been to remove common school 
grant lands from some counties and concentrate their replacements 
in other counties. Deviations were squared and summed (Column E, 
Table 3.2, signs are artifically maintained), and the proportion con­
tributed by each county to the total sum of squares (Column F, Table
3.2) was used to rank the counties in order of their contribution to 
the sum of squares (Table 3.3). Twenty-one, or 37.5 per cent of 
Montana's fifty-six counties, account for about 90 per cent of the 
sum of the squared difference between the expected and observed 
school land ownership. These twenty-one counties (Figure 3.2) are 
used subsequently for the detailed temporal analysis of state land 
distribution. The counties fall into two generic groups: those
with more and those with less common school land than expected.
The geographic tendency is also clear from Figure 3.2. Common school 
lands are relatively rare in those areas of the state dominated by 
federal land ownership--national forest reservation in the case of 
western Montana and Indian reservations in the case of Roosevelt
^Calculated by: (County Land Area in mi.^x.0556) - [(County
Land A r e a x .0556) x .1142] = Expected Land Area Owned by the State 
in the County in Square Miles or Sections.
Table 3.2. School Land Distribution, Expected and Observed
A
County
B
Sections
Expected
C
Sections
Observed
D
Difference
E*
Difference^
F
% of 
Column E
Beaverhead 273.39 400.15 +126.76 +16068.10 6.09
Big Horn 247.39 133.13 -114.26 (-313055.35 4.95
Blaine 210.55 272.50 +61.95 +3937.80 1.45
Broadwater 58.76 28.03 -30.73 (-)944.33 .36
Carbon 101.75 57.40 -44.35 (-31967.07 .75
Carter 163.17 222.39 +59.22 +3507.57 1.33
Cascade 131.47 104.65 -26.81 (-3718.88 .27
Chouteau 193.36 341.52 +148.16 +21954.22 8.32
Custer 184.98 215.16 +30.18 +910.59 .35
Daniels 71.07 339.40 +268.33 +72002.29 27.29
Dawson 116.72 136.35 +19.63 +385.49 .15
Deer Lodge 36.44 11.95 -24.49 (-3599.73 .23
Fallon 80.42 106.40 +25.98 +674.74 .26
Fergus 208.92 239.79 +30.87 +952.96 . 36
Flatheat 253.00 116.68 -136 .32 (-318582.76 7.04
Gallatin 123.96 46.07 -77.35 (-35983.51 2.27
Garfield 219.41 261.03 +41.62 +1732.47 . 66
Glacier 145.98 13.49 -132.49 (-317554.40 6. 65
Golden Valley 57.92 69.21 +11.29 +127.42 .05
Granite 85.35 27.56 -57.79 (-33339.52 1.27
Table 3.2 to be continued
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County SectionsExpected
Sections
Observed
Difference Difference^ % of 
Column E
Hill 144.16 222.99 +78.83 +6214.50 2.36
Jefferson 81.36 39.54 -41.82 (-)1749.31 . 66
Judith Basin 92.59 146,82 +54.23 +2940.78 1.11
Lake 73.58 84.35 +10.77 +115.89 .04
Lewis & Clark 171.19 134.71 -36.48 C-)1331.05 .50
Liberty 70.87 135.22 +64.35 +4140.89 1.57
Lincoln 182.92 84.79 -98.13 (-)9630.38 3.65
Madison 173.76 143.03 -30.73 (_)944.47 .36
McCone 128.40 147.14 +18.74 +351.16 .13
Meagher 115.94 94.21 -21.73 (-)472.19 .18
Mineral 60.18 11.56 -48.61 C-)2363.22 .90
Missoula 128.64 60.57 -68.07 (-34633.11 1.76
Musselshell 92.94 118.70 +25.76 +663.72 .25
Park 129.33 50.40 -78.93 (-36230.46 2.36
Petroleum 81.51 97.17 +15.66 +245.32 .09
Phillips 256.74 288.96 +32.22 +1038.13 .39
Pondera 81.02 88.39 + 7.37 +54.34 .02
Powder River 161.94 218.26 +56.32 +3171.68 1.20
Powell 115.04 88.15 -26.89 (-3723.07 .27
Prairie 85.20 111.65 +26.45 +699.54 .27
Ravalli 117.31 32.51 -84.80 (-37190.48 2.73
Richland 102.39 125.57 +23.18 +537.48 .20
on4^
Table 3.2 to be continued
County
Sections
Expected
Sections
Observed Difference Difference^
% of 
Column E
Roosevelt 117.46 28.86 -88.60 (-)7849.26 2.98
Rosebud 248.07 274.04 +25.97 +674.44 .22
Sanders 136.82 74.59 -62.23 (-)3872.04 1.47
Sheridan 83.43 71.64 -11.79 C-)139.09 .05
Silver Bow 35.21 20.76 -14.48 C-)209.81 .08
Stillwater 88.36 70.46 -17.90 (-3320.34 .12
Sweet Grass 113.99 73.56 -40.43 (-31634.72 .62
Treasure 48.51 57.63 +9.12 +83.19 .03
Valley 244.97 328.72 +83.75 +7013.32 2.66
Teton 112.98 113.35 + .37 + .14 .00
Toole 96.03 121.84 +25.81 +666.04 .25
Wheatland 69.94 100.53 +30.59 +935.96 .35
Wibaux 48.83 51.05 +7.22 +52.09 .02
Yellowstone 130.12 123.64 -6.48 (-342.04 .02
TOTAL -1.99 263832.85** 100.00
*Signs have been artifically maintained.
**Total calculated without reference to signs. 
Source: Author's Calculations.
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Table 3.3. Rank Order of Divergence from Expected School Land 
Ownership.
A B C D
Rank County Per Cent Cumulative
of County Divergence Per Cent
County from Expected Divergence
1 Teton .00 .00
2 Pondera .02 .02
3 Wibaux .02 .04
4 Yellowstone .02 .06
5 Treasure .03 .09
6 Lake .04 .13
7 Golden Valley .05 .18
8 Sheridan .05 .23
9 Silver Bow .08 .31
10 Petroleum .09 .40
11 Stillwater .12 .52
12 McCone .13 .65
13 Dawson .15 .80
14 Meagher .18 .98
15 Richland .20 1.18
16 Deer Lodge .23 1.41
17 Musselshell .25 1.66
18 Toole .25 1.91
19 Fallon .26 2.17
20 Rosebud .26 2.43
21 Cascade .27 2.70
22 Powell .27 2.97
23 Prairie .27 3.24
24 Custer .35 3.59
25 Wheatland .35 3.94
26 Broadwater .36 4.30
27 Fergus .36 4.66
28 Madison .36 5.02
To be continued
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A
Rank
of
County
B
County
C
County Per Cent 
Divergence 
from Expected
D
Cumulative 
Per Cent 
Divergence
29 Phillips .39 5.41
30 Lewis 8 Clark .50 5.91
31 Sweet Grass .62 6.53
32 Garfield .66 7.19
33 Jefferson .66 7.85
34 Carbon .75 8.60
35 Mineral .90 9.50
36 Judith Basin 1.11 (+)10.61*
37 Powder River 1.20 (+)11.81*
38 Granite 1.27 C-)13.08*
39 Carter 1.33 C+)14.41*
40 Blaine 1.45 (+)15.86*
41 Sanders 1.47 (-)17.33*
42 Liberty 1.57 (+318.90*
43 Missoula 1.76 (-320.66*
44 Gallatin 2.27 (-322.93*
45 Hill 2.36 (+325.29*
46 Park 2.36 (-327.65*
47 Valley 2.66 +30.31*
48 Ravalli 2.73 -33.04*
49 Roosevelt 2.98 -36.02*
50 Lincoln 3.65 -39.67*
51 Big Horn 4.95 -44.62*
52 Beaverhead 6.09 +50.71*
53 Glacier 6.65 -57.36*
54 Flathead 7.04 -64.40*
55 Chouteau 8.32 +72.72*
56 Daniels 27.29 +100.01*
*Significant divergence from the expected amount of school 
land ownership. The sign indicates whether the divergence is
positive or negative.
Source: Author's Calculation.
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and Big Horn counties. In turn common school lieu lands have been 
selectively concentrated in the plains of northcentral and eastern 
Montana, and in the valleys of southwestern Montana.
In Quantity Grant Lands 
The distribution of iji quantity grants cannot be analyzed 
by the procedure described above. The in quantity lands could be 
selected freely from the available, surveyed public lands, so poli­
cy does not provide a norm against which to evaluate the land dis­
tribution. It may be anticipated that the bureaucrat and politi­
cian, finding a suitable parcel of land, would find similar adjacent 
parcels and select them also. This tendency to concentrate selected 
land would likely be intensified by the transportation modes avail­
able during the period of land selection. In any even, observed 
concentration of the Iji quantity estate should come as little sur­
prise, but whether the concentration is a function of chance or the 
result of a systematic process must be determined. A random prob­
ability model, the Poisson distribution, was selected as the 
expected distribution against which the actual distribution could 
be measured.
The procedure employed is essentially that presented by 
Choynowski (1959) and involves comparing a known map distribution 
with a random distribution generated by the Poisson model. The 
Poisson distribution is generally defined (Mood and Graybill, 1963, 
pp. 70-72) as; The random variable x is distributed as a Poisson 
if the density is:
g-mrnX
f(x) = — 2^ , X = 0,1,2,3,... (3.1)
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where:
m = any positive number defining the parameter of the dis­
tribution
e = the base of the system of natural logarithms having the 
approximate numerical value 2.71828
X = the variable, in this case the amount of iji quantity 
grant land in each county.
The variable x, however, must be measured in observational 
cells of equal size, and the observational cells, Montana's fifty-six 
counties, are obviously not of equal size. The variable x is mea­
sured in observational cells of equal size if the number of sections 
of iji quantity grant land per county are divided by the area of the 
county. Table 3.4, Columns B, C, and D present these data.
The variable x (Table 3.4, Column D) does not meet the 
criterion of being a positive integer so it must be scaled to an 
integer. Choynowski (1959) recommended that the value of x not 
exceed twelve, so this value was selected as the largest value of 
X .  ^ The largest value of x in Table 4.3, Column D, is .0218 for 
Lewis and Clark County. This value of x was called twelve and the 
value of X for each other county was proportioned by:
n 12
^In fact, in analysis, the value of x was set at all intervals 
from two to 12. Since the same set of counties were "significant" 
regardless of the value of x, it is immaterial what interval x is 
set at for the purposes of scaling.
Table 3.4. In Quantity Land Density.
A
County
B
Sections of 
In Quantity Land
C
County 
Area in Miles^
D
Density 
Col. B/Col. C
E
Scaled
Density
Beaverhead 119.60 5551 .0215 12*
Big Horn .00 5023 .0000 0
Blaine 3.53 4275 .0008 0
Broadwater 10.27 1193 .0086 5
Carbon 9.78 2066 .0047 3
Carter 1.35 3313 .0004 0
Cascade 15.94 2661 .0060 3
Chouteau 76.75 3926 .0195 11*
Custer .75 3756 .0002 0
Daniels 6.08 1443 .0052 3
Dawson .75 2370 .0003 0
Deer Lodge .00 740 .0000 0
Fallon .00 1633 .0000 0
Fergus 3.48 4242 .0008 10*
Flathead 89.04 5137 .0173 7
Gallatin 33.92 2517 .0135 0
Garfield .00 4455 .0000 0
o\
To be continued
Table 3.4 Continued
A B C D E
County Sections of In Quantity Land
County 
Area in Miles^
Density 
Col. B/Col. C
Scaled
Density
Glacier .00 2964 .0000 0
Golden Valley 6,25 1176 .0053 3
Granite .00 1733 .0000 0
Hill 17.00 2927 .0058 3
Jefferson 9.40 1652 .0057 3
Judith Basin 7.11 1880 .0038 2
Lake 6.73 1494 .0045 2
Lewis § Clark 75.76 3476 .0218 12*
Liberty .22 1439 .0002 0
Lincoln 17.30 3714 .0047 3
McCone .00 2607 .0000 0
Madison 52.46 3528 .0149 8*
Meagher 46.78 2354 .0199 11*
Mineral 22.68 1222 .0185 10*
Missoula 40.45 2612 .0155 9*
Park 1.38 2626 .0005 0
Petroleum 2.00 1655 .0012 1
Phillips .56 5213 .0001 0
Pondera .50 1645 .0003 0
Powder River 1.84 3288
To be continued
.0006 0
o\
Table 3.4 Continued
___ _ Sections of
^ In Quantity Land
County 
Area in Miles^
Density 
Col. B/Col. C
Scaled
Density
Powell 2.92 2336 .0013 0
Prairie .00 1730 .0000 0
Raval1i 15.68 2382 .0066 4
Richland .94 2079 .0005 0
Roosevelt .00 2385 .0010 1
Rosebud 3.46 5037 .0006 0
Sanders 23.53 2778 .0085 5
Sheridan .00 1694 .0000 0
Silver Bow .00 715 .0000 0
Stillwater .00 1794 .0000 0
Sweet Grass .00 1840 .0000 0
Teton 47.65 2294 .0208 11*
Toole 32.66 1950 .0167 9*
Treasure .75 985 .0008 0
Valley 1.62 4974 .0003 0
Wheatland 13.10 1420 .0092 5
Wibaux .00 890 .0000 0
Yellowstone .00 2642 .0000 0
State of Montana 830.35 145587 .0054 2.97
G\W
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where:
= the scaled value of x for county n,
Xcoi Q = the observed value of x in Column D, Table 3.4, for 
county n.
The scaled values of x^ were then rounded to the nearest, integer 
and listed in Column E, Table 3.4.
The value of m, the parameter, was estimated by dividing 
the number of sections of iji quantity grant land in Montana by the 
area of the state and proportioning the resultant according to 
Formula 3.2. The scaled value of m was 2.97, no rounding of m to 
an integer being necessary.
With the value of m and values of x calculated, the prob­
able values of x from 0 to 12 could be calculated (Table 3.5, Column 
B]. The expected number of occurrences of counties with values of 
X  from 0 through 12 was calculated (Table 3.5, Column C) and was 
compared with the observed occurrences (Table 3.5, Column D).
Comparison of Columns C and D, Table 3.5, reveals the 
tendency toward concentration of in quantity land. Indeed, scaled 
values of x larger than eight are unlikely to occur in the Possion 
distribution, but ten counties have x values in excess of eight.
These ten counties are indicated on Table 3.4, Column E, and illus­
trated in Figure 3.3. They are the counties upon which subsequent 
analysis concentrates.
From Figure 3.3 it is obvious that in quantity land selection 
is concentrated in western and north-central Montana. Comparison 
with Figure 3.2 reveals that important selections of in quantity and
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in lieu land coincide only slightly, specifically in Beaverhead 
and Chouteau counties. Further in quantity lands are concentrated 
in two counties, Missoula and Flathead, which are conspicuously 
deficient in in lieu lands. In quantity lands, however, are not 
found in eastern Montana where in lieu land is abundant. The 
patterns suggest that lieu and iji quantity estates are spat­
ially surprisingly independent of each other, and this suggests 
that they may be temporally independent also. Exploration of the 
temporal characteristics of Montana state land selection is the 
topic of the next chapter.
Table 3.5. Expected and Observed In Quantity Land Density.
A
X
B
f ( x )
C
Expected** 
Number of Counties
D
Observed*** 
Number of Counties
0 .0513 2.8728 29
1 .1523 8.5288 3
2 .2262 12.6672 2
3 .2240 12.5440 7
4 .1663 9.3128 1
5 .0987 5.5272 3
6 .0489 2.7384 0
7 .0200 1.1200 1
8 .0076 .4256 1*
9+ .0047 .2632 9*
*Significant
**(56)[f(x)]
***From Column E, Table 3.4
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Conclusions
Methods for identifying counties with important excesses 
and deficiencies of school land, and with major concentrations of 
in quantity land, have been presented and applied to Montana. The 
methods have had to vary for the two estates because of salient 
differences in legal provisions which Congress attached to the 
grants. Still the grants were made essentially simultaneously, so 
that strong spatial similarities between the two estates might be 
expected. The spatial distribution of the two estates appears to 
be remarkably independent, however, and this spatial independence 
suggests temporal independence and policy differences possibly more 
profound than the differences dictated by Congress in the Omnibus 
Statehood Aot of 1889.
CHAPTER IV 
THE SEQUENCE OF STATE LAND SELECTION
In Chapter III Montana counties with significant concen­
trations of state land were determined. In Chapter IV the primary 
literature of state land selection decision-making is approached 
systematically in order to date the occurrence of these concentra­
tions. Analyzing the dates of selection of state lands that com­
prise a concentration is one method of making an evaluation of the 
importance of land selection policies. If large tracts of land 
were acquired during a given time period, then new policies prob­
ably were being implemented at those time periods. It follows 
that the primary sources of the time period should reveal the poli­
cies which generated the concentration.
Organization of the State's Chain of Title
As with any landowner, public land states can sustain 
claims to land only by tracing the chain of title from the sove­
reign, generally the United States. For in place lands, the claim 
is sustained by Montana through the Omnibus Statehood Aot and a 
completed cadastral survey. As a matter of law, the procedure is 
crude but simple.
For in^  lieu and in^  quantity, however, the chain of title 
is more complex. Two events establish a state's claim to land:
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selection, in which the state asks for a parcel of land; and ac­
quisition, in which the federal government conveys the land. The 
difference between the two events is the pendant time.
Selection of land established, at best, an equitable title, 
which is nothing but the right to acquire full title at a future 
date in the absence of parties with sounder claims. The equitable 
title carries no right to use or protect land. Acquisition, how­
ever, established a full or exclusive title to the land, as well as 
affecting the trust. With full title, state administrators could, 
according to law, lease, sell, and protect the land.
Land acquisition must be a matter of record, for without 
it the state lacks proof of ownership. Consequently, the Montana 
Department of State Lands carefully maintains the document, the 
"clear list," conveying full title to land as well as the date, 
literally to the hour, of the transaction. Once land is acquired 
there are few reasons for maintaining record of the selection date. 
As a result, although the date of acquisition is freely available, 
the date of selection is difficult to obtain, and since little 
clerical effort has been expended on these records, the selection 
date is of doubtful validity when it is available.
The implications of the record system are disconsolate.
The selection date is the date that more closely corresponds with 
the time when the decision is made, while the acquisition date be­
tokens the termination of a trifling and often protracted adminis­
trative procedure. However, the acquisition date, rather than the 
selection date, is used in much subsequent analysis because of its 
availability.
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Sampling the Clear Lists 
The clear lists and supporting documents in the Montana 
Department of State Lands contain acquisition dates, and in some 
cases, selection dates, for all land acquired for the trust estate. 
The records, however, are difficult to use and the time required 
to examine all transactions in the state is prohibitive. Conse­
quently, a sample was taken of lands in the counties in Figures 
3.2 and 3.3, which contain significant concentrations of state 
land. The clear lists for these lands were then searched for 
selection and acquisition dates. The sampling proceeded as follows: 
Two documents give the legal description and grant of all 
Montana trust land: the State Land Ovmership Listings and the
Classified State Forest Land Oitnership List. For the ten counties 
containing significant concentrations of quantity land (Figure
3.3), each line (a line being an entry in the documents) of in 
quantity land was identified, and the lines in each county then 
randomly selected. The sampled lines consisted of at least 10 per 
cent of the quantity acreage in the county. Further, to assure 
geographic dispersal of the acreage, the sample had to contain 
lands located in at least thirty individual cadastral sections, 
so the sample was increased, when necessary, until this criterion 
was met. The same sampling procedure was used for the in lieu 
lands (Figure 3.2). In both cases, in order to avoid problems re­
sulting from subdivision of cadastral sections, data were collected 
acre by acre. For example, a 640 acre state section might consist of 
two 320-acre tracts selected or acquired on different dates.
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Consequently, 320 acres would be attributed to the appropriate 
year.
The Land Acquisition Sequence--An Overview 
The per cent of the sample of lieu and quantity 
land acquired in each of Montana's four-year administrative periods 
is shown in Figure 4.1. The graph clearly reveals that in quantity 
lands were acquired generally before lieu lands. Indeed, sub­
stantial acquisition of lieu lands did not occur until 1901 
while, for all practical purposes, 1904 marks termination of in 
quantity land acquisition. Almost all land acquisition was com­
pleted by 1932.
Figure 4.1 also reveals two surprising trends. First, in 
lieu land acquisition was initiated in the period 1901 through 1904, 
only to wane for over a decade until the period 1917 through 1920. 
This lull in acquisition I have labeled the "abeyant period,” and 
it is discussed in Chapter VI. The second trend is the acquisition 
of a large amount of quantity land in the period 1957 through 
1960, long after quantity land acquisition had been completed. 
Specifically, the lands acquired in the period were part of the 
Glacier Park Exchange which is discussed in Chapter V.
In Quantity Land Selection Sequence 
Both the selection and acquisition dates were available for 
the in quantity lands searched in the clear lists. The Glacier 
Park Exchange is unusual not only because it is a late acquisition, 
but because the selection and acquisition date are the same, 1958, 
resulting in a pendant time of zero. Consequently, these lands were
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removed from the quantity land sample for separate considera­
tion. For the remainder of the in quantity land, an important act 
of selection was defined as any in which more than 5 per cent of 
the sample was selected in any single county in any single year.
The resulting important years of in quantity land selection and 
their corresponding counties are shown in Table 4.1. There were, 
however, a number of problems encountered in associating counties 
with years of selection. These problems--the relationship of 
Chouteau County with 1898 and 1899, and the impact of the 1958 
Glacier Park Exchange on the sample--are reviewed so that the as­
sociations shown in Table 4.1 can be more completely understood.
Chouteau County, 1898 and 1899 
Chouteau County does not meet the criteria in either 1898 
or 1899 if Julian calendar dates are used. However, if the fiscal 
year is used a different picture is evident. In Chouteau County, 
7.19 per cent of the sample was selected in the period from June,
1898, to June, 1899. Obviously, a significant land selection was 
being made in Chouteau County during the fall of 1898 and the winter 
of 1899. Consequently, Chouteau County was associated with 1898 and
1899.
The 1958 Land Selections 
The 1958 land selections were made without competition from 
the reserved public domain administered by the U. S. Bureau of Land 
Management. Consequently, the land selections were ceremoniously 
conveyed to Montana on the same day that they were submitted. This
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Table 4.1. The Sequence of In Quantity Land Selection.
Year County
1892 Madison
1893 Missoula and Flathead
1894
1895 Mineral
1896
1897 Beaverhead and Lewis and Clark
1898 Meagher, Chouteau, Teton, and Lewis and Clark
1899 Chouteau
1900-
1957
1958 Teton, Toole, Chouteau, and Lewis and Clark
procedure is artificial and produces a pendant time which fails to 
reflect the years of field investigation upon which the 1958 
selections were based. Consequently, the 1958 selections had to 
be segregated from the rest of the sample.
The sample identified four counties--Teton, Toole, Chouteau, 
and Lewis and Clark--which were subject to significant land selec­
tion in 1958. Only one county, Chouteau, was definitely associ­
ated with another period of land selection, though, particularly in 
Teton and Lewis and Clark counties, analysis of the sample sug­
gested important land selection activity in the final years of the 
Nineteenth Century. To verify this trend the sample for the four 
counties was expanded to include 100 per cent of their quantity 
lands.
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Table 4.2. The Relative Importance of the 1958 Land Selections.
County
1958 Selections 
as a 
Per Cent of 
In Quantity 
Land Selection
Other 
In Quantity 
Land 
Selections
Year(s) of 
Most 
Important 
Land 
Selection*
Per Cent 
In Quantity 
Land Selected 
in Most 
Important 
Years
Lewis 
8 Clark 24.84% 48.84 Sections
1897,
1898
68.98%
Chouteau 17.79% 63.32 Sections
1898,
1899
91.99%
Teton 72.74% 15.07 Sections
1898,
1899
79.00%
Toole 87.10% 5.27 Sections 1898 100.00%
*More than 20 per cent of the ^  quantity land, not including 
that selected in 1958, selected in any single year.
Table 4.2 summarizes the results of the expanded sample.
The importance of the 1898 and 1899 land selections in Lewis and 
Clark County is shown. Table 4.2 also shows that Toole County ap­
pears in Figure 3.2 as a county with substantial in quantity land 
selections only because of the 1958 land selections. The trend for 
Teton County is uncertain. The 1898 and 1899 selection of about 
11.91^ sections would not be viewed as important, but Teton County's
^Seventy-nine per cent of 15.07 sections.
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place in the region suggests that important land selections oc­
curred, though they were not indicated by the data collection pro­
cedures used in this study. Teton County is contiguous with two 
counties that had active land selection. Also, it is contiguous 
to Cascade County and its important city of Great Falls which was 
undergoing rapid growth and consequent rampant land speculation by 
the late 1890s. Further, Teton County's Sun River was notable for 
its irrigation potential, a potential which was realized through 
federal reclamation in the first decade of the Twentieth century.
All this suggests that Teton County was ripe for land speculation 
and the possibility that more than 11.91 state sections were 
selected but subsequently sold. Consequently, Teton County was as­
sumed to have been subject to important land selections in 1898 and 
1899, and the frequent mention of the county in the primary litera­
ture sustained the assumption.
The Sequence of In Lieu Land Selection 
Selection dates for ijn lieu lands are generally not avail­
able. Initially, it was thought that the selection dates of lieu 
lands could be estimated by deducting the pendant time of the in 
quantity lands from the acquisition date of the in lieu lands. The 
average pendant time for the quantity lands is 22.76 months, 
with a standard deviation of 11.52 months. The pendant time is long 
and the standard deviation large. Additionally, the distribution of 
the pendant times was highly skewed, as there were many selections 
with pendant times substantially less than the mean, and a small 
number with extremely long pendant times. This skewness makes the
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in quantity land's pendant time a poor estimator of selection dates 
of lieu lands.
Fortunately, a better estimator of the date of selection 
for the in lieu lands was available. The amount of iri_ lieu land 
selected in each county for a given year is generally indicated in 
the annual reports of the state land bureaucrats. The annual re­
ports vary considerably in the information they contain and in the 
way it is organized and presented. Also, between 1889 and 1923, a 
large number of new counties were created in Montana, so boundaries 
were continually altered. Consequently, it is difficult to associ­
ate the current counties with their antecedents except by recreating 
the history of each county. Once sample counties were identified, 
however, their antecedents could be determined, and by knowing the 
important date of land acquisition, the important date of land 
selection could generally be identified in the annual reports.
The acquisition dates for the in lieu land sample were 
grouped by four-year administrative periods. An important period 
of ijT^ lieu land acquisition in a county was defined as any adminis­
trative period wherein more than 5 per cent of the iii lieu lands 
were acquired. The major periods of land acquisition for the in 
lieu lands are listed in Table 4.3.
Several aberations were evident and dealt with, on an indivi­
dual basis. For example, by the definition used to identify impor­
tant acts of lieu land selection, two counties. Hill and Liberty, 
do not have any single period of land acquisition. Land acquisition 
in these two counties was a continuous rather than a discrete event.
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Table 4.3. The Sequence of In Lieu Land Acquisition.
Administrative
Period
Dates County
1 1889-1892 -
2 1893-1896 -
3 1897-1900 -
4 1901-1904 Chouteau and Judith Basin
5 1905-1908 -
6 1909-1912 -
7
8
1913-1916
1917-1920
Blaine, Chouteau, Daniels, 
and Valley
9 1921-1924 Carter and Powder River
10 1925-1928 -
11 1929-1932 Beaverhead
12-present 1933- -
Descriptive statistics bear this out. The model year of acquisi­
tion for Liberty County is 1924, but the amount acquired is only 
1.69 sample sections. The mean year of acquisition is 1919, and 
the squared variance about 1919 is 310.72 years, while the range 
of acquisition activity covers the period from 1899 through 1958. 
The descriptive statistics for Hill County are similar.
Although the selection dates for lieu lands in Liberty 
and Hill counties give no indication of the significance of any 
policy, a study of the patents for the in lieu lands reveals the
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policy responsible for concentrating much of the land in Liberty 
and Hill counties. Montana, like many western states, made first 
time farm loans out of the common school trust fund. During the 
agricultural depression of the 1920s and 1930s the default rate on 
these loans exceeded 95 per cent (Anderson, 1940, p. 191).
Following default, state officials had little alternative but to 
foreclose on the loan, which brought the mortgaged lands into the 
state estate. Fully half of the sampled lands in Liberty and Hill 
counties were acquired by Montana through foreclosure. Acquisition 
of land through foreclosure, the process which placed Liberty and 
Hill counties among other counties with significant amounts of in 
lieu land (Figure 3.2), represents the failure of financial manage­
ment practices rather than official decisions to actively acquire 
lands. No date of selection can be identified for foreclosure lands 
because there was never a selection. Rather, the lands were de­
faulted to the state because of an agricultural calamity. For these 
reasons Liberty and Hill counties were eliminated from further con­
sideration in this study.
With the important dates of land acquisition identified, 
the annual reports of the bureaucrats could be used to identify 
important periods of state land selection. The period of ^  lieu 
land selection is summarized in Table 4.4.
Toward A Geographical History of Montana Land Selection
The state land selection sequence in Montana is summarized 
by combining Table 4.1 and 4.4 in Table 4.5. Table 4.5 is given 
graphic expression in Figure 4.2. The patterns displayed in
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Table 4.4, The Sequence of In Lieu Land Selection.
Years County
1892-1898 --, Selection of In Quantity Lands
1899-1900 Chouteau and Judith Basin
1901-1909 --, The Abeyant Period
1910-1913 Chouteau and Blaine
1914-1915 Daniels and Valley
1916
1917-1921 Powder River and Carter
1922-1925 -
1926-1927 Beaverhead County
1928- --, Post-selection Period
Figure 4.2 conform to traditional geographic regionalization of 
Montana. Initial interest was in western Montana where earliest 
settlement occurred. The "patch-work" pattern, however, suggests 
interest in specific inter-mountain valleys and probably specific 
resources. Subsequently, land selectors turned to north-central 
Montana centering their activities around the rapidly developing 
industrial center of Great Falls. Final land selections were made 
in highly concentrated though geographically separated areas of 
eastern and southwestern Montana.
The general aspects of the geographical history associated 
with the development of these patterns (Figure 4.2) are necessary 
to the more detailed discussion of policy which follows in Chapters 
V and VI. The purpose of this section is to present such a discus­
sion. The historical circumstances are amplified, however, where 
necessary in Chapters V and VI.
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Table 4.5. In Quantity and In Place Land Selections,
Year County*
1892 Madison (Q)
1893 Flathead (Q) and Missoula (Q)
1894 -
1895 Mineral (Q)
1896 -
1897 Beaverhead (Q) and Lewis and Clark (Q)
1898 Meagher (Q), Chouteau (Q), Lewis 
Teton CQ3
and Clark CQ) and
1899 Chouteau (Q and L); Judith Basin (L)
1900 Chouteau (L) and Judith Basin (L)
1901-1909 --, Abeyant Period
1910-1913 Chouteau (L) and Blaine (L)
1914-1915 Daniels (L) and Valley (L)
1916 -
1917-1921 Powder River (L) and Carter (L)
1922-1925 -
1926-1927 Beaverhead (L)
1928-1957 Post-selection Period
1958 Glacier Park Exchange--Teton (Q), 
(Q) and Lewis and Clark (Q)
Toole (Q) , Choutez
1959- Post-selection Period, continued
*Q = In quantity land selections and 
L = In Lieu land selections.
Between 1889 and 1891, the administrative structure for 
selecting and managing a five-million acre estate was developing, 
so no land selections were made. Initially land selections were 
based on the distribution of known natural resources. The sheltered
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and fecund river valleys of the southwest were the cradle of Montana, 
possessing a well developed livestock industry that marketed cattle 
to Denver and Salt Lake City prior to the 1858 gold discovery in 
Montana and the development of local markets (Osgood, 1929, pp. 12- 
17). The state turned immediately to this area for land selection, 
for example, in Madison County in 1892 and in Beaverhead County in 
1897 (Table 4.5 and Figure 4.2). The preoccupation of state land 
administrators with the livestock industry was so strong that the 
motives are suspicious, but the plenteous pastures of southwestern 
Montana would be attractive to anyone seeking valuable land.
Commercially valuable timber was a desirable resource, 
particularly where it existed on land that also had agricultural 
potential. Commercial timber was found largely in northwestern 
Montana, so selectors turned to this area early with land selections 
in Flathead and Missoula counties in 1893 and Mineral County in 1895 
(Table 4.5 and Figure 4.2). However, after the Forest Reserve Act 
of 1891 (Sec. 24, 26 Stat. 1095) lands with potentially valuable 
timber became the subject of increasing federal land reservation, 
so that state selections in the northwest became increasingly diffi­
cult.
In the meantime, the Indian reservations of north-central 
Montana were extinguished, and ranchers pushed into the valleys of 
the high plains. More than ranchers came, however. Paris Gibson 
could not resist the power potential of the Great Falls of the 
Missouri. In cooperation with J. J. Hill, who began building a 
railroad "through nothing to nowhere," Gibson began a planned
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community at the Great Falls, while Charles Broadwater began a 
railroad link between the Great Falls and the isolated copper mines 
at Butte, Completed with amazing speed, this rail line sent Gibson 
on his way to the U. S. Senate, Hill's Great Northern Railroad on 
its way to the Puget Sound, and thousands of settlers on their way 
to Great Falls and.its hinterland.
The rapid ascendancy of Great Falls made its hinterland 
of high quality grazing and irrigable farm land attractive to land 
selectors. The quantity grant selections were completed with 
central Montana lands in Lewis and Clark, Meagher, Teton and 
Chouteau counties between 1897 and 1899 while lieu land selec­
tion, to replace school lands captured in national forests and 
Indian reservations, was begun further east in Chouteau and Judith 
Basin counties in 1899 and 1900 (Table 4.5 and Figure 4.2). For 
reasons which will be explored later, land selection was then cur­
tailed during the abeyant period for nearly a decade.
At the end of the abeyant period, between 1910 and 1913, 
initial land selections were again made in central Montana in 
Chouteau and Blaine counties (Table 4.5 and Figure 4.2). However, 
the field of selection quickly turned further east to Daniels and 
Valley counties in 1914 and 1915 (Table 4.5 and Figure 4.2). The 
Daniels-Valley county land selections were large indeed, amounting 
to 343.76 sections in two large blocks of nearly contiguous land.
This change in selection seems to suggest that Montana land admin­
istrators were selecting from lands specifically reserved for Mon­
tana. This condition is encountered again in the Powder River-Carter
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land selections between 1917 and 1921, and the Beaverhead County 
selections in 1926 and 1927 (Table 4.5 and Figure 4.2). Indeed, 
the Beaverhead land selections were the only ones ever publically 
mentioned by the bureaucrats before the selections were actually 
filed (Montana Register of State Lands, 1926, p. 33), which strongly 
suggests the absence of competition and the existence of special 
dealings between federal and state officials.
For all practical purposes, with the exception of the 
1958 Glacier Park Exchange, land selection was complete in Montana 
by 1927. Geographically, there was a logical sequence from initial 
resource specific land selections, to the speculative selections in 
central Montana, to the mere filling of the grants regardless of 
quality in far eastern Montana. There was a decided tendency for 
the field of land selection to progress from west to east, parallel 
to the general trend of intensive settlement of Montana.
Conclusions
Figure 4.2 portrays the geographic and temporal sequence of 
land selection in Montana. While the pattern is logical and ap­
pealing in general outline, it predicates only shallow reasons for 
land selection. What were the motives and objectives subscribed to 
by administrators as they made land selections? What conflicts did 
they encounter in making land selections, and how did these con­
flicts influence land selection decisions and policies? Answers 
to these questions must be found in the primary literary record of 
the decision-makers: the Minutes of the Board, the reports of the
bureaucrats, and the surviving private papers of politicians and
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bureaucrats. The volume of this literature is tremendous and 
without any inherent order. However, the geographic pattern de­
picted in Figure 4.2 does provide considerable guidance in ordering 
the primary literature search for evidence of major objectives, 
decisions, and problems. The remainder of this study is devoted 
to the analysis of that primary literature in a quest to identify 
the objectives held and the conflicts encountered by state land 
administrators as they made the selections.
CHAPTER V
FEDERAL-STATE LAND CONFLICTS
The policies articulated in the Omnibus Statehood Act speci­
fy that most school land should be iji_ place--that is, limited to 
Sections 16 and 36 of each township. The analyses in Chapters 111 
and IV indicate that a large quantity of school land is ^  lieu, 
however, and consequently, had to have been selected from the public 
domain. The movement of land from place to ^  lieu categories 
has been identified in Chapter II as a salient source of federal- 
state conflict over the spatial distribution of the grant estate 
and this conflict had to be resolved through policy manipulation. 
Furthermore, from Figure 3.2 it was inferred that national forest 
reservations in western Montana and Indian reservations in eastern 
Montana were the lands made eligible for iji lieu selections.
Montana officials could not select lieu lands for place 
lands unless the in place lands were actually denied to the state. 
Consequently, with each lieu land selection, officials had to 
identify the base, or ^  place lands denied to Montana, and offer 
proof that the lands had been denied to Montana for legitimate 
reasons. This information is preserved in the clear lists, the 
documents which convey full title to in lieu lands to Montana. In 
the original sample of 193.75 sections in the ten counties with
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excess school lands (Figure 3.2), the reason for base offering was 
noted. The relative importance of each reason of base offering was 
calculated and is displayed in Table 5,1.
Table 5,1 shows the importance of federal land reservation 
in freeing school lands from fixed locations. Fully 86,7 per cent 
of the lieu land sample was subject to state selection because of 
conflicting federal land reservation ("Primary Cause," Table 5,1), 
Forest and Indian reservations were the most important of these 
land reservations. It is clear that the federal land reservation 
policies subsequent to the Omnibus Statehood Act conflicted with 
the spatial dictates contained in the original state land grants so 
an understanding of the spatial pattern of the state land estate 
requires an understanding of this conflict and its resolution.
In this chapter the conflicts between the spatial dictates 
in the Montana land grants and subsequent federal land policies are 
discussed. The first of these conflicts is the impact of national 
forest reservations on freeing Montana state land from the fixed 
formulation grant, A logical extension of this inquiry is the ter­
ritorial conflict which arose over state lands in Glacier National 
Park, even though the state lands at issue were quantity rather 
than in lieu lands, State-Indian conflicts over the spatial distri­
bution of their respective lands, a topic of great interest today, 
is the last topic analyzed.
The burden of resolving conflicts resulting from federal 
land preservation subsequent to the Omnibus Statehood Act was the 
moral responsibility of Congress, What emerges from an analysis of 
Congressional action is a dismal portrait of Congress's inability
Table 5.1. Sample Causes for Lieu Land Selection.
Lieu Land Sample Primary Cause Secondary Cause
Source % of Sample Source % of Sample
Federal
Reservation 86.76%
Forest Reservation 
Indian Reservation 
National Parks 
Other**
67.42%
10.67%
7,25%
1,42%
100%
(n= 193.75 Sections)
Non-Fedeial
Reservation 10.36%
Farm Loan Foreclosure 
Preemption***
7.48%
2.88%
Miscellaneous* 3.19% - -
*Includes survey inaccuracies which permitted Montana to claim land, exchanges with local 
governments, and lieu lands for which base lands or reasons for base offerings were not identi­
fied.
**Includes military reservations and reclamation projects.
***Includes both mineral and settlement preemption.
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to consider national land legislation in a broad context of unified 
policy, or to provide the leadership necessary to resolve the con­
flicts which were created through shortsightedness in policy formu­
lation. The failure of Congress to provide a unified leadership 
through national land policy placed the burden of resolving distri­
butional conflicts, through manipulation of existent laws, on poli­
ticians and bureaucrats. Consequently, while many administrators 
acted ably, conflict resolution was dependent upon their leadership 
and ability to negotiate rather than upon more uniform and common 
practices.
National Forests and Montana State Land Selection
National forests in Montana occur almost exclusively in the 
western portion (Figure 5.1). Large stands of commercially valu­
able timber are concentrated even more in the extreme northwestern 
part of the state. Montana land selectors, hoping to acquire valu­
able timber, turned to this rich area at an early date. However, 
the selector faced a stout competitor, the United States. Forest 
reservation, a thing which did not exist when Montana entered the 
Union, advanced apace after 1891, and it had two impacts on Montana's 
land estate. First, in place school lands in national forests were 
denied the state unless the reserved lands had been surveyed prior 
to reservation. Second, im quantity land selections in national 
forests were denied to the state unless the survey of the selected 
lands was completed prior to forest reservation.
Denial of irj_ quantity land selections in forest reserves 
was of great concern to Montana land administrators. Though Montana
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was able to obtain large quantities of land in Missoula, Mineral, 
and Flathead counties, in addition to forest land in Sanders, and 
Lewis and Clark counties, many ^  quantity lands were ultimately 
denied to Montana by forest land reservation. Indeed, the Swan 
River and Stillwater Creek areas which, as is discussed in Chapter 
VI, were thought to be the most desirable land were denied to 
Montana during this period. Montana land administrators, however, 
had little recourse but to accept federal land reservations and 
denial of state in quantity land selections.
Ultimately, the fate of the place lands within national 
forest reservations became a subject of primary concern. Congress 
had seemingly promised these lands to Montana. Did Congress now 
deny them forever to the new state? Was Montana expected to relin­
quish all interest in these forest lands and to select nearly worth­
less range land to replace them? Was there not some way by which 
Montana could establish a greater interest in the national forest 
resources?
Legal Foundations and Early Relinquishments
National forest reservation has its origins in popular and 
Congressional discontent with public domain management. Though 
eastern and western Congressmen could not agree upon sound manage­
ment practices. Congress did manage to pass the Aot to Repeal Timber 
Culture Laws (26 Stat. 1095), Section 24 being the Forest Reserve 
Aot of 1891. The act empowered the President to reserve from the 
public domain land principally valuable for its timber. Though 
much land was reserved under the Forest Reserve Aot of 1891, the law
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had obvious weaknessess; it empowered only reservation and made no 
provision for management.
Reform of the Fovest Reserve Aot of 1891 was accomplished 
by the Forest Reserve Aot of 1897 (30 Stat. 11). Authored by 
western Congressman responding to what they considered to be Presi­
dent Cleveland's ruinous reservations of February 22, 1897, the act 
of 1897 provides the foundation of modern national forest law and 
is generally considered brilliant legislation. The act of 1897, 
however, failed to provide for the disposition of school lands with­
in the forest reserves. By implication, the Omnibus Enabling Act of 
1889 and the Lieu Seleotion Aot of 1891 were to determine the fate 
of state school lands in national forest reserves. Through this 
legislation Montana had two choices for managing the reserved school 
lands. It could either relinquish reserved lands and select lieu 
lands elsewhere, or it could await extinguishment of the forest re­
serves. The first alternative could only be followed if it were 
legal under state law, while the latter alternative impractically 
delayed acquisition of the lands.
Between 1892 and 1899 Montana officials selected the in 
quantity grants unconcerned about the future of reserved school 
lands. By 1899 the quantity grants were selected while applica­
tions for leases to state land in central Montana remained unfilled. 
To meet the demand for leasable state land, the Register of State 
Lands asked the Montana Board of State Land Commissioners for au­
thority to relinquish claim to school lands in a portion of the 
Flathead Forest Reserve (Minutes, June S, 1899). The action, the
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first of its kind, was authorized and a flood of requests soon 
followed. The Register was instructed to investigate the forest 
reserves for potential in place land relinquishments (Minutes,
August 21, 1899), and consequently the Board relinquished school 
sections in Bitterroot Forest Reserve on March 13, 1900 (Minutes) 
and the east half of the Lewis and Clark Forest Reserve on April 
11, 1900 (Minutes). Meanwhile, relinquishment of reserved Indian 
lands began on July 1, 1900 (Minutes).
Virtually all lieu lands selected to replace forest relin­
quishments were located in central Montana to meet the demand for 
leasable land, particularly in Judith Basin and Chouteau counties. 
Then, for reasons which will be explored in Chapter VI, both re­
linquishment and selection was halted until July 31, 1908 (Minutes). 
Initial selection after the abeyant period was cautious for many 
things had changed in Montana. Central Montana was nearly settled, 
so future land selections would have to be made further east in 
areas of dubious value. The relinquishment of valuable timber land 
in western Montana for questionable eastern grazing land was not to 
be entered into lightly, particularly since doubts about the legal­
ity of land relinquishments had arisen. Consequently, the Board, 
on July I, 1909 (Minutes), instructed the Montana Attorney General 
to investigate the state's right to in place school lands inside the 
national forest reservations.
The Montana Attorney General was given instructions to in­
vestigate and, if necessary, negotiate with the federal government 
on specific topics. He reported his findings to the Board in a
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Memorandum of December 30, 1912. The Memorandum of December 30, 
1912, is contained in four Decisions of the Montana Attorney General 
537, 544, though the more informative draft version of his report 
is available in the Forest Exchange Files of the Montana Department 
of State Lands. The draft version was used in this study. The 
Memorandum of December 30, 1912, addresses, in response to the 
Board's request, the legitimacy of state land relinquishments in 
the light of an Idaho Supreme Court Decision, Balderston vs. Brady 
(107 Pac. 493; 108 Pac. 742); the impact of Balderston vs. Brady
on United States House Bill 10584; and the negotiations between 
Montana and the Interior Department in the light of the model pro­
posed by H. B. 10584.
Balderston vs. Brady
The Montana Board could relinquish land in federal reserva­
tions under the Lieu Selection Aot of 1891 only if the action was 
lawful under state law. In early land relinquishments, the Montana 
Board had assumed that it was empowered to make relinquishments, 
but by 1909 a legal tangle in Idaho called into question the Montana 
Board's authority to make relinquishments. If the Board was not em­
powered to relinquish land, the issue of what to do about ^  place 
lands in national forests was moot, for the Board could not do any­
thing about them.
The Idaho rule was given in 1909 and 1910 in Balderston vs. 
Brady (107 Pac. 493; 108 Pac. 742), a complex, poorly presented 
case, tainted by politics. In 1901 the Idaho Board was selecting 
land in an area where it possessed a oriority right, but the U. S.
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Land Office failed to inform settlers of the state's priority 
right to land. Consequently, the U. S. Land Office rejected the 
filings of the Idaho Board, an action eventually reversed by the 
Interior Secretary on the reasoning that a state claim to land was 
not lessened by errors in the Interior Department (35 Land Dec.
640).
However, the Interior Secretary did not approve the filings, 
for the Idaho Legislature had taken up the matter. If the ruling 
of the Interior Secretary prevailed, many settlers would have to 
abandon their homesteads and the improvements on them to the State 
of Idaho. The Idaho Legislature by resolution appointed a special 
commission to investigate the conflict and instructed the Idaho 
Board to abide by the commission's ruling. The commission deter­
mined that genuine settlers were sustaining undue injury and since 
the lands in question were not as yet acquired by Idaho, directed 
the Board to relinquish the lands to the United States so that the 
settlers would be able to file on their homesteads. The suit of 
Bdldevston vs. Brady was brought to thwart implementation of the 
commission directive. The Court ruled that the Board was without 
authority to relinquish state lands under any circumstances. How­
ever, the Court did not make it clear if the weakness in the Board's 
authority was constitutional and correctable only by an amendment, 
or statutory and correctable by legislative action.
The rule issued in Balderston vs. Brady was important to 
Montana because Montana statutory and constitutional law was nearly 
indistinguishable from Idaho's, so it was highly probable that, if
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asked, the Montana Supreme Court would rule as did the Idaho Supreme 
Court. Since constitutional amendment is a slow and difficult route 
to correction of administrative problems, both Montana and Idaho 
elected to attempt correction of the problem by statutory provis­
ions. Chapter 78, Montana Laws of 1911 provided that, "All sections 
sixteen and thirty-six when surveyed, within the boundaries of the 
national forests within the State, are ceded to the United States." 
This specific law has since been broadened into a general relin­
quishment and exchange law (1947 RCM 81-304, 305 and 306) which has 
never faced serious court test. Idaho's relinquishment law, how­
ever, was challenged almost as soon as it became law and was sus­
tained {Rogers vs. Hawley, IIS Pac. 687).
Here it is necessary to distinguish between relinquishment 
and exchange. Relinquishment is the surrender of the state's 
equitable interest in a parcel of land, and Montana's statutes per­
mitting relinquishment are probably constitutional. Exchange, how­
ever, involves the trade of one parcel of land in which the state 
has an exclusive interest for land owned by another party. Since 
acquired lands cannot be disposed of except at public sale, the 
exchange laws of Montana are probably unconstitutional as well as 
inconsistent with federal law. As will be explored, this weakness 
has been used by the Board to assist it in negotiations, particu­
larly in the Glacier Park Exchange; however, the constitutional 
question surrounding land exchanges has seldom blocked a profitable 
land exchange.
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H. B. 10584
So long as the states could relinquish lands, the federal 
executive branch could resolve the conflict between state claims to 
land and the forest reservations. The procedure was legal and 
simple in design, but complex to implement. Within a forest re­
servation all Sections 16 and 36 were identified and their timber 
quality determined. For lands lacking in commerical timber quality, 
the state would routinely select grazing lands. For commercially 
valuable timber lands, however, state officials would identify a 
single tract of commercially valuable national forest land and 
select it. This land would then be surveyed after which the Presi­
dent, under authority of the Forest Reserve Aot of 1897^ would re­
turn the tract of land to the public domain which consequently con­
veyed instantaneously the lands to the state. Implementation of the 
process, however, required a tremendous amount of labor and state- 
federal cooperation. What constituted timber quality land had to 
be determined; unsurveyed Sections 16 and 36 in the national forests 
had to be located and appraised; and federal and state officials had 
to agree on the national forest lands to be surveyed and denational­
ized.
The major weakness in the system as that it depended upon a 
President who was willing to remove forest lands from national reser­
vation. This weakness could be corrected if Congress institutional­
ized the process in the national land policy and law. House Bill 
10584 was introduced by western Congressmen with the assistance of 
the Agriculture Secretary to accomplish this end.
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Representative Mondell of Wyoming guided the bill in the 
House on April 13, 1910 (Congressional Record, Vol. 45, pp. 4652- 
4639). The argument in support of the bill was that it simplified, 
through spatial segregation, management of federal and state land. 
The argument implied that states already held title to the re­
served forest lands, and was a complete misrepresentation of the 
actual situation. Representative Mann of Illinois staunchly opposed 
the bill. Reflecting on the tragic abuse of state land in the Old 
Northwest, Mann argued that concentration of state lands amounts 
to taxation without representation; that the states only wanted 
to waste the lands; and that the lands would retain value only so 
long as they were denied to the states. National forest reserva­
tion denied lands to the states, and Mann was not disposed to alter 
the circumstances. Though both the arguments in support of and in 
opposition to H. B. 10584 were factually incorrect and misrepre­
sented land grant concepts, the bill narrowly passed in the House.
In the Senate debate on H. B. 10584 was held on February 
2, 1911 (Congressional Record, Vol. 46, p. 1813), after issuance 
of the opinion in Balderston vs. Brady. Senator Heyburn of Idaho 
was responsible for guiding the bill through the Senate, and he 
stated that he intended to do nothing with the bill. Western sena­
tors voiced strong opposition to Heyburn who adamantly held that:
The supreme court of Idaho has passed upon that question 
[the process offered in H. B. 10584] adversely to the 
rule that would be established by the bill, and I am not 
willing to have it disturbed. I think our supreme court 
is entitled to that respect.
Since H. B. 10584 had only narrowly escaped the opposition of
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eastern congressmen in the House, western congressmen could not 
hope to pass another bill similar to H. B. 10584 with their own 
ranks divided. The attempt to make an informally negotiated sys­
tem of conveying land to the states part of the national land 
policy was hopelessly defeated,
Montana Forest Land Exchange
In the conditions leading up to Balderston vs. Brady, the 
Idaho Board violated a cardinal political rule of state land admin­
istration (Chapter VI, this study) by needlessly engaging itself in 
court proceedings where land rights of genuine settlers were at 
stake. Confusion resulted, not only in Idaho but in Montana and 
in the U. S. Congress. In this uncertain environment the Montana 
Attorney General began negotiations with the federal government to 
clear Montana's interests from the national forest reserves. The 
negotiations eventually involved both Gifford Pinchot and Theodore 
Roosevelt and culminated in the Agreement of December 23, 1912 
(Forest Exchange File, Montana Department of State Lands; 4 Dec. Mt. 
Att'y. Gen. 537, 544).
Agreement was difficult to achieve, however. To reach the 
Agreement of December 23, 1912, it was necessary to clear the con­
fusion raised by Balderston vs. Brady. This was accomplished by 
Chapter 78, Montana Laws of 1911, through which the Legislature re­
linquished the reserved school lands. The Montana Legislature 
would have been foolish to issue a blanket relinquishment of what 
little legal interest Montana held in the reserved lands unless 
there was assurance of available public lands in Montana sufficient
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to replace, through lieu land selection, the relinquished lands.
A gubernatorial proclamation of March 10, 1910, reserved to Montana 
a large portion of what is today Valley, Daniels, Powder River and 
Custer counties. This reservation assured sufficient land to fill 
the grants thus clearing the way for forest land relinquishment 
(Chapter 78, Montana Laws of 1911) and serious federal-state nego­
tiations.
The Agreement of December 23, 1912, assured that all lands 
relinquished by Chapter 78, Montana Laws of 1911, were to be sur­
veyed for commercially valuable timber. In the case of lands not 
valuable for their timber, the Board was to select from grazing 
lands held under the reservation of March 10, 1910. Relinquished 
lands of commercial timber value were to be replaced by one or more 
contiguous tracts of national forest. Needless to say, actual im­
plementation of the Agreement of December 23, 1912, was difficult.
Despite the monumental demands placed on federal and state 
personnel the majority of the survey was completed by November 27, 
1918, when President Wilson denationalized and conveyed to Montana 
what is today the Stillwater and Swan River state forests (40 Stat. 
1894, 1896). Simultaneously the Interior Department conveyed to 
Montana more than 200,000 acres in Daniels and Valley counties. 
Systematic searches for unrelinquished forest lands continued into 
the late 1920's resulting in lieu land selections from reserved and 
federal grazing land in Powder River, Carter and Beaverhead counties. 
Indeed, to the extent that there may still be unsurveyed school 
lands in the national forests for which Montana has never made lieu
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land selections the Montana Forest Land Exchange is not complete 
and the Agreement of December 23, 1912, is still in force.
Montana Forest Land Exchanges--Conclusions
In the creation of national forests. Congress failed to 
consider that it was permanently reserving lands in which the states 
had a long standing interest. In effect. Congress by dedicating the 
same land to two separate uses was creating conflict in policy. 
Congress was never able to resolve the dilemma. Consequently, con­
flicts which arose were settled by negotiations between federal and 
state officials although federal officials were not obliged by law 
to negotiate much less reach any settlement. The negotiations re­
solved the conflicts through the Montana forest land exchanges 
which were both difficult and expensive to implement.
To Montana the exchanges were worth the expense and diffi­
culty. Armed with an iron-clad state forest management law (1947 
RCM, Title 81, Chapter 14), Montana foresters have managed the 
small but fecund state forests with a singularity of purpose which 
would be intolerable if applied to the much larger national forests. 
The forest land exchanges permitted Montana to rid itself of dis­
persed, low value, mountainous forest land and replace it with 
grazing lands in northeastern, southeastern and southwestern 
Montana. Although there could be little doubt that these grazing 
lands were not the most valuable land in the state, the grazing 
lands acquired by Montana as part of the forest land exchanges be­
tween 1918 and the mid-1930's were an improvement over several
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hundred thousand acres of scrub timber, ridge crests, and talus 
slopes.
The Montana Forest Land Exchange had, however, its unfor­
tunate aspects. Congress created a major conflict in institution­
alizing both state land grants and national forest reservations. 
Congress did not anticipate the conflict and when it was brought 
to attention. Congress failed to provide leadership in resolving 
the conflict. Given Congressional failure, leadership fell by de­
fault to state and federal politicians and bureaucrats. In the case 
of Montana these negotiations probably provided more valuable lands 
than the original grant would have conveyed. For this accomplish­
ment Montana administrators are to be complemented. However, there 
was no guarantee that the negotiations could achieve such a happy 
end. A single mistake in the negotiations could have resulted in 
disaster for the integrity of Montana's estate. Further, while 
Montana achieved a profitable end, such informal negotiations be­
tween state and federal administrators cannot be interpreted as a 
national land or land grant policy. There was no guarantee of con­
sistency between juristictions so, while Montana attained worthy 
ends, other states may have been denied the success which Montana 
achieved.
The Glacier Park Exchange
The Forest Land Exchange explains Montana's lack of school 
land in western Montana and concentration of lieu land in other 
parts of the state. The Glacier Park Exchange resolved another 
serious land conflict. Montana acquired absolute title to 10,000
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in quantity acres of high quality timber in what subsequently be­
came Glacier National Park. By threatening to timber this land, 
the Montana State Forester led the Board’s negotiations which re­
sulted in the acquisition of 168,000 acres of in quantity land in 
Toole, Teton, Chouteau, and Lewis and Clark counties.
Although the amount of acreage involved in the Glacier 
Park Exchange might suggest that Montana negotiated an exceptional­
ly profitable trade, from a qualitative perspective the long and 
troublesome negotiations may have accomplished little but the pre­
servation of the state's dignity and the esthetic quality of en­
vironmentally important land. Nonetheless, the federal government 
paid a much higher price for the land than the Board would have de­
manded had federal officials not been so intransigent in initial 
negotiations. Indeed, settlement was achieved only because state 
officials, particularly the State Forester, were able to create and 
maintain a crisis atmosphere for almost eight years.
Glacier Park to 1946
The Organic Act of Glacier National Park became law on May 
11, 1910 (36 Stat. 354). After describing the new park's boundaries, 
the act ordered respect for the rights of landowners already located 
inside the park. The phrase implies that condemnation could not be 
used to acquire land solely for the general benefit of the park. 
Routinely, Montana relinquished the equitable title to unacquired 
school sections within Glacier National Park as a part of the Forest 
Land Exchange. Montana, however, possessed full title to about
10,000 in quantity acres, all prime timber, on the east bank of the
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Flathead River within the boundaries of the park. According to the 
trust, this land could only be disposed of at public auction. Ac­
cording to state law even this route was closed since vending of 
timber quality land was prohibited after 1909.
Trust and state law to the contrary, Montana officials ini­
tially appeared willing to sell the 10,000 acres back to the federal 
government at appraisal. Between 1924 and 1928 federal and state 
foresters appraised the timber with the intention of facilitating 
that sale. Rutledge Parker, the Montana State Forester after 1927, 
participated in those appraisals and in 1932 offered to sell the
10,000 acres to the National Park Service for the appraised $178,596.50. 
At that time Parker emphasized the state's legal and moral obligation 
to make productive use of the 10,000 acres. Still, for esthetic 
reasons, the Office of the State Forester restrained its impulse to 
cut the timber until the National Park Service obtained funding to 
purchase or exchange the lands (Letter, Parker to Gov. Ford, March 
18, 1946, quoting from a letter, Parker to E. T. Scoyan, Superinten­
dent of Glacier National Park, 35-108-5 MHS). However, by 1946 no 
special legislation had been sought and Parker ran out of patience.
The Initial Crisis
In 1946, Montana Senator Wheeler wrote to Govenor Ford that 
the National Park Service had complained to him of potential state 
timbering in Glacier National Park. What, asked IVheeler, was the 
explanation for this threat (Feb. 27, 1946, 35-108-5 MHS)? Ford 
sent the letter to Parker requesting Parker to provide a background 
so that Ford might "reply to Senator Wheeler in an intelligent manner"
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(Letter, March 6, 1946, 35-108-5 MHS). Parker's reply of March 18 
(35-108-5 MHS) reviewed the problem. On March 18, 1945, the timber 
in a remote section of the park had been offered for logging but no 
bids were received. The sale had been held to stimulate federal 
interest in reaching an agreement on the lands. Parker concluded 
that :
It does seem strange that our Federal Government would, 
on the one hand, give in the form of an endowment, a 
land grant to the State of Montana...and on the other 
hand, create a federal reservation in which are included 
valuable State grant lands, the negotiable assets of 
which have been frozen....What I don't like about it is 
the extreme complacent attitude on the part of the 
Government and its utter failure to make any serious 
effort to compensate the State for its property.
In a separate Memorandum accompanying the letter of March 
18, Parker recommended that the federal government be given an 
ultimatum to make settlement and that the Board settle only for 
cash (approximately $357,189.20) since the federal government pos­
sessed only mismanaged timber and overgrazed grasslands to offer in 
exchange.
Through Ford, Wheeler provided Newton B. Drury, Director 
of the U. S. Park Service, with Parker's letter of March 18, and 
on July 3, 1946, Drury replied to Parker (Letter, 35-108-5 MHS).
The Park Service, he said, was not complacent in the matter of the 
Glacier Park lands, but many states contributed funds and lands to 
help acquire the economic and social benefits of national parks. 
Montana could and should do the same. He suggested that the 
National Park Service acquire the lands at their pre-WWII value, 
and that the Montana Legislature compensate the state trust funds 
for the balance of the value which had accrued to the land.
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An irate Parker replied (Letter, August 2, 1946, 35-108-5 
MHS) that national park reservation was not always locally popular 
especailly when the motive was greed rather than philanthropy. 
Montanans had little reason to support or pay for more federal 
land ownership for any reason. In Montana, the federal government 
already owned acreage that exceeded the area of North Carolina by
10,000 square miles, and it was a burden, not a blessing. Further, 
exchanges offered no solution, for the land exchange laws of Montana 
were probably unconstitutional. Even if they were not, according 
to Parker, exchanges were out of the question for the reason that 
the federal government did not own in Montana 10,000 acres worth 
having.
Serious Negotiations 
In the initial period of negotiation state and federal bur­
eaucrats exchanged hostilities. The Park Service was chronically
short of land acquisition funds so the possibility of the Park Ser­
vice buying the state land was practically nonexistent. Drury ad­
mitted this in a letter of June 30, 1947 (35-108-5 MHS) and con­
cluded:
I repeat--to cut this timber would be a calamity. Isn't 
there some deferring action you can take, or ask the
State Legislature to take, in order to stop, for a speci­
fied time if not indefinitely, the cutting of this timber?
The humbler attitude facilitated negotiations leading to an agree­
ment on September 6, 1947 (Letter, Drury to Ford, Oct. 22, 35-108-5 
MHS). The state park lands would be bought by the Park Service 
at one-half their appraised value while Ford was to ask the 1949
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Montana Legislative Assembly to provide the other half necessary to 
compensate the trust funds.
State officials involved in the agreement of September 6, 
1947, knew it would never be implemented. There was little possi­
bility that the Park Service would obtain the necessary funds, and 
even less possibility that the Montana Legislature would appropri­
ate a match. Indeed, Parker reported to the Board (Letter, March 
3, 1948, 35-108-5 MHS) that he could not even find a sponsor for 
the necessary state legislation. The issue, however, might never 
get as far as the legislature because there was a difference of 
$128,454.25 between the federal and state appraisals of the land. 
Parker suggested that the Park Service be given until April 30, 
1949, the closing date of the 1949 state legislature, to agree to 
the state's higher appraisal or the issue would be closed and the 
timber would be sold. The Board agreed (Minutes, March 6, 1948).
Parker apparently did not believe that this ultimatum would 
ever be implemented. While he adamantly resisted the idea of ex­
changing the land, he cooperated with U. S. Representative Mike 
Mansfield in drafting and passing U. S. House Bill 4980 (80th Con­
gress, 2nd Session). The bill authorized the Interior Secretary 
to make a land exchange with Montana that would solve the Glacier 
Park crisis in the best interests of the United States.
The Crisis Culminates
The Park Service never responded to the ultimatum of April 
30, so on August 10 (Minutes), despite national and local pressure
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to the contrary, the new governor, Bonner, offered the timber on 
a remote section. It was purchased by the Park Service for apprais­
al, $36,531.60. The sale demonstrated that the Board would sell 
the timber but was designed so that only the Park Service could 
be the vendee (Minutes, Aug. 13, Nov. 18, 1948; May 11, June 15,
Aug. 10, 1949).
The environmental brinksmanship, however, was too much 
even for Parker. He reported to the Board (Letter, Dec. 13, 1949, 
35-130-3 MHS) that the Park Service simply did not have the money 
to buy all of the lands. Continuing the sale of the state land 
would mean the implementation of timbering, an activity that was 
not popular. Land exchange was the only solution left, but this 
violated so many state laws that the Board was ill-advised to under­
take it. The matter had become so complex that Parker advised 
the Board that only the State Legislature could solve the problem.
In response to this plea the 1951 Montana Legislature 
passed Chapter 168, 1951 Laws of Montana which ordered a reapprai­
sal of the state lands in Glacier National Park. The 1953 Montana 
Legislature was to review and approve the apprasial. Following ap­
proval of the appraisal the Board was instructed to dispose of the 
lands at a value equal to or more then the appraisal either for 
cash or;
...[the lands] may be exchanged for other lands of 
equal or greater value in accordance with the pro­
visions of Section 81-304 of the Revised Codes of 
Montana, 1947, and any amendments thereto.
The appraisal came in at $789,682.90. The amount was ac­
ceptable to the U. S. Bureau of Land Management which offered Montana
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116,223.87 acres with all mineral rights and 70,925.42 acres with 
fissionable minerals reserved to the federal government. The Bureau 
of Land Management valued this land at $755,120.31, leaving 
$34,573.62 worth of land to be selected by the Board. The offer 
was acceptable to the Board (Minutes, Jan. 30, 1953) and the 1953 
State Legislature (Chap. 114, 1953 Laws of Montana).
The 1953 act empowered but did not consummate the Glacier 
Park Exchange. For the next five years the Board and the Bureau 
of Land Management struggled over value, bickered over mineral 
leases, faced the problem of "squatters” on the land as late as 
1956 (Minutes, Dec. 21, 1956), and argued interminably about the 
wording in patents and deeds. By July 16, 1958 (Minutes), however, 
the Montana Attorney General found all patents and deeds in order, 
and on October 2, 1958 (Minutes) deeds for 9353 acres of state in 
quantity land valued at $84.43 an acre in Glacier National Park was 
exchanged for patents on 168,371.78 acres of central Montana federal 
grazing land valued at $4.69 per acre.
The Glacier Park Exchange--Conclusions
Parker, a bureaucrat, was supposed only to execute rather 
than create policy. In fact he contributed much to policy formu­
lation. By 1946 he recognized the contradiction of Congress dedi­
cating the same lands to two purposes and that only crisis could 
resolve that contradiction. Parker created the needed crisis and 
for seven years guided Montana's politicians and bureaucrats through 
a labyrinth of negotiations.
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Conflict resolution requires compromise and Parker even­
tually had to compromise. While he felt that cash rather than a 
land exchange was most advantageous, exchange eventually had to 
be accepted. Whether Parker was right in seeking a cash settle­
ment is difficult to determine. The Commissioner of State Lands, 
in the Report of 1956 and 1958, wrote in glowing terms of the new 
state lands. They were selected to "round out" existing state 
land parcels in north-central Montana, and thus increase the at­
tractiveness and value of the existing lands. Additionally, the
168,000 acres were selected with an eye on mineral value. To 
many employees of the State Land Department, however, the exchange 
brought little to the state except valueless gores.
Wise or not, the Glacier Park Exchange concentrated more 
than 168,000 acres of state land in portions of Chouteau, Teton, 
Toole, and Lewis and Clark counties while denationalizing an equal 
portion of federal land in those areas. The problem arose, sub­
stantially, because Congress, in the creation of national parks 
just as in the creation of national forests, forgot that grants 
to the states had also been made and that these grants might ser­
iously conflict with national reservations. Though repeatedly 
asked to offer guidance, Congress provided little direction and 
less money to the solution of the problem which it had created. 
Without congressional leadership, conflict resolution fell on federal 
and state officials. In this case, however, the only viable reso­
lution, exchange, so clearly violated state and federal law that 
only the Legislature dared take the responsibility for authorizing 
the exchange.
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Indian Land Conflicts
Dictated policy suggested that Montana should possess no 
land in Indian reservations. State lands in Indian reservations 
should have been relinquished by Montana under provisions of the 
Lieu Selection Act of 1891 or denied the state by the federal 
government under provisions of the Omnibus Statehood Act. In 
Montana, however, this presumption is only partially correct. No 
state lands are in the Fort Peck, Northern Cheyenne, Blackfeet, or 
Rocky Boy Indian reservations (Figure 5.2), but there are state 
lands within the Crow, Fort Belknap, and Flathead reservations.
At least three reservations, consequently, do not demonstrate 
characteristics predicted to exist by national and state land-grant 
policies. The objective of this section is to examine the contra­
dictions and conflicts which arose in state and Indian land rela­
tions .
Legal Foundations 
Indian land law, a maze of executive proclamations, treaties, 
and special and general legislation, appears to be a complex of 
unique circumstances. Some generalizations, however, are possible. 
Three types of Indian reservations, treaty, statutory, and execu­
tive, have been distinguished (Wilson, 1972, p. 14). Since treaty 
and statutory reservations are similar in character and function 
they may be grouped in this study as a single type, treaty-statutory 
reservations. Treaty-statutory reservations gain their authority 
either through a treaty made with the Executive Branch and ratified 
by Congress or directly through an act of Congress. In contrast, an
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executive proclamation is needed to create an executive reserva­
tion. As a matter of protocol, Congress has far more authority 
over treaty-statutory reservations than over executive reservations. 
In Montana all reservations except the Rocky Boy are of the treaty- 
statutory type.
Two acts of Congress have seriously affected lands within 
the treaty reservations. The first is the Dawes or Indian Allot­
ment Act of 1887 (24 Stat. 388), and the second is the Indian Reor­
ganization Act of 1934 (48 Stat. 984). The Dawes Act dictated the 
allotment of homesteads to Indians and the eventual extinguishment 
of reservations. However, by the 1930's it was obvious that allot­
ment was a failure in the sense that social integration was not a- 
chieved while conditions among "allotted" Indians were desperate.
In response. Congress abrogated the Dawes Act in 1934 with the 
Indian Reorganization Act. The Indian Reorganization Act restored 
tribal government but stopped rather than reversed the allocation 
process.
Wilson (1972, pp. 19-22) used the land divisions of the 
Dawes Act and the Indian Reorganization Act to construct a classifi­
cation of Indian reservation land tenure. All reservations in 
Montana except the Rocky Boy are of the "allotted-opened-reorganized" 
type recognized by WiIson. Tlio classification "allotted-opened-
reorganized" implies that the reservation was subject to the Dawes 
Aety and that allotment advanced far enough that all or part of the 
reservation was opened to non-Indian settlement. However, conse­
quent settlement by non-Indians did not proceed far enough that the
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reservation defied restoration under the Reorganization Act of 
1934. Such reorganized reservations, however, frequently enclosed 
lands of the non-Indian settlers within the restored reservations.
This progression of legislation was important to Montana's 
estate. Between 1892 and 1934 the Board could use the Lieu Selec­
tion Act to relinquish land inside Indian reservations. However, 
since the Dawes Act promised the rapid demise of Indian reserva­
tions in Montana, relinquishment of Indian reservation lands was 
not imperative. If school lands were not relinquished by the time 
the reservation was opened, in place lands not allotted to Indians 
were conveyed to Montana. When reorganization was applied to these 
reservations the state frequently found itself being the major "non- 
Indian settler" surrounded by Indian reservations.
The remaining portion of this section explores the early 
relinquishments of land on Indian reservations and through an ex­
amination of a single reservation, the Crow, the process by which 
Montana became a landlord within Indian reservations.
Early Relinquishments 
Prior to allotment of an Indian reservation, the state could 
elect to relinquish equitable title to place lands in Indian re­
servations. Alternatively, the state could elect to retain the 
equitable title which would become an absolute title with the inevi­
table implementation of the Dawes Act. In Montana the decision to 
relinquish or retain was based upon the availability of potential 
lessees to land, the scarcity of state land to meet the demand for 
leases, and the value of the Indian lands relinquished in comparison
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with other lands which might be relinquished.
The value of Indian land relinquishments was addressed by
the Register of State Lands in his Report of 1900 (pp. 7-8) where
he recommended:
...a careful examination be made [of reservation lands] 
to the end that those sections which are found to be...
[worthless for a variety of reasons]...be relinquished 
to the general government, and lands selected lieu 
thereafter. We can thus exchange about 400,000 acres 
of land...for an equal amount of first-class grazing 
land....
The Register's statement of 1900 was an appeal not for relinquish­
ment of Indian lands, but for use of discretion in making relin­
quishments. Relinquishment of federally reserved lands in Montana 
had begun on June 5, 1899 (Minutes) though relinquishment of Indian 
lands did not begin until June 1, 1900 (Minutes) and that relinquish­
ment, all in place lands in the Blackfeet and Fort Peck Indian re­
servations, applied indiscriminately to broad tracts of land.
The Register's request for discriminate relinquishment of 
Indian lands appealed to the Board. The next relinquishment came 
on January 28, 1901 (Minutes) and covered the Northern Cheyenne and 
Crow reservations "except those lands which in the view of the Land 
Agent should be retained." The Agent and Register appeared before 
the Board to detail the survey of the Northern Cheyenne and Crow 
Indian reservations on May 13, 1901 (Minutes). The survey of the 
Northern Cheyenne reservation was completed and all state lands on 
that reservation relinquished prior to the beginning of the abeyant 
period.
Lieu lands to replace the relinquished lands of the Blackfeet,
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Fort Peck, and Northern Cheyenne reservations were made to fill 
lease applications in central Montana. However, the Crow reserva­
tion survey was not completed prior to the beginning of the abey­
ant period and relinquishment of lands in the Flathead and Fort 
Belknap reservations had not even been considered. Land on these 
reservations never would be relinquished. In 1909, at the end of 
the abeyant period, place lands on Indian reservations had re­
ceived scant attention. The Board's indifference was understand­
able. The rich grazing lands of central Montana were settled and 
potential lessees were relatively rare. In a tighter land market, 
the reserved forest lands had to be disposed or the opportunity 
would be lost, while based on the intent of the Dawes Aet^ it was 
believed that the Indian land problems would resolve themselves if 
left alone.
The Crow Reservation and State Land 
The Dawes Act was only a general act which usually required 
specific legislation to consider the unique legal status of each 
reservation. Allotment came to the Crow Reservation in 1920 with 
the Ctow Allotment Act (42 Stat. 576). A substantial portion of 
the act concerned the in place lands in the Crow Reservation. 
Montana was to acquire all Sections 16 and 36 in the reservation un­
less those lands were allotted to Crows or otherwise reserved to 
the tribe. The Board could select up to two sections in each town­
ship of the reservation to replace i^ place lands allotted to the 
Crows. The grant was subject to the provision that Montana assume 
the duty of educating Crow children. Though Montana's Constitution 
technically protected the educational rights of all children in the
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state, special legislation was passed to accept the terms of the 
grant and assure the educational rights of the Crow children (1947 
RCM 81-1201, 1203).
For a number of reasons, allotment was a national disgrace. 
The Indian Reorganization Act of 19S4 was designed to halt allot­
ment and reverse the sad social degeneration of Indian populations. 
Tribal government was reestablished, allotment was halted, and the 
boundaries of the reservation reestablished. Private land owner 
rights within the reservation were recognized and protected though 
Congress was supposed to assist the Indians, through legal means, 
in acquiring private land within the reservation. The best assis­
tance which Congress could offer, of course, would be money for 
land acquisition, something Congress has never done.
Currently, the largest private land owner in the Crow Res­
ervation is Montana which owns 8,828.88 acres in place and 18,799.97 
acres in lieu. The nearly 28,000 acres of state land are owned in 
dispersed isolated tracts. Being mostly low carrying capacity 
grazing land, the estate is useless unless it can be attached, 
through leasing, to large ranch units. The Board has generally 
permitted the Crow to lease the state lands along with Indian lands 
to operators on the margins of the reservation and direct appropri­
ate compensation to the state.
The system, never particularly satisfactory, is functional 
only so long as the Crow lease their lands to non-Indian operators, 
something which the Crow are increasingly disinclined to do. The 
Crow themselves are hostile to paying rent on lands which they view
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as theirs by right and tradition and which, in any event, can be 
used as free range unless the Board elects to fence its lands.
Indian-state relations are becoming increasingly hostile. 
Montana land administrators, of course, are obliged to wisely and 
profitably manage the land grant estate so resentment of the Crow 
attitude is justified. The Crow, likewise, reasonably resent the 
presence of the state within their reservations. Neither Montana 
nor the Crow invented the circumstances making them neighboring 
landlords so confrontations between the two will never lead to suc­
cessful spatial segregation of their estates. Rather such con­
frontations will only raise the ire of both parties and contribute 
to the degeneration of state-Indian relations for no good purpose.
Inconsistent Congressional management of Indian affairs and 
state-land grants created an unsatisfactory land distribution with­
in the reservations and only Congress can rectify the conflict.
The Glacier Park Exchange suggests that Congress or the Executive 
Branch could purchase or trade for the state reservation lands. 
Montana land administrators, however, do not hold the negotiating 
leverage, land of national significance, which they held in the 
Glacier Park negotiations. Until negotiations leverage can be 
found it is doubtful if the federal government can ever be stimu­
lated to take action on the state-Indian land problems.
Leverage to force a solution to state-Indian land conflicts 
can be attained only through a state-Indian agreement to present 
a common front to federal officials, and the only point of agree­
ment is the mutual desire of both parties to be rid of each other. 
So far neither the Indians nor the state have produced the leader-
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ship necessary to convert the common hostility into a common front 
before Congress,
Federal-State Land Conflicts--Conclusions
The land grants to Montana were made when eventual denation­
alization of the public domain was assumed. Within two years, how­
ever, denationalization of the public domain was no longer a singu­
lar national policy. The Forest Reserve Act of 1891, practically 
a legislative accident, was a radical change in national land poli­
cy for forest resources would no longer be delivered to the private 
sector. The Forest Reserve Act of 1897 added clarity to the new 
land policy. The Indian Reorganization Act of 1934 further reversed 
the policy of denationalization of the public domain with great im­
pact on state-land management.
The shift of policy away from denationalization of public 
land was gradual and issue-specific; consequently. Congress has 
failed to consider the breadth of existent national land policy or 
the impact of reservation on established denationalization policies. 
For Montana, most Indian land legislation, all forest land reserva­
tion, and at least one national park organic act were written as if 
Congress had no knowledge of the grants made to Montana but a few 
years before.
Legally there was no conflict, for Montana could either re­
linquish the reserved place lands, or await extinguishment of 
the reservation. However, the conflict between state grants and 
national reservation was more than a simple matter of legal techni­
calities. In 1889 Montanans assumed that Congress had promised a
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given amount of land, and Montana land administrators planned on 
having that land. They consequently viewed increasing land reser­
vation as a breach of the contractual intent under which Montana 
became a state.
Appeal to Congress for special legislation to reconcile 
reservation with the intent of state-land grants was a logical 
course to follow but, overall, it failed dismally. Where cash has 
been required to satisfy conflicting claims. Congress has been 
miserly to a fault. Congress could create empowering legislation, 
but as in the defeat of H. B. 10584, it as often as not failed even 
in this. Since Congress was unable to reconcile national reserva­
tions with the intent of the land grants, the burden of reconcilia­
tion fell upon federal and state bureaucrats and politicians, those 
very low in the policy-making hierarchy (Figure 2.1 and 2.2). 
Through use, and possibly abuse, of existing policies and laws, 
agreements have been reached between the states and the executive 
branch which satisfy the intent of the land grants.
Successful state-federal negotiations have depended, in 
large part, upon the quality of leadership provided by state and 
federal officials. Yet leadership was powerless without adminis­
trative flexibility and freedom to act. Flexibility was achieved 
generally by avoiding public attention and courts, and interpreting 
laws and policies as the amount and situation demanded. Still laws 
could only be twisted so far, so it was occasionally necessary for 
the Board to turn to the Legislature to acquire specific powers.
The problem of segregating state land-grant lands from
122
reserved land has not been solved to this day, and in this sense 
state land selection is a process as yet not completed. On three 
Montana.Indian reservations, Indians and state officials face each 
other as neighboring landlords with little in common, save a mutual 
desire for each to be rid of the other. If that mutual desire 
leads to nothing more than confrontations, conflicts and possibly 
violence can be expected to plague land managers, if, however, 
the mutual desire to be rid of each other is sufficient to stimu­
late a common Indian-state cause before Congress and the federal 
bureaucracy, there is hope for a rational and sane settlement to 
Indian-state land conflicts.
CHAPTER VI
STATE LAND SELECTION OBJECTIVES
By April I, 1891, the administrative hierarchy requisite 
to state land selection was fully operational. The bureaucrats 
and politicians faced a tremendous task. By the smallest estimate, 
they had to select 27.03 per cent, and at the most 48.65 per cent, 
of the 5,863,645.36 acre land grant.^ Congressional and state 
legislation, though it prescribed many management rules, provided 
the politician and bureaucrat with little guidance in land selection. 
The land was to be selected from the surveyed, non-mineral, unre­
served, public domain; the land for which every other aspirant to 
landownership was competing. Like other aspirants, the state had 
to take parcels of at least forty acres, the minimum cadastral 
unit of the U. S. survey. However, the state had one major dis­
advantage in competing for land. Although the state, through the 
governor, could petition the Surveyor General to survey areas where 
selections were desirable, petitions did not guarantee a survey. 
Unlike the private citizen, however, the state could not preempt 
or "squat" on land beyond the margins of the survey.
^The smaller estimate is based upon the ^  quantity land grants 
plus the positive values in Column 0, Table 3.2. The larger esti­
mate assumes that all alienated land in the common school grant also 
had to be selected.
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Although dictated and evolved policy defined the lands 
from which the state estate could be selected, the guidance was 
not particularly helpful, for fundamental questions were not 
addressed. What resources were to be sought? What locations 
were the most desirable? Should the state seek timber, farm 
land, grazing areas, urban land, or land in proximity to known or 
potential areas of population? Should the state attempt to ac­
quire its lands in large contiguous blocks which would be easier 
to manage, but would concentrate in a few counties the burden of 
tax-exempt state lands? Was dispersal of the selected land de­
sirable? Was there a desirable limit to the amount of land the 
state should own in each township?
Since the dictated and evolved policy did not attempt, at 
least initially, to answer these questions, the politicians and 
bureaucrats had to rely on their own values, attitudes, and pre­
ferences in formulating answers. The beliefs and perceptions of 
those making state land selections, thus, became more important 
than written policies and laws in determining the final geographic 
distribution of state lands. State land administrators, however, 
were seldom novices in land economics and institutions. Most of 
the state land-management office holders were in their positions 
at least in part because they had distinguished themselves as pug­
nacious if not vicious competitors in the turbulent frontier land 
market. They could be expected to be thoroughly familiar with 
land resource potentials and the use and abuse of institutional 
aspects of land disposal and transfer. As thoughtful and often
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well-educated men, they brought to their offices valid, if desul­
tory, concepts of land institutions and values. These beliefs 
arose from experience and made sense to them in the social con­
text of the day.
The social context in which decisions were made cannot be 
overlooked without doing injustice to the reputations of devoted 
public servants. Hopefully, the approach used here permits us to 
capture some of the flavor of Montana at the turn of the century, 
and allows us to view the work-a-day world of the politician and 
bureaucrat in that light. Yet, it is as impossible for us to dup­
licate the historical context in which many fundamental land de­
cisions were made in early Montana, as it will be for social 
scientists a hundred years from now to completely understand the 
events which are determining coal development today.
This chapter explores, in light of the material presented 
in Chapter II, the beliefs, values, and attitudes of the politicians 
and bureaucrats whose decisions eventually created the spatial pat­
terns displayed in Figure 4.2. To accomplish this task, the poli­
tical and environmental objectives which eventually areally con­
centrated the dispersed state lands are explored. From the analysis, 
an understanding of the fidelity of the bureaucrats and politicians 
to the dictates of their beliefs, as well as an understanding of 
the compromises with their beliefs which reality forced them to 
make, emerges.
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The Theme of Insufficient Land
As anticipated in Chapter II, an important theme in the 
selection of state land is the mood of desperation created by a 
fear that there was not enough land available to fill the grants.
In Montana the sentiment, often approaching panic, was ubiquitous 
through the period of active selection despite the millions of 
acres of unoccupied and unclaimed land which surrounded the admin­
istrators on all sides. The sentiment was expressed by the Terri­
torial Superintendent of Public Instruction in 1882 (pp. 20-21); 
it is mentioned by the Board at the appointment of Granville Stuart 
(Meeting, April 1, 1891); and dominates the behavior of the bureau­
crats involved in the 1958 Glacier Park Exchange.
In one sense the lack of available land was a real rather 
than imagined problem. The administrators, seeking a productive 
estate, wanted the lands selected immediately, but at any one time 
there existed only a small amount of surveyed available land, and 
with the sluggish progress of the survey, selection promised to be 
perennial. The torpid surveys irritated Montana administrators 
and did little for federal-state consonance. Little was availed 
by the governor's hastening surveys by request if there was no 
money for a survey. Por example, the rejection of an early request 
for a survey of twenty-seven townships in Teton and Chouteau 
counties so irritated the Board that on June 10,1893 (Minutes), 
Governor Rickards was ordered to Washington to negotiate with the 
Interior Department. Rickards telegrammed the Board on June 16,
189.3 (Minutes), that the Interior Department was not inclined to 
approve a survey costing more than $5,000, particularly when the
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state offered no guarantee that it would select land in the survey 
area. He requested, "If I can promise to take [a] large quantity 
[I] think my work will be easier, though I have a hard job before 
me. Wire information." The Board promptly responded (Minutes, 
June 16, 1893) that the state would select 250,000 acres and "more
if^avaîTàhTëT" Thw^TgrirTr^tmted— apparently made up on the
moment. The state won its request only because the funds for sur­
veys would be lost if not committed by the end of the fiscal year.
On December 26, 1895 (Minutes), Rickards was again in 
Washington to argue that at least one-third of the money alloted 
for surveys in Montana should be spent only on state requests. He 
was not successful. A formal resolution was sent to the Surveyor 
General of the United States on June 27, 1898 (Minutes), asking him 
to hasten the Montana surveys. As selection was re-initiated after 
the abeyant period, the governor and attorney general were sent to 
Washington to pressure again for, among other things, completion of 
the survey of Montana (Memo, December 30, 1911, Forest Land Exchange 
Folder, Vault Files, Montana Department of State Lands). However, 
whining over the survey's progress dissipated only as selection of 
the grant was completed.
Conduction of the survey frustrated land selection. So 
long as the progress of the survey was a barrier to land selection, 
there was not enough land in Montana to fill the grants. However, 
the theme of insufficient land cannot be fully explained by the 
slow progress of the survey. As theories of Ricardo and Von 
Thunen might suggest, administrators recognized that land could
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be obtained, though obtaining land of value was more difficult.
Consequently, in terms of potential value there was insufficient
land to fill the grants (Montana Board, 1892, p. 7). Land Agent
Stuart, in his Report for 1892 (p. 30), gave expression to the
problem of value in making land selections:
In States like the Dakotas the land is mostly quite 
uniform in quality, and a great deal of it could be 
fairly selected from examination of the Land Office 
plats...but in Montana such a course would be dis­
astrous .. .because the sections, and even parts of 
the same section, differ greatly in value....The 
necessity of making a personal examination of a 
large number of sections...before I could determine 
what was worth taking has made my work seem slow, 
and it has been very laborious.
Dakotans might have taken issue with Stuart's evaluation 
of their land selection problems, but the statement clearly sug­
gests that Montana lands were throught of in qualitative categories 
which were judged on their economic potential.
Quality lands were necessary to the attainment of revenues
from the state land-grant estate. Quality lands were in short 
supply, and consequently the land selectors realized that insuf­
ficient lands were available to fill the land grants. Theories 
of land value presented by Ricardo and Von Thunen (Chapter II, this 
study) suggest that the conversion of even quality land to cash 
through sale or leasing would be difficult at best on a frontier. 
Any compromise in quality of selected land would simply delay 
further the realization of profits. Recognizing these prospects 
intuitively, the anxiety over insufficient land would only be in- 
hanced among the administrators. The remaining portion of this
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section explores the seriousness of the revenue production problem 
by reviewing the actual condition of land sales and leasing in 
Montana. The implication is that in meeting the environmental 
objectives of state land selection, the administrator was wise 
to consider factors other than absolute fucundity of land if he 
was interested in short-range returns. These other factors were 
the social environment of land rather than the mere physical en­
vironment.
Land Sales in Ricardian Economics 
One obvious way to make money is to convert land into 
cash which may be invested. For most states this is attractive 
for it frees the government from the problems of being a landlord. 
Congressional policy thwarted land sales in Montana as a manage­
ment strategy, however. To most settlers, the minimum supply 
price per unit of federal public domain was, essentially, zero.
The minimum supply price per unit of state land was set by Congress 
at $10.00 per acre while the minimum supply price per unit of state 
grazing land was eventually lowered to $5.00 per acre [47 Stat. 150). 
Consequently, only the most fertile and best located of state lands 
could attract potential vendees while the remainder of the estate 
remained unattractive because it was too expensive. Even after 
public lands were no longer available, vendees could not be attracted 
until the unit productivity of the land exceeded both the product 
price and the minimum sales price of the dictated policy. For ex­
ample, in the case of the 168,000 acres obtained by Montana in the 
Glacier Park Exchange, the average appraisal was $4.79 per acre
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which, since the appraisal included mineral value which cannot be 
alienated by Montana to a vendee (1947 RCM 81-902), is substan­
tially below the minimum sale price. A vendee had to donate to 
Montana the difference between the appraised value of the surface 
resources and the minimum sale price. Since few vendees are willing 
to make such a donation, land sales have been difficult.
If, however, land administrators were willing to sell land 
as soon as it became attractive to vendees, the sale price on state 
lands would remain through the history of land sales close to the 
minimum sale price. In studying grant land sales in Iowa, Lokken 
(1942, pp. 154-179) observed that the average sale price remained 
remarkably constant and close to the minimum sale price despite 
rampant speculation and inflation. Speculation and inflation, so 
long as the state was willing to sell land at the minimum price, 
only hastened land sales rather than raised the price. In Montana, 
in the period 1899 through 1919, the average of the yearly average 
sale price per acre was $14.42 (calculation based on Montana 
Register of State Lands, 1948, Table 16) even though the period is 
marked by rapid agricultural settlement, the dry farming experiment, 
high product prices, and rampant inflation and land speculation 
(Toole, 1972, pp. 25-58). Under these conditions, a figure of 
$14.42 per acre is very close to the minimum sales price of $10.00 
per acre.
Leases in Ricardian Economics
To the extent that sales were impossible, revenue had to 
be derived from contract rent produced by leasing the lands.
131
Obviously, in the long run, better quality land would produce more 
contract rent since its increment of unearned rent is larger, and 
this was reason enough to make selectors seek high quality land. 
However, Ricardo's interpretation of land rent suggests that high 
quality land would not begin accruing rent until a lower quality 
land was being settled. There is little reason for anyone to rent 
high quality land so long as high quality land is still available, 
essentially free, from the federal public domain. The leasing of 
high quality land is only possible, other things being equal, when 
all high quality land is taken and settlement is active in lower 
quality land. This suggests that a large proportion of the state 
lands would remain unleased and unproductive for a long period of 
time. The suggestion is valid; in fact, the proportion of the 
estate leased has grown only slowly (Table 6.1).
The land selector could not even be assured that selected 
land would ever be of value. Since society needs the produce of 
that land, land on the extensive margin attracts settlers, though 
not enough that they are willing to pay rent for the land. Beyond 
the extensive margin lies land which is not even attractive to the 
settler. Land selections on or beyond what would ultimately become 
Montana's extensive margin consequently would not accrue unearned 
rent so would be forever useless to the state. All state land in 
Montana was eventually leased (Table 6.1) but the early land selec­
tor had no way of knowing of this eventuality. Again, selection of 
land as near as possible to the intensive margin of Von Thunen and 
Ricardo assured not only the earliest possible rent accrual and the
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Table 6.1. Proportion of the Montana Estate Under Lease, Selected 
Years.
Year Per Cent of the Estate 
(Managed by Montana) Leased
1900 14%
1914 62%
1930 63%
1938 68%
1942 86%
1948 92%
1970 +100% (Through Multiple Leasing)
Source: Author’s calculations based upon Montana Register of State 
Lands, 1900, pp. 9 and 11; 1914, Table 5 and p. 9; 1930,
Table 12 and 14; 1938, Table 18 and 19; 1942, Table 19 
and 22; 1948, Table 17 and 20; Montana Commissioner of 
State Lands, 1970, pp. 1-2.
greatest possible eventual land sale, but the greatest possibility 
that the selected land would have any value at all.
Political Objectives of State Land Selection 
The purpose of this section is to examine the relationship 
between state land selection officials and the Montana resident. 
Relations between the state and ranchers as individuals and as a 
group are examined first. The individual farm settler's relations 
with the state are then explored, followed by relations between the 
state and groups of farm settlers and local government. The conclu­
sion is that maintainance of state-citizen relations were objectives 
of land selection as real, important, and serious as the economic 
and environmental objectives.
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The Rancher and State Land Selection
Even if selected wisely, state lands would remain vacant 
and therefore unproductive for a long period. Yet, making money 
was the objective of state land administration. There existed a 
solution to this dilemma if there existed a sub-population in the 
state which required greater access to cheap unoccupied land than 
provided through the homestead laws. To this class leasing, if 
not purchase, of state land would be attractive. The rancher 
population in the state filled this important niche in Montana 
land policy.
Because of the need for seasonal pastures, western Montana 
ranches were always based upon relatively large capital intensifi­
cation. Osgood (1929, pp. 56-57) describes one such ranch on the 
Beaverhead River in southwestern Montana in the 1870's. The oper­
ation consisted of 500 horses, 3000 cattle, 3000 sheep, 40 pure­
bred cattle, 75 pure-bred sheep, and dairy cattle producing 7000 
to 9000 pounds of butter per year. Besides buildings and livestock 
shelters, the "homestead" consisted of 500 acres of developed crop 
and hay land. The operation depended upon 19,200 acres of land 
divided into summer and winter pasture, all illegally fenced.
Eastern Montana ranches were originally more extensive. 
Cattle were simply put on the range to multiply naturally. The 
range livestock industry was speculative, to a degree dependent upon 
foreign capital, and dependent upon legal control of only a small 
amount of land. Pierre Wibaux, for example, owned only 160 acres 
but ran his herds between the Missouri and Yellowstone rivers on a
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range of fantastic proportions which nearly amounted to a fiefdom 
(Dick, 1941, p. 477).
There were few competitors for the eastern range lands, 
but since these huge estates existed without legal foundations 
in land, they were hard to protect from small settlers. Although 
vigilance committees occasionally directed their wrath at settlers 
instead of rustlers, violence was seldom either socially accept­
able or prolonged. The threat of settlers to the range livestock 
industry, however, never reached its full potential because the 
environment took its toll first. Following the dry summer of
1886, the herds froze to death in the bitter winter of 1886 and
1887. In the blizzard's wake many ranchers, such as Granville 
Stuart, went on to new careers. Others began rebuilding their 
operations along the lines of the more cautious but enduring western 
Montana intensive model ranch unit.
The intensive ranch unit required little land but demanded 
a secure title to a greater portion of the ranch unit. Pasturing 
had to be carefully controlled which meant fencing, winter feeding 
areas, water holes, and land suitable for hay production. Those 
who controlled these vital resources held de facto control of the 
extensive pastures and so had no need for legal control of them.
To gain control of the range, however, required more land 
than a rancher could easily obtain through the homestead laws. 
Leasing state land presented an obvious opportunity for the rancher 
to solve his land problems. Hence, if the state wanted an early 
income from its estate it had only one potential customer, the
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rancher. Circumstances conspired to make partisans of ranchers 
and state land administrators. Criticism of these cordial rela­
tions has been frequent (Most, 1943; Gladen, 1970) though the 
critics have failed to understand that state officials had little 
alternative but to cater land selections to the rancher's needs.
The system of catering land selection to ranchers, though 
there were many variations, was remarkably consistent. Once a 
rancher identified land he desired to control, he petitioned the 
Board to select it and promised to either lease or purchase after 
acquisition. Routinely, the petitioner defended the land's poten­
tial value. For example, on March 5, 1898, A. Lincoln of Deer­
field, Fergus County, wrote Governor R. B. Smith that since he was 
"surrounded by sheep" he was desirous of leasing eight and one-half 
sections "of the most extensive meadow land in the County," land 
which would "always rent" if selected by the state (35a-26-9 MHS),
Selection of the petitioned lands was hazardous. If the 
petitioner reniged on his promise after selection, there was little 
the Board could do under Montana's open range fence law to prevent 
the petitioner's free use of the land except to fence it. The good 
faith of the petitioner was assured by financially committing him, 
through bonding, prior to the selection. The bond required was 
normally the minimum sale price if the petitioner promised to buy 
the land and the first five years rent, generally $80 per section 
per year, if he was seeking only a lease.
This general model was provided for by law (Montana Laws of 
1901, p. 174 c), and was equalitarian in the sense that it was
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available to everyone, though having the cash for bonding limited 
the system to those of some means. At this point, however, the 
Board deliberately and routinely issued leases to defraud the 
United States. In Meagher County, for example, the Board issued 
leases to 37,487.20 acres on July 11, 1898 (Minutes) though the 
lands were not selected until June 27, 1898 (Minutes). Selection 
passed to the state an equitable title with no implication of ex­
clusive or possessory interest while the exclusive title remained 
with the federal government until the lands were acquired by the 
state. Consequently, the Board passed to lessees land rights 
which it did not possess.
This procedure could have caused trouble. Lessees were 
using invalid leases to exclude others from public lands open to 
traditional transitory uses either permitted or overlooked by law. 
Further, the state might be denied the exclusive title to the 
leasehold it had created. The first problem, apparently, never 
directly arose. The second problem did arise, but the lessees 
understood the process. If acquisition were denied the state, the 
lessees simply retrieved the unused portion of the bond (see for 
example. Minutes, May 25, and June 10, 1911). At least no one ever 
sued the Board for completion of the lease contract, probably be­
cause none dared to. On October 28, 1915, the Montana Attorney 
General ruled that leases issued prior to acquisition were "inef­
fectual for any purpose whatsoever" (6 Op. Mt. Atty. Gen. 265). 
Legal or not, there can be no doubt that the system was profitable 
and in the interest of Montana, even if it did pervert the common 
law.
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Rancher-State Contentions 
There can be no doubt that ranchers were privileged before 
the Board. The lands that the rancher wanted selected were usually 
selected, and these selections often gave the rancher de facto con­
trol of much public land. Even though leases were issued to 
ranchers before the state had any interest to lease, the privileged 
status of the rancher was subject to politico-economic limits.
Range conditions in Teton County about 1900 provide the best 
example of the limited scope of ranchers' privileges before the 
Board. On March 17, 1900 (Minutes), the "residents" of Teton 
County complained that leases of critical state water holes to the 
Sun River Land and Stock Company would cripple the residents' abil­
ity to keep herds and flocks on the range. The Chouteau Montanian 
(March 23, 1900, p. 1) noted that the residents asked the Board of 
County Commissioners to support the protest and editorially praised 
the decision of the County Commissioners to assist the settlers 
(March 30, 1900, p. 2). On April 12, 1900 (Minutes), the Montana 
Land Board ruled that leases to the water holes would be made to the 
Board of County Commissioners, thus maintaining the water holes as 
public property.
On June 1, 1900 (Minutes), Teton County residents protested 
leases to the Sands, Taylor and William Flowerree Sheep and Horse 
Company. After a closed hearing (Minutes, July 9, 1900), the Board 
issued the leases to "a settler," D. A. Ricardson. Although Ricard- 
son was an obscure individual, William Flowerree was not. William, 
the son of the "cattle king," Daniel Flowerree, held three earned
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degrees from eastern universities and managed his father's estate 
as well as the American Bank and Trust Company of Great Falls (Stout, 
1921, p. 583). Although Flowerree was obviously an illustrious 
rancher, his lease application was denied in favor of the obscure 
Ricardson.
Meanwhile, Flowerree disputed, before the Board, leases to 
J. P. Woolman, a merchant-ranchor and Republican of considerable 
import (Minutes, July 19, 1900; Progressive Men of Montana, pp. 
494-495). Unfortunately, the solution to this confrontation is 
not recorded. It is certain, however, that Woolman and Flowerree 
willingly submitted their land problems to the Board and peaceably 
abided by whatever decision was offered.
Teton County was not the only area to witness denial of 
ranchers' lease applications. For example, while the Teton County 
problems were before the Board, residents of Fergus County pro­
tested potential water hole leases to the Libby-Merril Company 
(Minutes, June 7, 1900). The decision (Minutes, June 28, 1900) 
was to deny all lease applications, and in effect, maintain the 
water holes as public property open to all users of the range.
Although ranchers' lease applications were occasionally 
declined, rent was a more serious point of contention. The usual 
bond for a lessee was $80.00 per section per year, a fixed contract 
rent which was eventually altered to consider the livestock market 
and the carrying capacity of the land (1947 RCM 81-402). Fixed or 
flexible, grazing land rent has been viewed as exorbitant by 
ranchers and criminally low by scholars (Murray, 1942; Gladen,
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1970; Most, 1943; Cole, 1966 and 1968). To the rancher, however, 
any rent not highly responsive to tlic notoriously unpredictable 
livestock market is potentially exorbitant, further, none of tlic 
scholarly criticism of the low rental rates has recognized that 
users of state land generally sacrifice freedom to negotiate terms 
when dealing with the state as a landlord. Land is rented at pre­
scribed rates and under prescribed rules, or it is not rented. The 
sacrifice of a lessee's right to negotiate justifies a lower rent 
than would usually be charged on similar private land.
On occasion, however, ranchers have been able to force the 
Board to negotiate. The classic example occurred in Valley County 
in 1929. On June 19, 1929 (Minutes), the State Land Agent appeared 
before the Board with three ranchers to report their request for a 
rent reduction. Between 1918 and 1927 the ranchers had leased only 
the water holes on a 47,800 acre tract of land, using the rest of 
the tract as free range. In 1927, the State Land Agent, appealing 
to the ranchers' citizenship, convinced them to lease the entire 
tract at $75.00 per section. Although the ranchers freely admitted 
that the land was worth $90.00 per section, they argued that the 
Board lacked competitors for the land; thus, if the request for a 
rent reduction was denied, the ranchers would not renew the leases 
but use the land as a free good. On May 11, 1929 (Minutes), the 
Board instructed the State Land Agent to make the necessary ar­
rangements with the ranchers to assure that all 47,800 acres remained 
leased.
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Overall, since ranchers were the state's only consistent 
customer for land, relations between the Board and the livestock 
industry were cordial to the point of being suspect. However, the 
cordiality was limited. Livestock lease applications were denied, 
often in favor of obscure settlers. Apparently, the Board was 
willing to assist ranchers in obtaining land rights necessary to 
guard their estates prior to settlement, but the Board was not 
willing to use its lands to protect ranchers from settlers already 
in the field. If contract rents have appeared ludicrously low to 
students of state lands, the rents have appeared exorbitantly high 
to ranchers. Ranchers have been unable to lower the contract rental 
rates beyond a certain point unless they held special spatial advan­
tage and a monopoly on the competition for the land they sought.
The Settler and State Land Selection
In 1901, Sutherlin published a brief criticism of Montana 
state land administration. He held that if state lands had been 
selected to please the farmer instead of the rancher, the estate 
would have provided 6,000 agricultural homesteads. Sutherlin 
failed to understand that at $10.00 per acre a state-supplied home­
stead was no favor to the agriculturalist. To the extent that the 
Board was interested in settler prosperity, the best it could do 
for the settler was avoid contact with him. Yet, as has already 
been discussed (Chapter II, tliis study), the geographic arrangement 
of available land on the frontier forced settlers and the state to 
compete for land. A number of laws, however, acted to differenti­
ate state-settler interests in land and thus reduce competition and 
consequent confrontation and conflict.
141
So long as the survey was lacking, the state could not 
select land, but under the Homestead Act of 1862, the preemption 
settler could settle the land he desired without fear of state 
interference in his affiars. Although preemption gave the settler 
choice of the best land which was to the state's disadvantage, it 
at least effectively separated interests of the settler and state.
After the survey the land was open to all, so state offi­
cials and settlers competed intensely. In this competition the 
state bureaucracy was unable to react quickly to crisis, and con­
sequently it normally lost, a situation which fretted administra­
tors, especially when the state had requested, and possibly helped 
pay for, the survey. The Priority Selection Act of 189S (28 Stat. 
394) was designed to correct this situation. Upon state request, 
the law required that after approval of a survey the land would re­
main closed to settlement for sixty days while state officals made 
land selections. In fact the law gave to state officials more power 
than they dared, for political reasons, to use. A sixty-day prior­
ity to select land where the state had requested a survey and given 
notice of its predetermined interests was fair, but a sixty-day pri­
ority period for the state in cases where settlers had requested a 
survey would hardly have been popular. Consequently, the Board only 
took advantage of tiie Priority Selection Act of 189Z where the state 
had requested the survey (see for example. Minutes, April 13, 1894).
As another way of avoiding state-settler conflicts, the 
state conducted its own field survey of prospective land selections. 
The state surveys sought to determine the environmental character­
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istics of the land and to identify lands which were subject to 
settlement. As a practical matter, to avoid conflicts the rights 
of a settler were recognized whether he legally or illegally settled 
on the land.
Montana's citizens had recognized the serious ramifications 
of citizen-state conflicts, and they offered the Board some gui­
dance in resolving state-settler conflicts. In the event of con­
flict, "...preference shall always be given to actual settlers 
thereon [the land]..." (1889 Mt. Const., Art. 19, Sec. 7). The 
phrase essentially puts the Board and the state courts on notice 
to resolve state-settler confli ugh equity, or "natural,
logical justice," as opposed to the stricter rules of the common 
law. Of course, this mandate only applied where Montana held juris­
diction. Jurisdictionally, where absolute title had passed to the 
state only the federal government could abrogate the trust and award 
the land to another party. Where the state did not have absolute 
title, that is on selected lands not yet acquired, the Board held 
jurisdiction and could resolve conflicts simply by amending selec­
tion lists to exclude the contested lands.
In fact, with one exception, the Board and bureaucrats suc­
ceeded in astutely avoiding selection of settled or squatted lands. 
In the Forest Land Bxchange, most of the bureaucracy was committed 
to surveying the valuable timber resources of northwestern Montana, 
so lieu land selections in Valley and Daniels counties were made 
without surveying the lands. IVhen the Governor issued the Procla­
mation of March 10, 1910, withdrawing hundreds of sections from the
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public domain in Valley and Daniels Counties, many settlers were 
already on their way to new homesteads in what, unknown to them, 
was a state reserve. These settlers could not have known of the 
Proclamation of March 10, 1910. As a matter of common law, their 
ignorance was their fault for constructive notice of the proclama­
tion had been published. As a matter of equity, however, the Board 
was obliged to rectify the harm done to actual settlers. A series 
of mass hearings, the "Scoby Land Contest,” ensued.
The Scoby Land Contest consisted of 124 appeals between May 
6, 1914, and January 29, 1918 (Minutes). Of these, fifty were found 
in favor of the appellants and the selection lists modified to ex­
clude their homesteads; sixty-seven went against the appellants; 
one was dismissed as irrelevant; five were remanded for further in­
vestigation; and one was under the jurisdiction of the Interior 
Secretary. Examples (Minutes, May 6, 1914) of reasons for awarding 
land to settlers were, "few cows, selling butter; wife and infant 
child all living there and making good; himself and family living 
there and farming; 180 acres in flax; fair house and barn; wife 
and three children with horses and some cattle; victim of mistake 
of U. S. Land Office; and, granted as charity only." Reasons for 
denial (Minutes, May 6, 1914) were, "small shack; no breaking; 
claimant is a lawyer in Scoby; no crop; more land than he can 
farm; came from Canada; not a citizen; and only postage stamp 
speculation." From the cases it was obvious that the Board was 
willing to grant equity to a genuine settler who was harmed through 
the state's failure to survey the selected lands, but intolerant of
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"postage stamp speculators" attempting to take advantage of the 
Board's kindness.
The reasonableness shown by the Board in the Scoby Land 
Contests inspired others to attempt to take advantage of the state. 
"Avaricious professional locators" encouraged settlers fraudulently 
to enter state land and to appeal to the Board to clear title to 
the land. The Board had no tolerance for the procedure, so the 
"locators" turned to Congress, and asked it to intercede on behalf 
of the settlers. On April 7, 1916 (Minutes), the Board petitioned 
Congress to avoid entering into land questions which were entirely 
a matter of state jurisdiction. Fortunately, Congress took the 
Board's advice.
The degree to which the Board could be firm with the settlers 
was demonstrated in Fergus and Choteau counties in 1917. On June 9, 
1917 (Minutes), a number of "squatters" appeared before the Board 
begging it to relinquish Montana's equitable title to their "home­
steads" so they might be able to file claims. The Board was merci­
ful in the sense that the squatters were allowed to gather their 
1917 crops. However, the squatters were expected to be off the 
land by January 1, 1918. Subsequently, the squatters appeared be­
fore the Board with a lawyer but did little better (Minutes, June 
28, 1917). They could compete for leases on the land like anyone 
else,in which case their improvements on the land would be disposed 
of according to statute. If they did not compete, they would be 
expected to be off the land by January 1, 1918, and any improve­
ments left on the land after that date were to become state property
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(Minutes, July 11, 1917). The Board did not relish such conflicts. 
When land selections were begun in Carter and Powder River counties, 
the field teams were strongly admonished to identify, if nothing 
else, occupied land.
If the rancher was privileged before the Board, so, though 
in different ways, was the small agricultural settler. While state 
lands could benefit the rancher, they were nothing but an impedi­
ment to the agriculturalist. In adapting and expanding upon 
policies found in the Homestead Act of 1882 and the Priority Selec­
tion Act of 1898, the Board categorically avoided conflict with 
agricultural settlers. Generally, the Board was successful in this 
objective. In the few instances where conflicts could not be 
avoided, the Board seriously undertook its obligation to provide 
equitable settlement. Possibly the best measure of the Board's 
quasi-judicial record is the openness with which cases were heard 
and the few appeals beyond the Board to higher courts and authori­
ties. Apparently, most appellants were satisfied with their treat­
ment before the Board. Speculators erred, however, in interpreting 
the Board's fairness as timorousness. The Board, while merciful to 
the honest man, was quite capable of defending itself from the un­
scrupulous .
Local Government and State Land Selection
The citizen, and consequently local government, generally 
supported wise state land selections. Indeed, in livestock areas, 
local government often assisted ranchers in attracting state land 
selectors to their area of the state. In agricultural areas, how­
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ever, state land concentrations were unpopular for two major reasons. 
First, state lands were expensive, so they were generally unavail­
able to small and poor settlers. Local governments consequently 
regarded state land as thwarting the economic development of the 
rural community and the local economy. Second, if state lands were 
not sold by the state, they were not subject to local property 
taxes. The geography of state lands, thus, had an important af­
fect on the distribution of the property tax burden.
These two objections to state land concentrations were
stated at an early date. Concerning prospective land selections in
Chouteau County, State Land Agent Stuart in 1891 wrote;
As usual, sentiment in that vicinity desires it [the 
land] be thrown open to settlement, and would oppose 
its being granted to the State, if they [the settlers] 
knew it was contemplated. [Field Notebook 1, p. 39, 
entry dated June 28, 1891, MHS].
Petitions opposing land selections were submitted by residents of 
Flathead (Minutes, July 1, 1893) and Beaverhead (Minutes, February 
28, 1898) counties. Normally, since such local opposition was un­
likely to become a state issue, the Board simply disregarded the 
petition.
However, the Legislature did pass laws aimed at restraining 
the Board's enthusiasm for concentrating land. The Selection Act 
of 1897 (Laws of Montana, 1897, p. 193) limited land selections to 
200,000 acres per county. The statute was, however, toothless for 
it did not apply when, in the Board's judgement, there was no 
alternative but to concentrate more than 200,000 acres in a county.
The Selection Act of 1907 (Laws of Montana, 1907, p. 100) limited land 
selection to 100,000 acres per county, irrespective of the Board's
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judgement. The Board, however, simply made decisions as if the 
law did not exist (Montana Legislative Council, 1956, p. 7).
If most Boards generally ignored local protests to state 
land concentrations, the Board of Governor Toole between 1901 and 
1909, took the protests seriously. For all practical purposes, 
during this, the abeyant period, Toole's Board stopped all land 
selection. The apparent reason was local protests from central 
Montana. Between 1897 and 1901, the Board had selected vast acre­
ages at rancher's requests while agricultural settlers flooded into 
central Montana through Great Falls, the town Paris Gibson had 
built. On May 13, 1901 (Minutes), U. S. Senator Gibson himself 
appeared before the Board to express his opposition to all state 
land selection. The Board responded on May 25, 1901 (Minutes) 
with new selection policies. The Seteotion Act of 1897 would be 
adhered to. Further, contiguous selected sections would be limited 
to two per township in counties with more than 50,000 acres of 
state land and three in counties with less than 50,000 acres. To 
this the Board added that further relinquishment of state lands in 
federal reservations would be curtailed (Minutes, April 15, 1902), 
and that in the future no leases would be made except at public 
auction (Minutes, June 4, 1902). The self-imposed restraints, ap­
parently in response to local protests, effectively terminated land 
selection until governor Norris took office in 1909.
Local opposition to land selection is the apparent explana­
tion for the abeyant period. In fact, it is not a good explanation. 
Toole had been the first governor of Montana, and in that adminis-
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tration he had appointed Stuart as Land Agent and enthusiastically 
pursued state land selection. Further, Toole's Board between 1901 
and 1909 was exclusively Democratic, so it had little reason to 
cower before the single protest of Gibson, a Republican. There is 
little to suggest that any member of the Board during the abeyant 
period was elected on a state land issue.
The alternative to the hypothesis that the abeyant period 
was a response to local protest is to accept the fact that many 
things were done during Toole's administration which are not fully 
understood. Governor Norris thought that the administrative poli­
cies of Toole's Board were mysterious. After succeeding Toole, 
Governor Norris initiated investigations of Toole's Board. No 
criminal abuse was revealed; but the investigation found the ad­
ministration of the forest lands to be in shambles (Anderson, 1940, 
pp. 72-94). The Minutes during the abeyant period are little more 
than lists of land offered for sale. The substantive information 
available in the Minutes suggests that Attorney General Donovan, 
whose erroneous legal opinions are rife in the Minutes, rather than 
Governor Toole, controlled the Board. The abeyant period is not 
only a period of little land selection, but also a mysterious period 
in the records of the state land administration. Whatever its cause, 
there can be little doubt that valuable time in the selection of 
state lands was lost. In this sense, the Toole administration was 
negligent in its responsibilities.
Normally, Board members eschewed debate with local authori­
ties over the wisdom of concentrating state land in local areas.
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This tactic minimized the possibility of a local issue becoming a 
state issue. However, there was one exception to this behavior 
which is important for it reveals that local protests to state 
land selection were not always ethical, and that state attitudes 
toward local protest could be surprisingly crass. The selection of 
the Swan River State Forest, a part of the Forest Land Exchange, 
encountered the staunch opposition of the Kalispell Chamber of Com­
merce. Governor Stewart openly engaged in conflict with this group 
over the issue.
The Kalispell Chamber of Commerce protested transfer of 
the Swan River area from federal to state government on September 
29, 1915. The contents of the protest have been lost, but subse­
quently a Kalispell citizen wrote the governor that the Chamber was 
a tool of a "company" seeking to keep the forest lands in federal 
control where they were more easily exploited (October 6 and 16,
1915, 35-231-3 MHS).
After an extended period of silence Stewart replied to 
W. H. Griffin, President of the Kalispell Chamber of Commerce 
(November 2, 1915, 35-231-3 MHS). The letter was remarkably harsh 
in its tone. According to Stewart, "[NJo intelligent man would 
question the wisdom of the exchange." The only reason for opposi­
tion to the land acquisition was that Griffin feared that the 
Somers Lumber Company would be unable to obtain the timber for the 
"give away" price of national timber.
Griffin replied on November 9, 1915 (35-231-3 MHS). After 
defending himself and the Kalispell Chamber of Commerce and a routine 
condemnation of state land generally, Griffin raised a salient issue.
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The acquisition of the Swan River State Forest was a violation of 
the Selection Act of 1907. Griffin's point is correct. The Board 
violated the Selection Act of 1907 not only in Flathead (present 
day Lake County), but also in Chouteau, Daniels, Valley and Beaver­
head counties before the act was repealed in 1921. Stewart replied 
to Griffin that as a believer in public debate he would look for­
ward to reading Griffin's letter (November 13, 1915, 35-231-3 MHS).
This type of public debate was unusual for Board members, 
but for a public official to be so blunt was even more unusual.
Even more astonishing, although Griffin raised a persuasive legal 
point, that the exchange violated state law, he did not pursue 
the point. Though there exists no satisfactory explanation for 
Griffin's failure to pursue his point in court, it is important to 
realize that,without judicial challenge, the Board's actions in 
Flathead County were final and binding irrespective of the state 
laws they violated.
Political Objective--Conclusions
As a political entity the Board was dependent upon the 
people and their political representatives. Consequently, the 
Board made land selection decisions that were acceptable to the 
people. Because ranchers need inexpensive access to large tracts 
of land, state land selection found its greatest political support 
in ranch communities. Though inexpensive to lease, purchase of 
state land came dearly, especially when compared with federal 
homesteads. State lands were not only useless to, but an impediment
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to, farm settlers. Consequently, the Board was wise to avoid 
farmers and areas of the state suited to farming. Failing to 
avoid conflict with the settler, it was wisest to capitulate rather 
than pursue purely legal logic to its end. Local governments pre­
sented the most elegant denunciations of state land selection and 
ownership.
A number of factors helped the Board meet its political ob­
jectives. Laws made the Board's actions credible. Law enabled the 
selection of land which users had promised to lease and advised the 
use of equity when conficts occurred. Federal law attempted to 
spatially segregate state and settler interests in land, and thus 
reduce the possibility of conflict.
The Board, however, relied on its own political acumen as 
much as law. It had to decide when to apply equity and when to 
apply law to settlers, ranchers and citizens. The Board realized 
that political protests from local governments seldom expressed a 
statewide sentiment, so it generally disregarded local protests. 
Indeed, silence was the prevailing tactic in land selection for 
silence avoided attracting attention to the Board's activities. 
Meetings and hearings were usually open but they were seldom adver­
tised, and public hearing on land selections were unheard of. Court 
proceedings, because they tended to expose the entire land selection 
process to public view, were avoided. This rubric was violated by 
the Idaho Board in Balderston vs. Bvady^ and the result was chaos 
even beyond the borders of Idaho.
Not all of the methods the Board applied were morally
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attractive. Equity, since it requires subjective moral judgement 
rather than the application of strict rules of law, is difficult
to apply and easily seduced by favoritism. The Board excelled at
equitable judgement, and there is little in the Minutes to suggest 
favoritism. Still, the use of equity made decisions of the Board
unsystematic and unpredictable in the sense of the order demanded
by common law doctrines and for this reason the Board is suspect 
and subject to criticism.
If this were the only shortcoming of the Board, however, 
it would be minor indeed. When all else failed, the Board neglected 
the law in order to meet its objectives. Administrative neglect of 
legal dictates to meet legitimate administrative goals is illegal 
and enjoinable but not criminal. The Board did not make decisions 
which were criminal, that is the deliberate misallocation of public 
property for personal profit, except possibly during the abeyant 
period, or if they did, they hid them well. Still, though official 
approval of worthless leases and routine violation of such state 
laws as the Selection Act of 190? was not criminal, the actions were 
illegal and an ugly perversion of legislative intent and the common 
law.
Though the behavior of the Board in these matters was inex­
cusable, the decisions were made, apparently in all cases, with the 
good of ti'ie state in mind. For example, it generally took more 
than two years for the Interior Department to approve a state land 
selection, and during that two years the land would have provided 
no revenues to the state if the Board had not decided to make
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legally questionable leases during the pendant time. The realiza­
tion of the situation does not exonerate the Board, but it is clear 
that the Board found it necessary to neglect principles of the com­
mon law as well as statutory dictates not because it willed to, but 
because the common law principles and statutory dictates were 
utterly unrealistic in the political world the Board faced. Given 
inadequate legal theory and guidance, the Board chose to abandon 
legal theory and dictates in favor of its own common sense in order 
to meet the intent of the land grants. The chosen course was trag­
ically, rather than vilely, damnable.
Environmental Objectives
Settlers seek out the most valuable land. This commonsense 
observation is not as simple as it first appears because defining 
the qualities that produce value in land is difficult at best. For 
the sake of simplicity in developing their models, Ricardo defined 
value in terms roughly equivalent to soil fertility, while Von Thunen 
determined value by distance from the market, both variables, of 
course, being powerful determinates of land value.
Whether stated in terms of fertility, distance from the 
market, or the core of settlement. Table 4.5 and Figure 4.2 suggest 
tlie hypothesis that state land administrators thought in terms of 
grades of land of descending quality and structured their selection 
decisions according to these grades. The core of settlement in 
Montana is certainly the fertile valleys of the western mountains. 
Here the earliest selectors sought the valuable meadows and dense
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stands of timber in the core area. Thwarted by dense settlement 
and the political factors which attended it, and forest reserva­
tion, selectors turned to central Montana lands, further from the 
core of settlement and of lower value. Still, the rich pastures 
and potentially arable lands of central Montana were attractive. 
However, as settlement, compounded by the delay of the abeyant 
period, advanced in the region, selectors had to settle for lands 
on the edge of the final frontier, far removed from the core of 
settlement and of remarkably low value.
The purpose of this section is to evaluate this model of 
land selection. The model is not particularly efficacious.
Selectors appear to have clearly recognized only two categories 
of land, "good” and "bad." Among "good" lands subcategories were 
recognized though the subcategories did not necessarily imply an 
understanding of value so much as an understanding of complex en­
vironmental diversity and a desire to take advantage of this di­
versity. Further, the selectors did not ^end to dichotomize the 
environment into natural and social or political components.
Rather the environment was understood holistically so that soil 
fertility, for example, and political acceptability were co-vari­
ables in the environmental evaluation of potential land selections.
Western Montana Land Selections
Selection of i^ quantity land began in 1892 in Madison County, 
llxcapt to note that there were over 133,000 acres selected in south­
western Montana (p. 19), Land Agent Stuart's Report for 1892 is re­
markably silent about these initial selections. It appears that
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applications for leases existed in Madison County and that selec­
tions were made to satisfy the potential lessees. The Territorial 
Superintendent of Public Instruction (1884, p. 18) recorded that 
applications for leases were made in the territorial period though 
the territory could not act upon them. Madison County was a 
likely candidate for such applications for within its boundaries 
were Montana’s second territorial capitol, the gold camp of 
Virginia City, and the sheltered river valleys of the Madison and 
Ruby with its tributary, the Beaverhead, the cradle of the Montana 
livestock industry. The intensive ranch unit was supplying beef 
to Salt Lake City and Denver prior to the discovery of gold and 
the development of local markets (Osgood, 1929, pp. 12-16). Though 
Virginia City did not survive as Montana's political center, Madison 
County's livestock industry was, by the 1890's, mature, stable, and 
without doubt in need of greater legal land control. State land 
selections supplied this needed access to land.
In Montana large stands of commercial timber are located
exclusively in the northwest (Figure 5.1), the area where state
land agents spent much time. Stuart was dubious about the worth
of trees, considering them only in relationship to soil, topography,
water resources, and proximity to society. Agricultural potential
was his first consideration. In his Report of 1891 (p. 4), Stuart
said of the Swan River and Lake area (present day Lake County):
[The Swan River] valley is about six to seven miles 
wide, narrowing to a point at the foot of Swan Lake 
which is a fine body of water...well stocked with 
trout and [sjalmon...[the] soil of the valley is 
generally good and suitable for agriculture, but 
covered with a dense forest [a] considerable portion 
...being large enough for lumber.
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Of the Missoula River Valley, Stuart wrote:
Found it [the river valley] narrow and tortuous, with 
nearly all good land occupied by squatters. The timber 
had been good, but a number of saw-mills were fast
culling it out, so that it was not worth while to ask
for surveys there [Montana Land Agent, 1891, pp. 6-7].
The Missoula River Valley, therefore, did not attract Stuart, 
for, while the land was satisfactory, settlement and development 
were too far advanced. Other areas were rejected for different
reasons. The lands were attractive but they were too isolated to
be attractive to users for years, possibly decades. In the eyes 
of the land selector the Swan River and Lake area was ideal, com­
bining lack of development with accessibility, fine soils, level 
land, and commercial timber, so it became the norm against which 
other areas were evaluated.
Several areas met the standards of the Swan River Valley. 
The Camas Prairie (Clearwater State Forest, Figure 5.1) area of 
southwestern Missoula County, traversed by the Agent in 1891, was 
reported to be a level plain with fine stands of commercial timber 
interspersed among the tall grasslands (Minutes, June 13, 1891; 
Montana State Land Agent, 1891, p. 7). The Stillwater-Whitefish 
creeks in northwestern Flathead County (Stillwater State Forest, 
I'igure 5.1) were attractive for their fine timber, good soils, and 
level topography. The "Pleasant Valley," apparently in Lincoln 
County but impossible to precisely locate today, attracted Stuart 
because of its similarity to the Swan River Valley area (Montana 
State Land Agent, 1891, p. 4).
Deliberately chosen because they were close to the frontier
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margin and only slightly affected by settlement, the areas were 
lacking surveys. In requesting surveys the Board emphasized the 
land's timber quality (see for example letters to 0. Eaton, Sur­
veyor General, appended to Montana State Board of Land Commis­
sioners, 1891). This may have been a convenience, for the Board 
had to justify its requests for survey, and the phrase "the same 
being timber” appended to the description of requested surveys 
was as good a reason as any. In reviewing selections through 1897, 
Governor Smith emphasized that:
The lands [recently selected] in Flathead, Gallatin 
and Deer Lodge counties are either very valuable 
for the timber growing thereon or as agricultural 
lands....The timbered lands are easily worth ten 
dollars per acre and are rapidly increasing in value 
....A good portion of the timber land when cleared 
of timber is very valuable as agricultural land.
[.Memo of Governor R. B. Smith, April 22, 1897, 
under signature of the Montana State Board of Land 
Commissioners, 3Sa-23-15 MHS].
However, agents and the Board increasingly sought timber for its
own sake. For example, in 1897 Smith also projected that:
We expect as fast as surveys are made to select the 
rest of the grant, yet to be selected, in timbered 
lands of Flathead, Missoula or Ravalli counties as 
far as is possible. [Memo of Governor R. B. Smith,
April 22, 1897, under signature of the Montana State 
Board of Land Commissioners, 35a-23-15 MHS].
The lands identified for selection in this early period 
had to be surveyed, and much could befall the land prior to com­
pletion of the survey, selection, and completion of the state's 
title to the land. The lands were desirable because they were 
only slightly beyond the margin of settlement and, in the few years 
it took to survey and select land, settlement could advance rapidly,
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In 1893 State Land Agent Hickman reported that he filed on 43,967,48 
acres in the Stillwater River area of Flathead County. He had 
hoped to get 100,000 acres but the "timber sharks" had gotten 
there first and, adding insult to injury, were pressuring the 
state to relinquish half of what it had claimed (Montana Land 
Agent, 1893, pp. 5-6).
Private development was a minor problem compared to the 
federal reservations of forest land. Under the timber reserve 
acts of 1891 and 1897, the President removed from tlie public domain 
land valuable for timber. Although the Board was able to acquire 
the Camas Prairie, or Clearwater State Forest; the Thompson River 
State Forest in Sanders County; and the Lincoln State Forest in 
Lewis and Clark County (Figure 5.1), most of the desired areas of 
western Montana, including tlie Swan Lake and Stillwater Creek 
areas, were included in national forests before the Board acquired 
the selected lands. The Swan Lake and Stillwater Creek areas, as 
has already been discussed, became the subject of negotiation in 
the Forest Land Exchange and were conveyed to Montana in 1918.
With northwestern Montana closed to selection, the admin­
istrators had to go elsewhere for land. In 1897, selections were 
again made in the mountain pastures and valleys, this time in 
Beaverhead County, The Honorable .1. E. Moore of Beaverhead County 
wrote the Board that the state grants could "yet be located in 
Beaverhead County," and the Agent was instructed to investigate 
(Minutes, April 10, 1897). No definite reason for Moore's interest 
in the welfare of the grant land can be found, but interestingly,
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he appeared before the Board almost three decades later with two 
state senators to again urge the Board to make the greatest possi­
ble land selections in Beaverhead County (Minutes, September 9, 
1926). In both instances he apparently achieved his objectives.
The 1897 selections in Beaverhead County were logical for the same 
reason that selections in Madison County in 1892 were logical--the 
lands were "well watered and excellent grazing" (Minutes, July 30, 
1898).
Central Montana Land Selections
Land selections in the western portion of central Montana 
deviate from Ricardian-Von Thunen precepts. Although Fort Benton 
is one of Montana's oldest towns and was a port which linked the 
Missouri to western Montana via the Mullen Military Road, it can­
not be regarded as a market or core area of settlement (Figure 6.1). 
Western Montana's valleys were well developed before central Montana 
attracted the settler. Despite its remoteness, however, state land 
selectors turned to central Montana almost before they turned to 
western Montana. Only fiscal problems with the survey kept central 
Montana from being the field of earliest land selections in Montana. 
In 1891 Land Agent Stuart investigated the abandoned Fort Shaw 
Military Reservation which had protected in northwest Cascade County 
the vital Sun River Crossing of the Mullen Military Road. In addi­
tion to land on the military reservation, he found at least 40,000 
acres of irrigatable land and recommended another 589,120 acres, or 
about twenty-five townships, for survey (Montana Land Agent, 1891, 
p. 8). His recommendation, with the qualification that "it cannot
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be known how much of it will be secured by the state until after it 
is surveyed and examined," was acted upon in 1893 by the Board; 
however, the survey request was promptly rejected as too expensive 
and too far beyond the pale of settlement. These lands sent 
Governor Rickards on his 1893 odyssey to Washington and gained the
eventual approval of the mammoth survey.
These early selections of the Board were beyond the frontier, 
and Stuart suggests the reason why--the speculative value of poten­
tially irrigable land. Paris Gibson, a businessman bankrupted by 
the Panic of 1873 before turning to sheep ranching near Fort Benton, 
built a city at the Great Falls of the Missouri in the 1880's. 
Hydroelectric power, the services of James J. Hill’s rapidly expanding 
railroad, and Butte's copper assured the swift ascendancy of the new 
hamlet. The agricultural hinterland was limited to sheep and cattle 
enterprises because of problems of aridity. The rivers flowing east 
from the Rocky Mountains to the Missouri, Sun, Teton, and Marias, 
provided a potential for irrigation, but privately endowed reclama­
tion was limited by the expensive engineering structures required 
for any substantial advance of irrigation. Through the 1890's, 
pressure mounted for federally subsidized reclamation. As Montana's 
IJ. S. Senator, Gibson provided much of the leadership in developing 
the Realamation Act of 1902y and the Sun River was among the first 
projects approved under that act. Needless to say, speculation was 
rampant in the area north and west of Great Falls through the 189G's. 
It was in this uncertain field that the Board cast its lots.
The success of the speculative venture presented new
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frustrations. A resolution was presented by the Board in 1902 
(pp. 3-4), the preamble reviewing the Teton, Chouteau, and Lewis 
and Clark county land selections, and the text affirming that 
Montana would not interfere with Federal irrigation plans. Where 
state lands were needed for canals and ditches, the Board would 
return the lands to federal authorities. This resolution neglected 
legal realities, for the Board was constitutionally barred from 
giving acquired land to any group, even the federal government.
The Montana Legislature moved to alter this resolution in 1905. 
Chapter 53 of the Montana Laws of 190S made three salient pro­
visions. First, state lands within federal irrigation projects 
would be sold through the same procedures as the reclamation pro­
ject lands. Second, where the federal government needed state 
land in fee simple, the lands would be sold at $10.00 per acre, the 
minimum legal price. Third, easements, where necessary, would be 
donated by Montana to the Federal Government. As a matter of law, 
however, this bill was only a slight improvement over the resolution 
of 1902. The Legislature could not authorize the disposal of the 
fee simple interest in grant lands except through public sales. 
Granting of easements does not require public sale, but does require 
just compensation for the easement granted (Lassen vs. Arizona), 358 
U. S. 458).
The fact remains, however, that the selectors had gambled 
and won. Total victory demanded that acquisition of potentially 
valuable lands was not to impede the federal construction which 
would convert potential value to reality. Legislative action
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eliminated conflicting objectives, and, while it did so by neg­
lecting constitutional mandates, the legislative dictate was none­
theless the law of the land. Any eligible plaintiff, of course, 
could have sought to enjoin administrative action authorized by 
Chapter 53, Montana Laws of 1905, but none did.
Other factors drew land selectors to central Montana. 
Overcrowding of the western pastures and extinguishment of Indian 
reservations in the east provided the incentive for expansion of the 
livestock industry. In 1871, the first herds were driven along the 
Mullen Military Road to the new fields that lay beyond the Sun, 
while further east were the Smith, Shields, and Judith rivers, bo­
vine paradises of natural pastures and abundant water (Osgood, 1929, 
p. 57). By 1880, expansion was so profitable that range stock were 
driven from California to the Smith River (Dick, 1941, p. 498). As 
we have seen, the central Montana herds suffered terrible destruc­
tion in the winter of 1886 and 1887, so ranchers began intensifying 
their operations. However, ranch land around Great Falls was in­
creasingly difficult to control.
The land grab gave the state land administrators a market 
filled with ranchers ready to lease land. The Agent’s Report for 
1902 (pp. 32-33) stated directly that lands in Chouteau, Meagher, 
and Judith Basin counties were selected for the promised grazing 
leases on them. This was no understatement. On June 13, 1898 
(Minutes), the Board held a selection list of about 37,000 acres 
in Meagher County for further consideration. On June 27, 1898 
(Minutes), the list embracing exactly 37,487.20 acres was approved
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for selection, and on July 11, 1898 (Minutes), the register was in­
structed to issue five-year grazing leases on the lands even though 
they were not yet acquired. Little wonder the developer of Great 
Falls, Paris Gibson, objected to state land selections in central 
Montana.
The Montana administrators were attracted to central 
Montana by the speculative fever which accompanied irrigation 
development and the land requirements of the livestock industry.
In its dealings with ranchers, the state essentially let the live- 
stockmen, rather than the bureaucrats, select valuable land. The 
system smacked of favoritism and was often blatantly illegal, but 
worked to produce revenues and better the trust funds.
Final Land Selections
In the initial period of land selection the politicians and 
bureaucrats were unimpressed with eastern Montana. The State Land 
Agent in 1895 (pp. 17-20) had argued that eastern Montana lands 
were and always would be worthless. The state was better advised 
to leave the grants unfilled than accept land with its liabilities 
in the east of Montana. In Ricardian concepts the agent believed 
that eastern Montana lands were beyond the extensive margin and 
would always remain so.
However, between 1895 and the initiation of land selections 
in Chouteau and Blaine counties about 1910, many conditions in Mon­
tana had changed. The plains of eastern Montana became attractive 
to settlers who entered the land, assured by dry farming theories
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that prosperity was just around the corner. The movement reached 
a crescendo when good weather and inflated wheat prices induced by 
World War I combined to make the dry farming theories appear cred­
ible (Toole, 1972, pp. 25-98). The fortuitous combination of 
events, however, did little to whet the enthusiasm of the state 
land administrators for eastern Montana lands. After the abeyant 
period initial selections in Chouteau and Blaine counties were made 
on the basis of two considerations. The first was continuation of 
the lease application system, and the second was a "hot tip" from 
the Secretary of Interior recommending the "excellent character" of 
a 61,000 acre block of land just being surveyed in Chouteau County 
(Minutes, January 31, 1910). The Board's reliance on the Interior 
Secretary for information suggests that land was becoming increasing­
ly difficult to find, and since a large part of this 61,000 acre 
block was selected by March 15, 1910 (Minutes)', lack of thoroughness 
and enthusiasm for the field surveys is suspected. By reminding the 
field teams that adequate evaluation of grazing land was difficult 
when lands were snow covered (Minutes, January 21, 1910), the Board 
indicated that at least the survey teams were indifferent to quality 
field investigation.
By the Agreement of December 23, 1912 (Forest Exchange 
Folder, Vault I'lies, Montana Department of State Lands), Montana re­
linquished claim to i_n place lands in the national forest reserves 
and agreed to take in their stead eastern grazing land for relin­
quished land not of commercial timber quality. In anticipation of 
this agreement, the Governor in 1910 requested that a large tract
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of land in Valley and Custer counties (present day Valley, Daniels, 
Carter and Powder counties) be reserved and surveyed for the state. 
The survey, however, revealed that the lands were underlaid by 
coal, closing the lands to state entry and, worse yet, potentially 
opening them to private entryinen willing to accept the coal 
severed and federally reserved. This situation threw the state 
land administrators into confusion. Montana Attorney General Galen 
was adamant that neither the lands nor the coal were particularly 
desirable (Memo of Attorney General A. J. Galen, Dec. 30, 1911, 
Forest Exchange Folder, Montana Department of State Lands). To 
the Attorney General, although the lands the Board wanted lacked 
quality, they were the best remaining lands in Montana. The coal 
underlying the lands was at best only alleged and, if there at all, 
of low quality so that any recognizable value was decades off. Be­
sides, the Interior Department was wrongly interpreting the home­
stead laws. The state should, like any other settler, have the 
right to enter with the coal severed from the land. This was the 
arrangement eventually reached. The Board was under no illusion 
that in Valley and Daniels counties it was getting a paradise and 
clearly had come to think of selection as a desperate crisis.
When selection turned from northeastern to southeastern 
Montana, the field agents were instructed to insure that selected 
lands wore not already occupied (Minutes, May 4, and December 27, 
1918). In the land selections made in southeastern Montana and 
later in Beaverhead County the state made no pretense that it was 
obtaining good land, only that it was the best of what was left.
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In 1921, the State Forester reported on the quality of federally 
reserved land in Beaverhead County which was offered to the Board 
as a field of selection (Minutes, July 9, 1921). The lands were 
of high quality in the sense that there was not enough growing on 
them to bum. Consequently, expenditures to protect the lands 
would be slight. Again, on August 19, 1926 (Minutes), the State 
Forester recommended that if possible the Board should acquire 
yellow pine land in Beaverhead County because the yellow pine is 
fire resistant.
It is also obvious that in selections after 1917 the Board 
was intent on acquiring all land due it; and less intent on the 
comparative value of the land acquired. Much time, therefore, was 
spent in identifying slivers of base land which the Board could 
relinquish (Register, 1926, p. 33). The reasons for this appear 
to be the satisfaction of accomplishing the selection task, and 
possibly, the joy of harassing federal bureaucrats. Certainly, 
federal land ownership was unpopular in Montana so that there was 
an emotional if not practical satisfaction in converting all land 
possible from federal to state landlordship. The intricacy, how­
ever, of completing the selections is illustrated by the complexity 
of the base offerings of the period. The base offerings for a 
39.82 acre lieu land lot in Beaverhead County is an example (Table 
6.2). Admittedly this lot is unusual, but in both southwestern and 
southeastern Montana far more complex base offerings can easily be 
found. Furthermore, only in Beaverhead, Carter, and Powder River 
counties are such complex base offerings encountered.
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Table 6.2. Base Lands for Lot 2 (39.82 acres), Township 15 South, 
Range 5 West, Section 11, Beaverhead County, Montana.
Base Land Description Reason Base Unavailable
1. TlS,R37E,Sec.36, part SW% Indian Reservation
2. T2S,R9E, part Fractional Township
3. T2S,R42E,Sec.16, part NW% Indian Reservation
4. T3S,RISE,Sec.36, part National Forest
5. T3S,R41E,Sec.16, part Sh Indian Reservation
6. T3S,R46E,Sec.16, part NW^ National Forest
7. T3S,R46E,Sec.36, part National Forest
8. T4S,RlE,Sec.36, part NE%SE% National Forest
9. T4S,RllE,Sec.l6,part NE%SW% National Forest
10. T4S,R14E,Sec.l6, part N%SW% National Forest
11. T4S,R14E,Sec.36, part SE%NE% National Forest
12. T4S,R51E,Sec.16 part Fractional Township
13. T4S,R57E,Sec.16, part N%SW% Preemption
14. T5S,R2E,Sec. 16, part N^ NE^ ^ National Forest
15. T5S,R2F.,Sec. 16, part N%NE% National Forest
16. T5S,R3E,Sec.36, part SE%SE% National Forest
17. T5S,RIDE,Sec.36, part SE%NW% National Forest
18. T5S,R13E,Sec.16, part National Forest
19. T5S,RISE,Sec.36, part National Forest
20. T5S,R38E,Sec.36, part of lot 4 Indian Reservation
21. T5S,R44E,Sec.36, part of NW^ National Forest
22. T5S,R44E,Sec.36, part of SE(j National Forest
23. T6S,R30E,Sec.36, part Indian Reservation
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In the latter period of land selection, it can be concluded 
that Montana land administrators were acting to fill the grants as 
best they could from a pool of land that was not particularly de­
sirable. The most the Board could hope to do was to take the best 
of a bad lot. In this regard, the Board clearly disagreed with 
the Agent's statement of 1895. It was better to take nearly worth­
less land, liabilities and all, than to leave it in federal hands 
and the grants unfilled.
Environmtnetal Objectives--Conclusions
A Ricardian-Von Thunen model of land selection suggests 
that ; L îctors would recognize a gradient or, at least, categories 
of lam rom good to bad, and a temporal-geographic view (Table 4.5 
and Figu] 4.2) of land selection suggests that catagorical land 
'.^ If'ctiop -oirred. The primary literary remains of land selection 
-.^xaious does not reflect, however, a gradient in land selection 
beyond a dichotomous "good-bad" land classification.
The environmental factors which defined good quality land 
were complex, but the fact that the Board sought several types of 
good quality land simultaneously indicates the Board members did 
not perceive of good land in categories of decending quality. Land 
was, of course, classified into categories based upon potential use, 
but there is little to suggest that the classification reflected 
value. By implication, then, the temporal-regional pattern of land 
selection portrayed on Figure 4.2 reflects preference only in that 
the last selections in Montana were made from "bad" or at least low
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quality undesirable lands. In the earlier period of selection from 
1892 through 1902, the shifting of the field of selection from mea­
dows of southwestern Montana, to the forests of northwestern 
Montana, to the pastures of central Montana reflects not the order 
of preference of administrators but the administrative ease with 
which the several types of land could be selected and acquired.
Among the "good lands," agricultural quality lands were an 
obvious goal. However, agricultural lands which could be brought 
into production with little capitalization were rare in Montana, 
and preemptors clearly held the advantage in obtaining them. Be­
sides, seeking high-quality agricultural lands conflicted with an 
important political objective of state land selection, avoiding the 
agricultural settler. Agricultural lands with dense stands of timber 
required capitalization to bring them into production. The capitaliza­
tion, timbering, could be profitable in its own right, however. Con­
sequently, agricultural lands covered with timber were a high value 
land selection.
There is a clear shift of interest from timbered agricul­
tural land to land valuable exclusively for its timber. This shift 
may be interpreted as an appreciation of land value gradients, but 
I am of the opinion that it is an incorrect interpretation. The 
Board initially planned to strip timber from land and then sell it 
for its agricultural potential. Timber was not, in the traditional 
way of thinking, a renewable resource. However, federal forest re­
servation forced westerners to learn rapidly the principles of sus­
tained yield forest management. The shift in interest from timbered
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agricultural land to commercial grade timber for its own sake re­
sulted not from an appreciation of the theoretical subtleties of 
land economics but from the growth of a new technology, scienti­
fic forestry, which altered the land managers' understanding of 
environmental resources. After a few bad experiences with timber 
sales, Montana adopted legal policies which have demanded sus­
tained yield management irrespective of the agricultural potential 
of the state forest resources.
Potentially irrigable land, since it required immense capi­
talization, was not subject to the political objective of avoiding 
contact with the small agricultural settler. The selection and ac­
quisition of potentially irrigable land was, however, a speculative 
venture of uncertain potential results.
High quality pasture, meadow, and grazing land was an at­
tractive resource since it assured income even before the land was 
acquired. The difference between high quality grazing land and low 
quality grazing land is, however, slight. The distinction was gen­
erally not determined by an environmental assessment of the land 
conducted by state field personnel but by an operator's willingness 
to pay a minimum rent for access to the land. Allowing ranch 
operators to select state lands was valid only if it was assumed 
that the operators had long term objectives and were not selecting 
lands of value only for the survival of their unique operations.
Such an assumption by public servants is made at great economic risk.
The failure of the Board to recognize and behave in a uni­
verse that nearly matched a Ricardian-Von Thunen model has several
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explanations. The models themselves determine value on the basis 
of simplified variables and both make assumptions about the nature 
and ability of the decision-maker which are unrealistic. The Board 
faced a complex environment in which value was determined by mea­
suring, if only subjectively, such factors as soil quality, avail­
able water, vegetative cover, slope, topography and location. The 
Ricardian-Von Thunian models assume knowledge of the future, pos­
sible alternative actions, ability to determine values associated 
with alternatives, and the ability to assign proper "payoffs" to 
alternative choices. Obviously the Board did not meet these assump­
tions. Still the Ricardian-Von Thunian models have revealed consid­
erable predictive powers even when applied to other operators who 
faced a highly complex environment and who have not met the assump­
tions of the Ricardian-Von Thunian model.
The central difference between the state and other operators 
is that other operators are fairly assumed to be economically ration­
al, that is desirous of maximizing profits or minimizing losses, but 
the state meets this assumption only in part. Certainly, the Board 
sought to maximize the returns to the land grant estate, and in this 
sense it was economically rational. However, the Board acted as an
agent of the state, an artificial corporate entity whose very being
was political. Politics required the minimization of conflict and 
to the extent that this political objective conflicted with econo­
mics then economically rational behavior had to be sacrificed in 
favor of politically rational behavior. In other words, in solving 
the "mini-max" problem, minimize conflict while maximizing profits.
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emphasis was on the "mini" portion of the problem. To avoid con­
flict, economically valuable land was avoided in favor of land of 
less long-range value if the political environment demanded.
The land grant legislation, in the case of Montana, the 
Omnibus Statehood Aot, sought to structure political activities in 
the states within economic parameters acceptable to Congress. In 
so doing Congress appears to have implied that state officials 
were to bo always economically rational. In fact, no level of the 
decision-making hierarchy ever made such an assumption. Indeed, 
all levels have been aware and tolerant of official neglect of even 
Congress' economic-legal parameters so long as that neglect was 
based upon politically rational thinking and not criminal in intent. 
However, many scholars in reviewing state land selection and ad­
ministration have demanded strict economically rational behavior 
on the part of state decision-makers even though such behavior has 
been neither demanded nor expected by law. If economically rational 
behavior is expected of state land administrators then the manage­
ment of most state land grants has been a dismal failure. If, how­
ever, the researcher recognizes that both economically and politi­
cally rational behavior has been expected of state land adminis­
trators and that these types of behavior are to a degree in direct 
conflict, then, at least in Montana, the accomplishments, if not 
always the actions, of the Board may be viewed as impressive.
CHAPTER VII
THE SPATIAL EFFICACY OF 25 U. S. STATUTE 676
Whittlesey (1939) was the first geographer to clearly arti­
culate the need for the study of geographical jurisprudence, and he 
observed that, "The operation [or efficacy] of law can be traced 
only through patient study of the incidence of individual laws."
In this study, the individual law which has been patiently studied 
is the Omnibus Statehood Act of 1889 (25 Stat. 676) which dictated 
the spatial allocation of land resources to Montana.
Decisions concerning the spatial allocation of Montana's 
in quantity land were not made by Congress in the Omnibus Statehood 
Act of 1889. Instead, decision-making authority was delegated by 
Congress to Montana and, subsequently, by Montana to the Board. The 
majority of this estate, however, was given in a geographically pre­
determined pattern which denied to state officials all decision­
making authority. In fact, the spatial distribution of the modern 
iif^ place estate differs substantially from the geographically pre­
determined pattern, implying that much of the in place grant was 
conveyed to Montana through techniques not prescribed in the Omnibus 
Statehood Act. In this aspect, the Omnibus Statehood Act was not 
entirely normative, so the research task became two-fold: explaining
the deviations from the Omnibus Statehood Act and explaining the 
procedures by which land selections were made.
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Deviations from the Omnibus Statehood Act existed because 
that act was only one portion of a rapidly evolving national land 
policy. Lands which Congress reserved for Montana in 1889 became, 
before transference to Montana, priority lands in other components 
of the national land policy. Consequently, some grant lands were 
denied to Montana. IVhile this denial was not a legal abortion, it 
was a moral miscarriage of legislative intent. Congress was 
morally bound to resolve the conflict between the Omnibus Statehood 
Act and the rapidly evolving national land policy. It did so with 
the Lieu Selection Act.
The Lieu Selection Aot allowed state officials to select 
land lieu of the iji^ place land reserved to the federal govern­
ment. The act increased the freedom of administrators to choose 
land in accordance with their own objectives. Implementation of 
the Lieu Selection Aot was more difficult than anticipated, however. 
Congress might have assisted, through further legislation, state and 
federal officials in selecting the land grant as modified by the Lieu 
Selection Act, but it failed almost entirely in filling this leader­
ship role. The result was that federal and state officials had to 
engage in prolonged negotiations to implement the combined land 
grant acts, and they frequently did so i.y bending if not breaking 
major national and state laws.
Although Congress delegated major land selection decisions 
t( the State of Montana, through an accident the magnitude of this 
delegated task was greater than the Omnibus Statehood Act alone sug­
gests. Montana then delegated, subject to a few restraints, land
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selection to a politically based board. The Board's actions tended 
to concentrate state land in selected counties of Montana. Any po­
tential landlord subscribes to a theory of land value and, given 
freedom of choice, will cluster his land acquisitions around re­
sources which that theory predicts will be valuable. Consequently, 
the Board's concentration of land is not surprising. The resources 
about which the Board centered land selection are, however, sur­
prising at first glance. Crazing land dominated both agricultural 
and forest land. A simple explanation for the dominance of grazing 
land is that the Homestead Act of 1862 gave the preemption settler 
priority to agricultural land, and the Forest Reserve Aot of 1891 
gave the federal government the first pick of timber, thus leaving 
only grazing land to state land selectors.
This explanation, however, does injustice to the complex 
world of the state land administrator. Reinforced by legislation, 
the nature of the economic system threw the land selector on to the 
margin of Montana's then-settled areas. There was little point to 
selecting land in areas already densely settled, and even less point 
in leaping far beyond the frontier into the wilderness. In the 
former area only marginally productive lands had escaped settlement, 
and in the latter, the administrator faced difficulty in evaluating 
land or in obtaining the survey necessary to convey land to the 
state. Consequently, the land administrator was forced to acquire 
land in the most competitive of Montana's land markets, the land be­
tween the wilderness and the area of established settlement. Conse­
quently, the progress of state land selection strongly reflects the
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major events of Montana settlement: initial settlement of the
western valleys, the movement into north-central Montana, and the 
final progress into the eastern plains.
In making land selections, one may believe the Board should 
have pursued only economically normative objectives, and any com­
promise of pure economics was dereliction of duty. However, the 
Board faced political responsibilities. Consequently, deviations 
from economic norms is much more difficult to criticize. Because 
a political corps draws its power from the people and is account­
able to the people which had created it, the Board faced political 
responsibilities as demanding as any economic or environmental re­
sponsibilities. The Board's political objective was simply to avoid 
excessive and intolerable conflict with its chief competitor, the 
citizen. The objective implied, at the least, avoidance of public 
review and open conflict, and the settlement of conflict by equit­
able judgement when conflict was unavoidable. The Board could de­
fend its interests from obvious exploitation, but when no clear evi­
dence of exploitation existed, the Board thought it best to avoid 
pursuit of the issue.
The political objective also meant that cooperation with 
those who needed and appreciated state land concentrations was ad­
visable. Consequently, ranchers and the Board became colleagues.
In central Montana, at the turn of the century, Board-rancher co­
operation reached a level obnoxious to small land holders and econ­
omic leaders. While the motives of the Toole administration during 
the abeyant period are less than clear, it is certain that the Toole
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Board established its policies at least in partial response to popu­
lar criticism of rancher-Board accords.
In meeting its objectives, the behavior of the Board was not 
always admirable. In adjudicating conflicts through equity rather 
than stricter legal principles, decisions were frequently inconsis­
tent and contradictory. In resolving conflicts, laws and policies 
were interpreted out of context and intent to justify legally ques­
tionable actions and decisions. If loose interpretation of law and 
policy failed, the Board (and more than once, the State Legislature) 
simply disregarded the dictates of higher authorities. While this 
action may be criticized, it was not criminal or even technically 
illegal. When authority was delegated to the Board, it was delegated 
completely. The Board's official actions, no matter how questionable, 
were as much a portion of the national land law and policy as the 
most concrete and absolute statute until challenged through due pro­
cess .
The power of the Board should be a caution to modern legis­
lation. There is no harm in delegating authority to individuals, 
but difficulties occur when those who delegate power cannot monitor 
the actions of the subordinate group. Certainly, the Board was ex­
pert in hiding its actions. Modern innovations such as advisory 
councils, public hearings, citizen advocacy, evaluation of objectives 
through planning and budgeting, and legal provisions which make it 
simpler to challenge decisions, have been implemented to make those 
holding delegated authority accountable to those who have delegated 
authority. While many administrators may view accountability as an 
imposition on their offices, the imposition is utterly necessary to 
efficacious public policy.
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Accountability, however, is a dual responsibility. The 
Montana Board found it necessary to neglect legal dictates because 
many of the dictates were unrealistic and inappropriate to the 
situation which the Board faced. Institutionalized legislative 
research has been the innovation designed to bring applied scien­
tific research to measuring the efficacy of existent and potential 
laws. While elimination of politics from innately political systems 
is neither practical nor desirable, the modern legislature which 
disregards legislative research is inviting disaster instead of per­
forming civic duty.
The Spatial Efficacy 2^ U. Statute 676 
and the Study of Geographical Jurisprudence
Whittlesey did not identify what he meant by a "law" when he 
suggested its geographic study. The mere complexity of the litera­
ture encountered in evaluating the efficacy of the Omnibus Statehood 
Aot suggests that modern law is far more complex than the classical 
sovereign command and threat. An individual "law" exists in a legal 
environment composed of the literature and ideas of the age so that 
an individual law must be understood in this environment if it is to 
be credibly evaluated by jurisprudents.
The concept of public policy is at best vague and uncertain, 
but this nich is certain: policy is both effected and affected by
law. In this study the land grant concept was effected by the na­
tional land disposal "policy," and after passing through a maze of 
statutory provisions the grant was affected by the Board which sub­
scribed to a vaguely defined set of objectives which may justly be
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identified as policy.
If the nature of policy is illusive, the concrete nature
of law is deceptive. A statute or code, the most obvious form of
law, is authoritative and knowable, but in the words of Friedman
(1973, p. 78), "A code may be a behavioral mirage; it may not
mean what it says; it may be 'interpreted' totally out of shape."
Even if the researcher is capable of intellectually relating the
maze of codes and statutes, he still has understood only a portion
of the law. Behind the statutory law is the common law. Friedman
(1973, p. 78) describes the common law as:
...too shapeless, too complex. There are too many 
books. The law is too unknowable. It can never be 
restated authoritatively.
Still, statutory law must be interpreted in the light of common law 
principles and doctrines. In the law under study, the statutes re­
commended the application of equity to state-citizen conflicts, but 
the statutes did not define equity. Rather, the principles of 
equity, natural or moral law, were set forth in several centuries 
of chancery court decisions.
A large portion of administrative law delegates authority, 
not surprisingly, to administrators. The latters' actions, atti­
tudes, prejudices, and technical abilities, seldom recorded and 
often not even understood, become, through the act of delegation, 
as much a portion of public law and policy as the most carefully 
worded statute. The scholar who seeks to understand the operation 
of administrative law must, consequently, address the role of ad­
ministrative discretion in law, for without such consideration, the
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law cannot possibly be understood in its complete operational con­
text.
Beyond law as policy, statute, common law, and administra­
tive prerogative is law as the unwritten social norm. The common
social practices have been referred to by various scholars in such 
terms as "the living law" and "the code of the West." Administra­
tors must consider and adapt their behavior in accord, as much as
possible, with the way people actually behave. Equity was forced
upon the Board because, even on the turbulent frontier, land busi­
ness was conducted by certain commonly understood ethics. Even if 
these ethics were largely mythical, the Board was given notice that, 
like anyone else, it was expected to abide by the norms.
Returning now to the Omnibus Statehood Aot of ISdS, what of 
its efficacy? Were those provisions of the act which allocated 
lands by fixed location efficacious? If the act is analyzed only 
in terms of its internal text, the answer must be that the law lacked 
efficacy. However, if the law is understood in the light of other 
laws, cohimon law principles, perogatives of administrators, and 
common practices of the day, it emerges as a fairly successful law 
in that its intent if not its letter was implemented. This conclu­
sion implies, for those with interests in geographical jurisprudence, 
that the "patient study of the incidence of individual laws" may re­
gard laws either in the absolute terms of their own text, or in terms 
relative to the entire legal environment. To the extent that geo­
graphers evaluate the spatial efficacy of law in absolute terms they 
will disclose the successes and failures of specific laws in achieving
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specific objectives. To the extent that laws are evaluated in terms 
relative to the entire body of law, successes and failures of the 
general legal system will be evaluated. Both are worthy accomplish­
ments, and in this sense, further inquiry into the complex relation 
between law and geographical phenomena will be productive.
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